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Mr. Mathur, learned counsel for the accused, relied on a decision by a learned single judge of this court in D. C. Goel v. B. L. Verma [1974] 93 ITR 63. It was a case of prosecution under section 276B of the Act. Learned single judge held that no trial could be as the company or the firm being a juridical person is not liable to be prosecuted under section 276B of the Act inasmuch as it cannot be imprisoned. This decision was no doubt a decision directly on the point under consideration but cannot be accepted as good law in view of the Full Bench decision of this court in J. B. Bottling Cos case [1975] Crl Law Journal 1148. Learned single judge in D. C. Goels case [1974] 93 ITR 63, had relied on the Division Bench decision in Rameshwar Dass Chottey Lal v. Union of India, 2nd [1969] Delhi 1196, which was overruled by the Full Bench.

Learned counsel for the accused contended that the Full Bench decision had no application because the respective sections of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and the Income-tax Act were not in pari materia. The objects of the two Acts were wholly different and the principles of interpretation applicable to the two Acts were diametrically different. This contention has no substance. The question involved is not the question of interpreting any of the provision of the Income-tax Act or the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The question was a pure question of law, namely, whether a juridical person is liable to be prosecuted for an offence where the minimum punishment was imprisonment. This was the question for consideration before the Full Bench in J. B. Bothing Co.s case [1975] Crl Law Journal 1148 and this the question for determination in this case. The reasons given by the Full Bench in support of its view equally apply to prosecution for an offence under section 276B of the Act. Following the Full Bench decision, I hold that the firm, though a juridical person, was liable to be prosecuted for an offence under section 276B which provides a minimum punishment of imprisonment. In case of conviction, a sentence of fine only could be imposed on the firm.

Does the offence created under section 276b of the Act belong to the group of offence which do not call for consideration of means read ? The reply, in my view, must be in the affirmative. It is for the reason that the liability to deduct tax out of the amount of interest paid or credited, created by the section 194A of the Act, is an absolute liability. It does not depend on the wrongful intention or blameworthy condition of mind.

The Supreme Court examined this question in State of Maharashtra v. Mayer Hans George, AIR 1965 SC 722; [1965] 35 Comp Case 557. That was a case under section 8(1) read with section 23(1A) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. Section 8(1) of the said Act provided : "The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, order that, subject to such exemptions, if any, as may be contained in the notification, no Person shall, except with the general or special permission of the Reserve Bank and on payment of the fee, if any prescribed, bring or send into India any gold or silver or any currency notes or bank notes or coin whether Indian or foreign. " Contravention of this order was punishable under section 23(1A) with imprisonment for a term which may be extend up to two years or with fine or with both. On examining these provisions, the Supreme Court held : (at pages 738 and 739 of AIR; at page 584 of 35 Comp Cas) :

Section 276B of the Act also does not contain the word "knowingly". It provides punishment for contravention of the provisions contained in section 194A(1), etc. Section 194A requires the person making any payment of interest to deduct the tax at the rate in force. This liability is an absolute liability. Deficient deduction or non-deduction was a conscious act. Therefore, in a case under section 276B read with section 194A of the Act, means read was not required. The principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the above case fully apply to the present case.