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7. The terms of Ex. I in this case are important. It is dated 10th January 1924 and is called an agreement of consent" executed by the insolvent. The deed recites that his" cloth business is in difficulties, his creditors are worrying him and he has no means to fully discharge their debts. So he-has put in possession of the trustee his entire properties, accounts, documents relating to the business, piece goods and the house. He also promises to deliver some bundles of cloth to the trustee on the next day and recites delivery of the lock and key of the shop in token of having put the trustee in possession thereof. The trustee is to sell all the piece goods, accounts, documents, etc., but, when sold, the transferor himself is to execute a sale deed of the house. Towards the end of the document he again repeats "I have put you in possession of all the documents relating to piece goods, accounts etc." Ex. II is a document of even date by 10 of the creditors out of 40, called an agreement, consenting to the sale of this property of the Insolvent and a payment of Rs. 250 to the insolvent. It is perfectly clear to my mind that this document is really not ¦ a transfer but one constituting the so-called trustee Subbiah an agent for the sale of this property. "If I am wrong and it is a transfer, then the question is, does it infringe the provisions of S. S3 of. the Provincial Insolvency Act which begins "any transfer of property" and this transfer of property is said in Section 2(f) of the Act to include "transfer of any interest in property and the creation of any charge upon property". It is all very well to say that the Insolvency Act is self-contained, but any transfer of property must mean, I think, a transfer recognised by the general law. If this is a transfer and if it is a trust for creditors, it must conform to the requirements of the Law of»Trusts, that is to say, Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Trusts Act must be satisfied. If so, a mere declaration of trust with regard to moveable is clearly not enough as laid down in Alagappa Chettiar v. Lakshmanan Chettiar (1918) IC 253 : MLJ 267, a decision of a Bench of this Court, where the learned Judges were of opinion that there were no words of transfer to be found in the document, and no distinction either with regard to the immoveables or the moveables, and Seshagiri Aiyar, J., said that the document was one and indivisible and it was never the intention of the parties that the moveable property should be taken without the immoveable, and that if there were no words, conveying the immoveable property you cannot say there is anything in the document which would convey the moveable. There may be provisions in a document of transfer which are separable and the invalid part may then be separated from the valid part and the latter can be given effect to while the former fails, and some attempt has been made here to introduce the analogy of partition deeds of both immoveable and moveable properties. The answer to that is that here it is perfectly obvious from Ex. I that the trustee was intended to take everything. "I have put in your possession my entire properties"; and in the next sentence the house is mingled with the accounts and the documents and the piece goods. If this document therefore is to be construed as one entire document, if one part of it is bad, the whole of it is bad. That is really enough to dispose of the matter. But I think that, under the provisions of Section 53, the transfer, if it is a transfer, may also be impugned. In other words, the trustee is not a purchaser in good faith and for valuable consideration. It is true that in Official Receiver of Trichinopoly v. Somasundaram Chettiar (1916) 30 MLJ 415, Sadasiva Aiyar and Moore, JJ., held that the responsibility undertaken by a person to whom pro-perities are transferred in consideration of his taking such onerous work fell within the expression "valuable consideration". Hence the creditors in that case who undertook to be trustees of the insolvent's properties for the benefit of the rest and had been discharging the duties of trustees came within the protection afforded to trustees for valuable consideration. With great deference I am unable to agree with the decision unless it can be distinguished on the ground that we have no proof here that the transferee ever undertook any onerous work or had been discharging the duties of a trustee. It seems to me perfectly clear from the judgment in Ex parte Hillman : In re Pamfrey (1879) 10 Ch. D. 622 that a trustee of a post nuptial settlement of feaseholds for the benefit of the settlor's wife and children is not a purchaser within Section 91 of the Bankruptcy Act. Jessel, M. R., said that the word "purchaser" means a 'buyer in the ordinary commercial sense. In Hance v. Harding (1888) 20 QBD 732 this case in 10 Ch. D. was explained. In the former case, the father of the settlor had conveyed certain lease-hold properties to trustees on trust for the bnefit of the settlor's children. At the same time the settlor assigned a policy of insuranse on his life to the same trustees for a like purpose. There was no intention to delay or defeat the creditors of the settlor and the transaction was perfectly bona fide. The only point was whether the settlement was valid, and the settlor's father, the settlor having become bankrupt, was a purchaser in good faith and for valuable consideration. The Court of Appeal held that he was, because the father gave something in order to induce the son to give something. In this there was ample quid pro quo and this was the meaning to be applied to the word "purchaser". As pointed out in Ex-part e Hillman : In re Pamfrey (1879) 10 Ch. D 622, the trustees had not given something to procure something for other persons nor did they give anything at all. The case in Ex parte Hillman : In re Pamfrey (1879) 10 Ch. D 622, according to Lord Esher, decided that such purchasers as those were not purchasers within the section and that In order to constitute a purchaser within the section there must be valuable consideration. Both cases were considered in In re Pope : Ex parte Dicksee (1908) LR 2 KB 169 by the Court of Appeal. In that case there was a settlement post nuptial made by a bankrupt within two years of his bankruptcy in favour of his wife and children in consideration of the wife refraining from taking divorce proceedings against the bankrupt. The majority of the Court of Appeal held that there was valuable consideration according to the findings of fact in the Court below and that the purchaser is equivalent to a buyer, following Hance v. Harding (1888) 20 QBD 732. On the other hand, it is something more than a conveyancing term and is not satisfied by a deed such as an assignment of leaseholds, which might render the assignee a purchaser within the Statute of 27 Elizabeth, Ch. 4.

13. It would seem at first sight that both the first and the last were wanting. As to the first, there is no suggestion that the transferee is an 'encumbrancer' and if by 'purchaser' is meant a 'buyer', as that term is used in the Transfer of Property Act, it would require him to be a party to a 'sale' as defined in Section 54 of that Act, a definition which cannot be made applicable to a transfer of the nature under consideration. A » more extended significance has however been given to the term 'purchaser' in Official Receiver of Trichinopoly v. Somasundaram Chettiar (1916) 30 MLJ 415, a case deckled under Section 35 of the Provincial Insolvency Act of 1907, corresponding to the present Section 53, by Sadasiva Aiyar and Moore, JJ., That too related to a transfer of property by a person who subsequently was adjudicated, for the purpose of distributing his assets among his creditors. Sadasiva Aiyar, J., appears to assume that 'purchaser' means no more than 'transferee'. Moore, J., following an English case, Hanee v. Harding (1888) 20 QBD 732, held that 'purchaser' in the section is used not in the ordinary legal sense of one who has bought a property under a contract of sale and purchase, but means a person who has given valuable consideration. The facts of Hance v. Harding (1888) 20 QBD 732 were these. The settlor, by post nuptial settlement made in pursuance of an arrangement between himself and his father, assigned a policy of insurance upon his life to trustees on trusts for the benefit of his children, the settlor's father at the same time conveying certain leasehold property to the trustees on similar trusts. The settlor became bankrupt and the Official Receiver claimed the money payable under the policy on the ground that the policy was void under Section 91 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1869 which, like the Indian Act, exempts a transfer "in favour of a purchaser or encumbrancer in good faith and for valuable consideration". It was found that the transaction was entered into in good faith and not with any intention to defeat or defraud the settlor's creditors. Lord Esher, M. R., after exonerating the parties from any imputation of improper motive, proceeded to hold that the settlor's father was a purchaser within the meaning of the section because he had given something to get something for other person, vis., the family of his son, and he had given it to induce his son to give up his interest in the insurance policies; that is to say, he held that a 'purchaser', as used in this context, means no more than a transferee for valuable consideration. Sir James Hannen, the other learned Judge who decided this case, makes this clear by saying that the word must not be treated as a conveyancing term, but must be considered as applying to cases where there is a quid-pro-quo. Reference is made in this case to a decision of the Court of Appeal, Ex parte Hillman : In re Pamfrey (1879) 10 Ch. D 622, where a construction has Been given to the word "purchaser" as used in this connection. Jessel, M. R., who delivered the leading judgment in that case, expressed the view that it meant a 'buyer' in the ordinary commercial sense, not a 'purchaser' in the legal sense of the word. The question arose in that case whether an assignment on trust for the benefit of the settlor's wife and children was void under Section 91 of the Bankruptcy Act upon the settlor being adjudicated a bankrupt, and Lord Esher says: