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1. This matter comes up before the Full Bench on the following order of reference by our learned brother P. D. Desai and R. C. Mankad, jj "The papers of !he case to be placed before the learned Chief Justice for f,onstitution of a larger Bench to consider the question whether or not there is any material and substantial distinction between the provisions of sub-section (2), S. 7 of the Gujarat Vacant Lands in Urban Areas (Prohibition of Alienation) Act, 1972 (since repealed) and Clause (b) of subscc. (1) of S. 20 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulalion) Act. 1976 and whether, therefore, a conditional decree for specific performance, subject to the condition of the plaintiff ob,aining exemption from the State Government under Clause (b) of sub-see. (1) of S. 20A the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 can or cannot be passed, following the decisions of the Division Bench in First Appeal No. 1174 of 1968 decided on April 25/26, 1974 and First Appeal No. 251, of 1967 decided on Nov. 22, 1974 in the context of S. 7, sub-section (2) of the Gujarat Vacant Lands in Urban Areas (Prohibition of Alienation) Act, 1972. The need for consideration of a larger Bench arises because of he important question of law involved and berause the decision of the Division Bench in Kanubhai v. Nayankuni Society, (1978) 19 Gui LR 920: (AIR 1978Guj 140), which takes the view that S. 20 of 1he Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 confers upon the State Government power to expemt, which is materially different from the corresponding provision of S. 7 of the Gujarat Vacant Lands in Urban Areas (Prohibition of' Alienation) Act , 1972, requires, in our opinion, reconsideration."

"Whatever decree is passed by the Court will be subject to the provisions of S. 7 11' the State Government exempted by an order in writing the present alienation, it would be open to thc plaintiffs to get a decree for specific perforrnance enforced. But it could not be said that merely because of S. 4 of the Act, the Court would be helpless and could not pass a decree for specific performance as prayed for."

The same was the view expressed by a later Division Bench of Justice M. P. Thakkar (as he then was) and P. D. Desai, J., in First Appeal No, 251 of 1967. That Bench further took note of the fact that Gujarat Act No. 12 of 1972 was itself an Act of temporary duration was originally enacted for one year and was extended from time to time and that the Act was to expire in August 1974 was a matter of relevance. In considering whether a conditional decree can be granted, the Court noticed that besides this, even Act No. 12 of 1972, as amended, provided for exemption being granted for alienating lands in exercise of powers under S. 7 of the Act. A conditional decree was granted, postponing the transfer to the date after the expiry of the Act and also enabling the appellants to apply for exemption under S. 7 and to direct, specific performance in case such exemption was obtained.

7. Just as Gujarat Act Nc. 12 of 1972 prohibited transfer, though it was an Act of a temporary nature, Act No. 33 of 1976 also prohibits "transfer" under sub-section (3) of S. 5 of the Act and renders any such transfer null and void. There is a provision for exemption under this Act too and naturally, therefore, it may be said in light of the two earlier dec isions to which we have. adverted that a conditional decree could be passed even after Act No.. 33 of 1976. Such was the contention , raised before a Division Bench of this Court in.Kanubhai Sankal 7 phand Patel (Heir of Decd. Sankalchand Manila] .Mukhi) , v. Nayankunj Co-operative Hoiasing Society. Ltd., (1978), 19.Guj LR .920: (AIR 1978 Gui 140), but the contention did not succeed. ' The learned Judges of the Division Bench evidently took the view that the provisions for exemption under Gujarat Act No. 12 of 1972 and the Ceniral Act No. 33, of 1976 were not identical and that there is material, difterence between the two sets of provisions. The Bench Then went on to hold that the agreement for sale that the defendant in that case had executed in favour of the plaintiff was not enlorceable in law. Of course, there are provisions for exemptions in both the statutes and the provisions may not be identical. That by itself may not be determinative of the issue as to whether a conditional decree could be passed. Assuming that there is material difference between the provisions in Act, No. 33of 1976 and the earlier State Act No. 12 of 1972 in regard to the provisions relating to exemption, still, the question whether a conditional decree can be passed in a suit in view of the provisions for exempt.101) in Act No. 33 of 1976 needed independent consideration. This question as such is not seen considered in the judgment in the case of Kanubbai v. Nayankuni.Society (AIR 1978 Guj 140) (supra) and does not appear to have been urged as such before the Court. Merely because the Court found that the two sets of provisions relating to exemption varied, the Court went on to hold that the agreement of sale execused in favour of the plaintiff could not be.enforced. Evidently, the Division Bench which referred this case felt that this question called for consideration by a Full Bench of this Court. Two questions have been referred to the Full Bench and they are (1)Whether or not there is any malerial and substantial distinction between the Provisions of sub-see. (2) of S. 7 of the Gujarat Vacant Lands in Urban Areas (Prohibition of AlienatiOn) Act, 1972 (since repealed) and C1, (b) of subsee, (1) of S. 20 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976?

(2) Whether, therefore, a conditional decree for specific performance, subject to the condition ol the plaintiff obtaining exemption from the State Government under Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of S. 20 of the urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 can or cannot be passed though the answer to Question No. 2 is sought to be connected to the answer question 'No. 1, we.ean, answer Question No. 2 independent of any answer to Question No. I and in that event, answer to the first question may not be called for in fact, it would be an academic exercise, though the two provisions are not identical both are for exemptions and the situation, in which the exemption is to be sought are envisaged differently in the two sets of provisions. But the real question which calls for decision in the reference is whether a conditional decree for specific performance could be pasged in view of the provision for exemption in S. 20(1)(b) of the Central Act No. 33 of 1976 and that is a question to which we propose to address ourselves.