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The contention of the appellant that income taxable on accrual basis in Singapore is not subject to provisions of Article 24 of the treaty is a self-serving argument. Article 24 is an anti abuse provisions in the tax treaty with emphasis on 'subject to tax1 to avoid double non-taxation.

As regards Appellant's reliance, upon the judicial precedents in the cases of AzadiBachrioAndolan, Vcnkatesh Karrier and Emirate Shipping Lines, in these cases, expression used is 'liable to tax1. These DTAAs are different from India Singapore DTAA as the expression used in the India Singapore DTAA is 'subject to tax' and the objective is clear and unambiguous, and Article 24 leaves no doubt about the underlying thrust of the prevention of double non taxation.

I.T.A Nos. 429 & 430/Rjt/2018 A.Y. 2017-18 Page No 21 ISS Shipping India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT

6. This issue is no longer res integra. In the case of Emirates Shipping Line FZE v. Asstt.DIT [2012] 349 ITR 493/211 Taxman 82/23 taxmann.com 400 (Delhi), Hon'ble Delhi High Court had an occasion to adjudicate on the question whether an order passed under section 172(4) can be treated as an assessment order for the purposes of subjecting a completed assessment to reopening under section 147 of the Act. It was in this context that Their Lordships observed held that an order passed under section 172(4) is a summary assessment of income, though the assessee has an option to seek regular assessment of income under section 143(3), and that "it is difficult to accept the contention of the petitioner that the provisions of Section 147/148 cannot be invoked in the present case or in cases in where summary assessment is made under section 172(4) of the Act". It was also noted that "Section 147 does not refer to an assessment order under Section 143(1) or (3)" which is the same position so far as Section 144C is concerned. It was thus held that what is material is that section 172(4) assesses the income, even though it is a provisional assessment of income which can be followed by a, what is termed as "regular" assessment of income under section 143(3). As the Privy Council pointed out in the case of Seth Badridas Daga v. CIT [1949] 17 ITR 209, the word assess and assessment refer primarily to the computation of income. Therefore an order computing the taxable income is essentially an assessment order. Whether it is a regular assessment or an ad hoc or summary assessment, it is an assessment nevertheless, and, therefore, any order passed under section 172(4) is also an assessment order. Once we hold so, it is not really necessary to adjudicate on learned counsel's argument that since the impugned order is passed qua an agent and qua an assessment year, rather than qua a vessel, it is de facto an assessment order under section 143(3). As we hold the impugned order to be an assessment order, it is also useful to take note of, as was taken by Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of Emirates Shipping Line FZE (supra), the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of AS Glittre v. CIT [1997] 225 ITR 739/91 Taxman 286 wherein the following observations were made by Their Lordships of Hon'ble Supreme Court: