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and of the' validity of the notification No. Rex. 184/52/39 issued by the Governor of Assam on July 5, 1955, in exercise of powers conferred on him by sub-a. (3) of a. 3 of the said Act appointing the Commissioner of Hills Division and, Appeals as, the appellate authority under the 1948 Act. All the appeals were accordingly heard together.

In order to correctly appreciate the question raised before us it is necessary at this stage to refer to certain relevant statutory provisions and rules. In 1910 was passed the Eastern Bengal and Assam Excise Act 1910 (E.B. aild Assam Act 1 of 1910) which is hereinafter called " the 1910 Act." It is an Act to consolidate and amend the law in force in Eastern Bengal and Assam relating to the import, export, transport, manufacture, sale and possession of intoxicant liquor and intoxicant drug,%. Sub-section (2) of s. 3 as amended and adapted, defines " Board " -as meaning the Provincial Government of Assam. Chapter II of the Act deals with establishments and control. Section 8 makes provision for the appointment of officers and the conferment, withdrawal and delegation of powers on them. Section 9 of the Act, which is of importance, was as follows:

Thus, broadly speaking, under the 1910 Act up to March 31, 1937, appeals lay under s. 9 from the Deputy Commissioner to the Excise Commissioner and from the latter to the Board, that is to say, the Provincial Government. On and from April 1, 1937, when the Government of India Act, 1935 came into force up to June 1946 when the 1946 Act was passed appeals lay from the Deputy Commissioner to the Excise Commissioner and from the latter to the one member tribunal constituted by the Governor of Assam and after the enactment of the 1946 Act, Which abolished the Governor's tribunal, appeals 1 say from the Deputy Commissioner to the Excise Commissioner and from the latter to the three member tribunal constituted under the 1946 Act.

In order to correctly interpret the 1948 Act one has to have a clear conception of the circumstances in which and the purpose for which that statute came to be enacted. It will be recalled that there was the 1910 Act dealing with the excise law in force in Eastern Bengal and Assam. That Act set out a hierarchy of appellate authority as will appear from s. 9(2) of that Act hereinbelow quoted. Then came the Government of India Act, 1935, s. 296(2) of which authorised the Governor to constitute a tribunal to exercise the appellate jurisdiction that was, immediately before the commencement of that Act, being exercised by the Provincial Government. The Governor's tribunal was to exercise such jurisdiction until the Provincial Legislature made other provision with respect thereto. By the 1946 Act the Assam Legislature made other provision- for the exercise of the final appellate powers by the tribunal constituted by the Provincial Government in exercise of the powers conferred on it by s. 3 of that Act. Jurisdiction was conferred on the Tribunal to entertain appeals and revise decisions in all revenue cases arising under the

It was finally urged that the intention of the legislature' in enacting the impugned Act was to give effect, inter alia, to the provisions of the Excise Act and that there was nothing in any portion of the impugned Act to indicate that the intention of the legislature was to effect the repeal of the provisions of s. 9 of the 1910 Act. There was no question, it was said, of any implied repeal of any portion of s. 9. This argument overlooks the fact that in Assam the "Board" meant the Provincial Government. Section 296 (1) debarred the members of the legislature, which included the ministers, from exercising any appellate authority and s. 296 (2) authorised the Governor to constitute a tribunal to exercise the appellate jurisdiction which was being exercised by the Provincial Government immediately before the commencement, of the Government of India Act, 1935. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the Board meaning the Provincial Government under a. 9 of the 1910 Act was taken away and vested first in the Governor's tribunal and there- after in the Assam Revenue Tribunal constituted under the 1946 Act, and this appellate jurisdiction was by the 1948 -Act distributed between the Assam High Court and the authority referred to in s. 3 (3) of the last mentioned Act. There is, in the circumstances, nothing in the impugned Act which is repugnant to s. 9 (2) as modified by s.296 of the Government of India Act, 1935. It was next pointed out that the Excise Commissioner and the Commissioner of a Division had almost co-ordinate powers under the scheme of s. 9, that the powers of the Commissioner of a Division were more restricted as they related only to matters specified by the Provincial Government and that there was no provision in s. 9 for any appeal to the Commissioner of a Division against the orders of the Excise Commissioner. This is true enough, but the "Board" meaning the Provincial Government bad been superseded by s. 296(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935, whereby the Assam Revenue Tribunal was constituted by the Governor as the authority to entertain appeals and revisions from the Excise Commissioner. The Governor's tribunal was replaced by the Assam Revenue Tribunal constituted under the 1946 Act, which in its turn was replaced by two authorities, namely, the Assam High Court and the Authority referred to in s. 3(3) of the 1948 Act. We see no impropriety in the Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, assuming that he is the same as the Commissioner of a Division, being appointed as the authority to entertain appeals from the Excise Commissioner. It is true that appeal from the decision of the Commissioner of a Division in matters specified by the Provincial Government lay initially to the Board and thereafter to the Governor's tribunal and then to the Assam Revenue Tribunal and finally to the tribunal referred to in s. 3 (3) of the 1948 Act. The possibility of an appeal from the decision of the Com- missioner of a Division coming up before the authority referred to in s. 3 (3) cannot in our opinion affect the validity of the Notification whereby the Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals was appointed as the authority contemplated by s. 3 (3). At the highest it may be that the Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals exercising the powers of the authority referred to under s. 3 (3) may be disqualified from entertaining appeals from his own order, but that does not affect his power to entertain appeals from the Excise Commissioner. Even that situation will not arise, for under r. 341 of the Excise Rules appeals arising out of cases decided in the excluded areas by the Commissioner of Hills Division and reseals would go to the Governor. In any event the drop not appear to be any repugnancy between the Notification and the so called principle or policy of a. 9 of the 1910 Act as regards the hearing of appeals from the decisions of the Excise Commissioner. In our opinion there is no substance in this point.