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7. In the second place, it has been contended that the charge under Section 120B, Indian Penal Code, is bad, because it does not specify the explosive substance which, it is alleged, the accused had conspired with one another and with other persons to make and keep. The substance of the argument is that to make and keep explosive substances generally is not an offence which, it is contended, means according to Section 4, Clause (a) of the Criminal Procedure Code, "any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force," and according to the second paragraph of Section 40, Indian Penal Code, denotes, "a thing punishable under that Code or under any special or local law," as defined in sections 41 and 42. Reference has also been made to Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act, where the expression is used, "two or more persons have conspired together to commit an offence or an actionable wrong." Reliance has been placed in support of the contention of the accused on the decisions in The King v. Biers (1834) 1 A. & E. 327. The Queen v. Parker (1842) 3 Q. B. 292. O'Connell v. The Queen (1844) 11 Cl. & F. 155. The King v. Mason (1788) 2 T.R. 581, and The Queen v. Mckenzie [1892] 2 Q. B. 419 : 17 Cox 542. Stress has also been laid upon the cases of Behari v. Queen-Empress (1844) I. L. R. 11 Calc. 106, and Poresh v. Emperor (1905) I. L. R. 33 Calc. 295. We are unable to accept as well-founded the contention of the accused that where the illegal act, charged under Section 120B, is the unlawful and malicious possession of explosive substances within the meaning of Section 4 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, it is essential to specify in the charge the explosive substances which the accused have conspired to have in their possessions or under their control. It is indisputable that a person may be guilty of criminal conspiracy, even though the illegal act which he has agreed to do or cause to be done has not been done. As was observed by Cleasby B. in Reg. v. Hibbert (1875) 13 Cox 82 86, conspiracy differs from other charges in this respect, that in other charges the intention to do a criminal act is not, a crime of itself until some thing is done amounting to the doing or attempting to do some act to carry out that intention; conspiracy, on the other hand, consists simply in the agreement or confederacy to do some act, no matter whether it is done or not We very often get facts sufficient to establish the guilt of parties to a conspiracy other than acts which have been done in pursuance of it. Baron Cleasby then gives an example; "there may be n conspiracy to set fire to London at different places at once, and that conspiracy may be fully proved, though no part of London has in fact been set on fire, inasmuch as the crime of conspiracy consists only in the agreement or confederacy to do an illegal act by legal means or a legal act by illegal means": Quinn v. Leathern [1901] A. C. 495, 529. Reference may also be made to the decision in The Queen v. Most (1881) 7 Q. B. D. 244; 14 Cox, 583, where it wag ruled, that the accused who bad published an inflammatory article in a newspaper not addressed to any individual in which be recommended the murder not of any specified individual, but of crowned or uncrowned heads of States from Constantinople to Washington, was guilty of misdemeanour under Section 4 of 24 and 25 Vict. G. 1.00. If the contention of the accused in the case before us were well-founded, there could be no prosecution for a conspiracy to commit murders or dacoities till a murder or dacoity had been actually committed in pursuance of the conspiracy, though it might be conclusively proved that the conspiracy had been formed, even before a single overt act was, done. The gist of the offence is in the conspiracy or agreement, and if the offence goes no further, it may not be possible to say what murders or dacoities it is proposed to commit, or in a case such as that before us, what particular explosives the accused intend to obtain [see Russell on Crimes, 1909, Vol, I, p. 187, foot-note (g)]. The decisions to which out attention has been drawn do not assist the contention of the accused. In R. v. Biers (1834) 1 A. & E. 327, the objection to the indictment was upheld on the ground that it misrecited an Act of Parliament [2 Hawkins, P. C. Bk. II, Chapter XXV, Section 104]. The King v. Mason (1788) 2T.R. 581 : 1 Leach 487 : 2 East P. C. 837, is an authority for the proposition that an indictment for obtaining-property by a false pretence must not only expressly allege that the pretence was false, but also set out the false pretence sufficiently: Reg. v. Oates (1855) Dears, C.C. 459, R. v. Henshaw (1864) Le & Ca. 444. But it is worthy of note that although an indictment, which omits to set out the particular false pretence alleged, is held bad, where the objection is taken before verdict, if no such objection is taken and there is a verdict of guilty on such an indictment, the defect is deemed cared by verdict: Reg. v. Goldsmith (1873) 2 C. C. R. 74. Heymann v. The Queen (1873) L. R. 8 Q. B. 102. It is farther well settled that it is not necessary to set out the false pretences in an indictment for a conspiracy to obtain goods by false pretences or for receiving goods obtained by false pretences; in other words, that the indictment in all cases of conspiracy must, in the first place, charge the conspiracy, but that in stating the object of the conspiracy the same degree of certainty is not required as in an indictment for the offence conspired to be committed; The King v. Gill (1818) 2 B. & Ald. 204. The Queen v. Kenrick (1843) 5 Q. B. 49. The Queen v. Blake (1844) 6 Q. B. 126. Sydserff v. The Queen (1847) 11 Q. B. 245. The Queen v. Gompertz (1846) 9 Q. B. 824; 2 Cox 145. Aspinall v. The Queen (1876) 2 Q. B. D. 48, 60. Taylor v. The Queen [1895] 1 Q. B. 25. R. v. Parker (1842) 3 Q. B. 292, is an authority only for the proposition that where the indictment charged the accused with conspiracy to obtain by false pretences divers goods and merchandise the Prosecutor was bound to state whose the goods and merchandise were, as otherwise he might make an indefinite statement and he in wait for whatever might come out in the evidence. In G'Conntill v. The Queen (1844)11 Cl. & F. 155, 233, 235, Tindal, C.J., observed as follows: "the crime of conspiracy is complete, if two or more than two should agree to do an illegal thing, that is to effect something in itself unlawful or to effect by unlawful means something which in itself may be indifferent or even lawful. It has accordingly been always held to be the law that the gist of the offence of conspiracy is the hare engagement and association to break the law, whether any act be done in pursuance thereof by the conspirators or not," The Lord Chief Justice then proceeded to state, with reference to two of the counts to which exception had been taken, that in the opinion of the Judges those counts did not state the illegal purpose and design of the agreement entered into between the defendants, with such proper and-sufficient certainty as to lead to the necessary conclusion that it was an agreement to do an act in violation of the law. The act imputed to the defendants was "intimidation," and with reference thereto, the Lord Chief Justice observed that as the word was not a technical term, not vocabulum artis, having a necessary meaning in a bad sense, it was essential to make clear from the context what species of fear was intended or upon whom such fear was intended to operate. This view was confirmed by the House of Lords. Lord Campbell observed that the counts of the indictment which stated general conspiracies to effect changes in the government and repeal of the legislative union by intimidation and display of physical force, were bad, because they gave the defendant no information of the specific offence, which they had to answer. In The Queen v. McKenzie [1892] 2 Q. B. 519; 17 Cox 542. 1 Cox 413; 5 St. Tr. N. S. 1. where a person was prosecuted under Section 7, 38 and 39 Vict., Chap, 6, for intimidating another person with a view to compel him to abstain from doing an act which that other person had a legal right to do, it was held that the conviction was bad, as the summons did not set out the particular acts alleged to be illegal. The cases reviewed are clearly distinguishable and do not support the contention that when the illegal act Contemplated by Section 120-A, Indian Penal Code, is the possession of explosive substances under Section 4 (b) of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, it is essential to specify in the charge the particular substance which the accused have conspired to make or have in their possession or under their control. There is, further, plainly no analogy between the case before us and the class of cases of which Behari v. Queen-Empress (1884) I. L. R. 11 Calc. 106, and Poresh v. Emperor (1905) I. L. R. 33 Calc. 295, may be taken as the types, where it has been rated that the charge in a prosecution for unlawful assembly must specify the common object. We are clearly of opinion that the conspiracy charge is not open to objection on the ground that it does not specify the explosive substances for the preparation or possession whereof the alleged conspiracy was formed. We observe, however, that the charge does not follow the language of Section 4 (b) of Act VI of 1908, and uses the expression "make and keep" explosive substances, while it omits the expressions "unlawfully and maliciously," and "British India." It is a wholesome rule that the Court should adhere to the language of the Statute as I far as practicable, when a charge is drawn up; nothing is gained by a paraphrase, while opportunity is afforded to the accused to take exception to the form of the charge. We hold accordingly that there is no force in the second contention, which must accordingly be overruled.

13. The next important question of fact which requires determination is whether the prosecution has proved the existence of a conspiracy to make explosive substances or to possess them or to have them under control, with intent by means thereof to endanger life or to cause serious injury to property in British India. The question may be appropriately considered at this stage, because it is well settled that in a charge of conspiracy, general evidence of the existence of the conspiracy .may first be given before particular facts are proved to show that one or more of the defendants took part in it: R. v. Sidney (1683) 9 St. Tr. 817, 841. Queen Caroline's Case (1820), The King v. Bunt (1820) 3 B. & Ald. 566. Regina v. Frost (1539) 9 C. & P. 129, Regina v. Shellard (1840), 9 C. & P. 277. Reg. v. Desmond (1868) 11 Cox 146. Reg v. Deasy (18837) 15 Cox 334. It is now admitted that Sasanka manufactured and was in possession of the articles which, in concurrence with the Sessions Judge we have found, were intended for use in the manufacture of bombs. The question is whether Sasanka had confederates or associates in the design and its accomplishment. An answer in the affirmative is the only solution admissible in view of incontestable facts. The circumstance that bombs of this particular type have been used, in various places in British India sis widely separated from each other, as Calcutta, Lahore, Delhi, Sylhet, Mymensingh and Midnapore, points to the conclusion that more than one person is engaged in these transactions; the bombs are not the handiwork of one individual, though they may be the work of one controlling mind. This inference is confirmed by the contents of at least one revolutionary document found in the room of Sasanka, which advocates the realization of the independence of India with the aid of heroic patriots by bloodshed and assassination. This aspect of the case does not, in our opinion, stand in need of elaboration, and the only substantial question for consideration with regard to each of the accused persons, is the extent, if any, to which his complicity in the conspiracy charged and proved has been established beyond reasonable doubt. Before we deal, however, with the cases of the individual accused persons, it is necessary to decide an important question of admissibility of evidence, which turns upon the true construction of the terms of Sections 14 and 15 of the Indian Evidence Act.

14. At the trial before the Sessions Judge evidence was adduced by the prosecution to establish that some of the accused had associated with Pulin Behary Das in 1908 or 1910 and that they had been seen from time to time in the premises of the Dacca Anusilan Samity, whereof Putin Behary Das was the leader. Exception was taken on behalf of the defence, to the admissibility of this evidence, but the objection was overruled. The objection has been reiterated in this Court, and we have been invited to pronounce a decision on the point. Evidence has been adduced to prove that Pulin Behary Das and some of his associates were convicted in 1912 of offences under Section 121-A of the Indian Penal Code, but no evidence has been given as to the nature of the activities of the Samiti, of the different grades of its member's and of the extent of their participation in the ultimate aims and purposes of the society; proof in these respects, could, indeed, be hardly attempted without reproduction of the voluminous evidence adduced at the trial of the Dacca Conspiracy Case. The defence, however, have elicited in cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses that the activities of the Anusilan Samity were not known to have been in any way connected with bombs. In these circumstances, we have to decide whether evidence was admissible to prove that some of the present accused had in 1908 or 1910 associated with Pulin Behary Das and had been seen engaged in lathi play or in other innocent pursuits on the Samiti premises. In our opinion, the evidence was inadmissible and should have been excluded. The prosecution has relied upon Section 14 of the Indian Evidence Act which is in these terms: "Facts showing the existence of any state of mind-such as intention, knowledge, good faith, negligence, rashness, ill-will or good will towards any particular person or showing the existence of any state of body, or bodily feeling are relevant, when the existence of any such state of mind or body or bodily feeling-is in issue or relevant." But on behalf of the prosecution, the first explanation to the section which is absolutely fatal to their argument, has been completely overlooked. "A fact relevant as showing the existence of a relevant state of mind must show that the state of mind exists, not generally, but in reference to the particular matter in question." We invited counsel for the prosecution to explain how evidence of association with Pulin Behary Das in 1908 or presence in his Samity, could have any relevancy with reference to the particular matter in question before us, namely, the intention with which the first lour accused had assembled in the room rented by Sasanka, on the night of the 20th November 1913; but not even a plausible answer was attempted. Illustrations (i), (j), (o) and (p) also plainly indicate that the contention of the prosecution is not well founded. Nor can the prosecution derive any assistance from Section 15 of the Indian Evidence Act, which is in these terms: "Where there is a question, whether an act was accidental or intentional or done with a particular knowledge or intention, the fact that such act formed part of a series of similar occurrences, in each of which the person doing the act was concerned, is relevant." Reference, however, was made to a number of judicial decisions which throw light upon the question in controversy, and particularly to Attorney General v. Makin [1894] A. C. 57; (1893) 17 Cox 704. Blake v. Albion Life Assurance Society (1878) 4 C. P. D. 94. The Queen v. Rhodes [1898] 4 1 K. B. 389. R. v. Wyalt [1904] 1 K. B. 188. The King v. Bond [1906] 2 K. B. 389. The King v. Fisher [1910]. The King v. Ellis [1910] 2 K. B. 746. The King v. Ball [1911] A. C. 47. The King v. Rodley [1913] 3 K. B. 468. R. v. Shellaker [1914] 1 K. B. 414. R. v. Hunt (1829) 3 B. & Ald. 566 : 22 R. R. 485 : 1 St. Tr. N. S. 171. R. v. Geering (1849) 18 L. J. M. C. 215. R. v. Garner (1864) 3 F & F. 681. R. v. Cotton (1873), 12 Cox 400. Reg. v. Jones (1877), 14 Cox 3. and The Queen v. Ollis [1900] 2 Q. B. 758. No useful purpose would he served by an analysis of the special facts of each of these cases, but the principles deducible therefrom as to the law administered in England, may be briefly formulated. Facts similar to but not part of the same transaction as the main fact, are not, in general, admissible to prove either the occurrence, of the main fact or the identity of its author. But evidence of similar facts although in general inadmissible to prove the main fact or the connection of the parties therewith, is receivable, after evidence aliunde on these points has been given, to show the state of mine] of the parties with regard to such fact; in other words, evidence of similar facts may be received to prove a party's knowledge of the nature of the main fact or transaction, or his intent with respect thereto. In general, whenever it is necessary to rebut, even by anticipation the defence of accident, mistake, or other innocent condition of mind, evidence that the defendant has been concerned in a systematic course of conduct of the same specific kind as that in question may be given. To admit evidence under this head, however, the other acts tendered must be of the same specific kind as that in question and not of a different character, and the nets tendered must also have been proximate in point of time to that in question. It is plain that the principles thus formulated are of no assistance to the prosecution. The view we take is consistent with the decisions in Empress v. Vyapoory (1881) I. L. R. 6 Calc. 655, Mankura v. Queen-Empress (1899) I. L. R. 27 Calc. 139, Baharuddin v. Emperor (1913) 18 C. L. J. 578. Giridhari Lal v. Emperor (1909) 11 Cr. L. J. 428, 430, and Emperor v. Debendra Prasad (1909) I. L. R. 36 Calc. 573 : 9 C. L. J. 610. With reference to the case last mentioned, it may be noted that the Court properly declined to follow Reg. v. Holt (1860) Bell 280 : Cox. 804; 92 L. T. 208, which is no longer authority: Rex. v. Smith. We hold, accordingly, that the evidence of association with Pulin Behary Das and the Anusilan Samity are irrelevant, for the purposes of proof of the conspiracy j, charge in this case, and should not have been admitted.

16. In the solution of the first question, we may, consequently, interpret the expression "unlawfully and maliciously" in the sense in which it h familiarly used in the Criminal Law of England. The term "unlawfully," as is plainly indicated by Section 5 of Act VI of 1908, which reproduces the provisions of Section 4 of 46 and 47 Vict., Chapter 3, signifies, "not for a lawful object." The term "maliciously" signifies "intentionally and without justification or excuse or claim of right"; The Queen v. Clemens [1898] 1 Q. B. 556 : 19 Cox. 18. Miles v. Hatchings [1903] 2 K. B. 714; 20 Cox. 555. Blackburn, J. observed in Reg. v. Ward (1872) 12 Cox. 123 : 1 C. C. R. 356, 360, that a man acts maliciously when he wilfully does that which he knows will injure another in person or property. This accords with the statement of Littledale J. in McPherson v. Daniels (1829) 10 B. & C. 263. malice, in its legal sense, denotes a wrongful act, done intentionally, without just cause or excuse," which is identical with the language used by Bayley, J. in the earlier case of Broinage v. Prosser (1825) 4 B. & C 247. The dictum of Bayley, J. was quoted with approval by Brett, L. J. in Clark v. Molyneux (1877) 3 Q. B. D. 237, and by Halsbury, L. C and Lord Watson and Lord Herschell in Allen v. Flood [1898] A. C. 1; the dictum of Littledale, J. was, on the other hand, adopted by Martin B in Johnson v. Emerson (1871) L. R. 6 EX. Ch. 329, 373. Blackburn, J. had the matter again under consideration in R. v. Pembliton (1874) 2 C. C. R. 119, 122 : 72 Cux. 607, in which he observed that where any person wilfully does an act injurious to another, without lawful excuse, he does it maliciously." To the same effect is the language used by Bowen, L. J. in Mogul steamship Co., Ld. v. McGregor [1892] A. C. 25 : 23 Q. B. D. 598, "maliciously means and implies an intention to do an act which is wrongful, to the detriment, of sin other; the term wrongful, imports, in its turn, the infringement of some right." Reference may also he made, in this connection, to the definition of the term " maliciously " given in the Jaws of England, Md. Halsbury, Volume IX, page 768, Article 1499 as also to the observations of Lord Coleridge, C. J. in Reg. v. Martin (1881) 8 Q. B. D. 54 : 14 Cox 633, of Lord Lindley in South Wales Miners' Federation v. Glamorgan Coal Co., Ld. [1905] A. C. 239, 255, and of Collins M. R. in Read v. Friendly Society [1902] 2 K. B. 732. There can be no question, in the case before us, that I lie bomb, on the construction whereof Sasanka was engaged-was not intended for a lawful object and there can be no controversy also that his act was intentional.