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18. In Devas Multimedia Private Limited vs. Antrix Corporation Limited, 2017 SCC OnLine Del 7229, this Court has held that the very object of Section 42 is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and if it is the legislative intent that the first Court that is approached by either party to the Arbitration Agreement is the 'one stop' Court for all subsequent proceedings, it is important that petition under Part-I must be capable of being granted and the Court in which it is filed must be competent in law to entertain and grant the reliefs prayed for in the first petition. In other words, the Court must be a competent Court and the petition must be a valid petition. The Madras High Court in Surya Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. First Leasing Company of India Ltd., 2013 SCC OnLine Mad 3384, held that mere filing of an application before a Court by itself will not oust the jurisdiction and the bar of Section 42 cannot be extended till the party raising the plea of lack of jurisdiction is able to establish that the Court which entertains the first application at the earliest point of time, has the jurisdiction to do so.

"59. Equally incorrect is the finding in Antrix Corpn. Ltd. [Antrix Corpn. Ltd. v. Devas Multimedia (P) Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine Del 9338] that Section 42 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 would be rendered ineffective and useless. Section 42 is meant to avoid conflicts in jurisdiction of courts by placing the supervisory jurisdiction over all arbitral proceedings in connection with the arbitration in one court exclusively. This is why the section begins with a non obstante clause, and then goes on to state "...where with respect to an arbitration agreement any application under this part has been made in a court..." It is obvious that the application made under this part to a court must be a court which has jurisdiction to decide such application. The subsequent holdings of this court, that where a seat is designated in an agreement, the courts of the seat alone have jurisdiction, would require that all applications under Part I be made only in the court where the seat is located, and that court alone then has jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of the arbitral agreement. So read, Section 42 is not rendered ineffective or useless. Also, where it is found on the facts of a particular case that either no "seat" is designated by agreement, or the so-called "seat" is only a convenient "venue", then there may be several courts where a part of the cause of action arises that may have jurisdiction. Again, an application under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 may be preferred before a court in which part of the cause of action arises in a case where parties have not agreed on the "seat" of arbitration, and before such "seat" may have been determined, on the facts of a particular case, by the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 20(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1996. In both these situations, the earliest application having been made to a court in which a part of the cause of action arises would then be the exclusive court under Section 42, which would have control over the arbitral proceedings. For all these reasons, the law stated by the Bombay and Delhi High Courts in this regard is incorrect and is overruled."

44. Petitioner had placed strong reliance on the judgment of this Court in Devas Multimedia Private Limited (supra), to contend that in the said case this Court had negated the contention of the Respondent that the City Civil Court at Bangalore, where the first petition was filed under Sections 9 and 34 of the 1996 Act, should first decide on its jurisdiction, before this Court could exercise jurisdiction in the petition pending before it under Section 9 of the 1996 Act. Having given a thoughtful consideration to the plea of the Petitioner, this Court is of the view that in the wake of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Priya Hiranandani Vandrevala (supra), it is not permissible for this Court to enter into the realm of adjudication of any issue pertaining to the Section 9 petition pending before the District Court, Karnal, as it is only that Court which can take cognizance of the validity of the petition filed before it. The judgment is even otherwise completely distinguishable not only on law but also on a host of facts. In the said case, the Respondent/Antrix Corporation Limited ('Antrix') had filed a petition under Section 9 of the 1996 Act being AA No. 483/2011 on 05.12.2011 in the City Civil Court at Bangalore seeking restraint against Devas Multimedia Private Limited ('Devas') from proceeding with the ICC Arbitration contrary to the Agreement between the parties, as also getting the Agreement modified or substituted and restraint against the Arbitral Tribunal constituted under the ICC Rules from proceeding with the arbitration. During the pendency of the petition, however, ICC gave its award on 14.09.2015 in favour of Devas and on 19.11.2015 Antrix filed an application in the City Civil Court at Bangalore under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, challenging the award. Pertinently, before filing of the Section 34 application, Section 9 petition was filed in this Court by Devas on 28.09.2015 seeking directions to Antrix to secure the awarded amount by furnishing a bank guarantee/attaching bank accounts/receivables/other movable or immovable assets of Antrix.

45. One of the issues before the Court was the 'seat' and 'exclusive jurisdiction' interplay and the Court held that in the absence of a jurisdiction clause in the arbitration agreement, the mere fact that a seat is mentioned would not automatically confirm exclusivity on the seat Court as far as the jurisdiction is concerned. Having so held the Court observed that there was no exclusive jurisdiction clause between Devas and Antrix and while parties had specified the seat as New Delhi but by doing so, they did not intend to oust the jurisdiction of the Courts at Bangalore. On a finding that substantial part of cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the Bangalore Court in terms of termination of the agreement being conveyed at Bangalore, agreement signed at Bangalore, registered offices being Bangalore, the Court rejected the plea of Devas that Delhi had exclusive jurisdiction only because the seat of arbitration was Delhi, without anything more. This position stands reversed by the Supreme Court in BGS SGS SOMA JV (supra), where the Supreme Court has held and which is a binding dictum before this Court, that where seat is designated in an agreement, the Courts of the seat alone will have jurisdiction and this would require all applications under Part-I to be made only in the Court where the seat is located. Thus, only the seat Court will have jurisdiction over arbitral proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of the arbitral agreement. This judgment therefore cannot help the Petitioner. Even for the sake of arguments if the observations in the said judgment are to apply, the Court had ruled that the jurisdiction of the Bangalore Court arose on account of substantial part of the cause of action being at Bangalore since that was the place where agreements were signed, parties had their registered offices and termination of the agreement was conveyed. In the present case, all the three events have occurred at Karnal and not at Delhi and therefore even by this yardstick this Court would have no jurisdiction.