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It is, however, to be remembered that it is not a case of extension, but of exclusion, of time under Section 14. In other words, a party who makes out a case under Section 14 is entitled that the time during which the proceeding in: question was pending should be totally disregarded in computing the prescribed period of limitation. So in the present case if the aforesaid 186 days are totally excluded or disregarded in computing the period of limitation, the total delay of 215 days is reduced! to a delay of only 29 days, which is less than the1 90-day period prescribed under Article 158. This distinction between cases where only Section 5 has to be applied and those where Section 14 comes in for application has been clearly brought out by Sulaiman, J., (as he then was) in --'Ram; Rup v. Naik Ram', AIR 1926 All 252 (I). That was a case where the lower appellate Court had dismissed the subsequent appeal filed on 19-2-1925 as time-barred because the appellants had failed to account for the delay between that date and 12-2-1925 when the previous appeal was dismissed. The provisions of Section 14 dp not seem to have been applicable in that case since it appears that the previous appeal was dismissed by the District Judge on account of a defect in the Vakalatnama filed on behalf of the appellants, and not from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, as contemplated by the section. His Lordship, however, was prepared to give the appellants the benefit of tnat section and was of the opinion that the time during which the previous appeal was pending should be taken into1 account while exercising the discretion under Section 5 of the Act. He went on, however, to observe that that did not absolve the appellants from their obligation to show that there was sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier than 19-2-1925.