Indian Kanoon - Search engine for Indian Law

7. The matter was then fixed for final arguments. Final arguments heard. Record perused. Considered.

8. Before proceeding further, it would be apposite to delineate the relevant provisions of law:

Section 186 IPC Obstructing public servant in discharge of public functions:

"Whoever voluntarily obstructs any public servant in the discharge of his public functions, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both."

9. Qua the aforesaid provisions, Hon'ble Supreme Court of India held in Durgacharan Naik Vs. State of Orissa 1966 AIR 1775, " It is true that most of the allegations in this case upon which the charge under s. 353, Indian Penal Code is based are the same as those constituting the charge under s. 186, Indian Penal Code but it cannot be ignored that Sections 186 and 353, Indian Penal Code relate to two distinct offences and while the offence under the latter section is a cognizable offence, the one under the former section is not so. The ingredients of the two offences are also distinct. Section 186, Indian Penal Code is applicable to a case where the accused voluntarily obstructs a public servant in the discharge of his public functions but under s. 353, Indian Penal Code the ingredient of assault or use of criminal force while the public servant is doing his duty as such is necessary. The quality of the two offences is also different. Section 186 occurs in Ch. X of the Indian Penal Code dealing with Contempts of the lawful authority of public servants, while s. 353 occurs in Ch. XVI regarding the offences affecting the human body. It is well-established that s. 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not bar the trial of an accused person for a distinct offence disclosed by the same set of facts but which is not within the ambit of that section."

10. Bare perusal of the two provisions reveals that there is a great overlap in the areas they operate, in as much as both of them relate to obstruction made in the functioning go a public servant, while the latter is discharging his public duties. However, an essential difference between the two provisions is that Section 353 IPC contemplates physical assault used for such obstruction, as an essential ingredient, and is classed as an offence against human body, unlike Section 186 IPC, which is classified as an offence against authority of a public servant.

11. In the case at hand, prosecution has alleged both obstruction by accused of act of public servants discharging their duties, and assault committed for such obstruction. It has also been alleged that during the incident accused intimated the complainant as well.

12. Now, by virtue of Section 195 CrPC, cognizance of the offence under Section 186 IPC can only be taken on the basis of complaint filed by a public servant. The said complaint on the basis of which the cognizance in the present case was taken is Ex. A1. The same was admitted by the accused, and accordingly, can be considered to have been proved. The complainant was, at the relevant time, an officer whose duty it was to prevent offences and to give information of such offences. It is thus asserted by prosecution, and nowhere denied by the accused, that complainant was a "public servant" within the meaning of Section 21 IPC at the time of the incident and hence, without further ado, the same is also considered to be a fact established by the prosecution.