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Gift is the transfer of certain existing moveable or immovable property made voluntarily and without consideration, by one person, called the donor, to another, called the donee, and accepted by or on behalf of the donee.
Such acceptance must be made during the lifetime of the donor and while he is still capable of giving.
If the donee dies before acceptance, the gift is void.
21. Thus, Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act clearly postulates that a gift must have two essential characteristics (1) that it must be made voluntarily, and (2) that it should be without consideration. This is apart from the other ingredients like acceptance, etc. Against the background of these facts and the undisputed position of law, the words, transfer for adequate consideration used in clause (b) of the proviso clearly and expressly exclude a transaction which is in the nature of a gift and which is without consideration. Love and affection, etc., may be motive for making a gift but is not a consideration in the legal sense of the term. As regards the argument of Mr Kacker that if the legislature intended to exclude gifts, clause (b) of the proviso should have expressly said so; the answer is very simple. Every legislature has its own technical or legal device to express its intendment. Some legislatures may have chosen to expressly exclude gift as Mr Kacker says but that is not the only method of conveying the legislative intent. There may be other methods or devices by which the legislative intent can be expressed, namely, by using such expressions which would expressly or by necessary intendment exclude a particular transaction. This method seems to have been adopted by the legislature in enacting clause (b) of the proviso. In fact, the legislature has made its intention clear that gift is excluded by qualifying the word consideration by the adjective adequate. Assuming that love and affection, spiritual benefit or similar other factors may amount to a consideration for the gift, the word adequate is wholly inapplicable to and inconsistent with the concept of a gift because it is impossible to measure love and affection, the sentiments or feelings of the donor by any standard yardstick or barometer. The words adequate consideration clearly postulate that consideration must be capable of being measured in terms of money value having regard to the market price of the property, the value that it may fetch if sold, the value of similar lands situated in the vicinity, so on and so forth. In the instant case, therefore, in our opinion, the legislature by using the word adequate to qualify the word consideration has completely ruled out and excluded gift from the ambit of clause (b) of the proviso. In these circumstances, therefore, the argument of Mr Kacker that by not expressly excluding gift, clause (b) of the proviso includes gift cannot be accepted particularly in the face of the clear and unambiguous language used by clause (b) of the proviso in describing the nature of the transaction as one for adequate consideration.
10. After the above Privy Council decision, there has been a gradual growth in Madras of a particular legal position in regard to alienations by way of gift. Although at the time of the judgment of the Privy Council in Suraj Bunsi Koer case the Madras courts recognised alienations by gift, as time passed the courts of law declared alienations by gift of undivided interest in coparcenary properties as void. The leading decision on the point is the case of Baba v. Timma where it has been held that a Hindu father, if unseparated, has no power, except for purposes warranted by special text, to make a gift to a stranger of ancestral estate, movable or immovable. In that case, the gift was made by the father to a stranger to the detriment of the sons right in the property gifted. In Ponnusami v. Thatha the gift was made by a brother to the children of his daughter. It was held that under the Hindu law a voluntary alienation by gift of joint family property could not be made by an undivided coparcener, unless permitted by an express text. Thus, the cumulative effect of Ponnusami case and Baba case is that a coparcener cannot make a gift of his undivided interest in the coparcenary property either in favour of a stranger or in favour of his relations.
18. The High Court has noticed most of the above decisions and also the legal position that a gift by a coparcener of his undivided interest in the coparcenary property without the consent of the other coparceners is void. The High Court has also noticed the provisions of Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. The learned Judges of the High Court have, however, placed much reliance upon its previous Bench decision in G. Suryakantam v. G. Suryanarayanamurthy. In that case, it has been held that the law is not that a gift of an undivided share is void in the sense that it is a nullity, but only in the sense that it is not binding on the other coparceners. No authority has, however, been cited in support of that proposition of law. On the contrary, there is a long series of decisions since the decision in Baba v. Thimma some of which have been referred to above, laying down uniformly that a gift by a coparcener of his undivided interest in the coparcenary property either to a stranger or to his relation without the consent of the other coparceners is void. In the circumstances, it is very difficult to accept the proposition of law laid down in G. Suryakantam v. G. Suryanarayanamurthy that a gift by a coparcener of his undivided interest in the joint family property is not void, but is only not binding on the other coparceners. When a particular state of law has been prevailing for decades in a particular area and the people of that area having adjusted themselves with that law in their daily life, it is not desirable that the court should upset such law except under compelling circumstances. It is for the legislature to consider whether it should change such law or not. It may be legitimately presumed that before the passing of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the Legislature must have taken into consideration the prohibition against making of gifts by a coparcener of his undivided interest in the coparcenary property, but the legislature has not, except permitting the coparcener to make a will in respect of his undivided interest by Section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act, altered the law against making of gift by a coparcener of his undivided interest. While considering whether the strict rule against alienation by gift should be interfered with or not, the court should also take into consideration the legislative inaction in not interfering with the rule against alienation by gift, while enacting the Hindu Succession Act. In the circumstances, we are unable to accept the proposition of law that has been laid down in G. Suryakantam case.

(ii) 1993 (4) SCC 392 (Pavitri Devi and another vs. Darbari Singh and others). Certain excerpts from it would run thus:

"11. ............. A gift made with the consent of the coparceners was held to be valid in Appan Patra Chariar v. V.S. Srinivasa Chariar.
12. In Dwarampudi Nagaratnamba v. Kunuku Ramayya this Court held that under the Madras School of Mitakshara law by which V was governed, he had no power to make gift of his undivided interest in the coparcenary property to his concubine. But a gift by one coparcerner of his undivided share to another coparcener, to the exclusion of the others is not invalid (Thamma Venkata Subbamma v. Thamma Rattamma). This Court in Mukund Singh v. Wazir Singh held that a gift of coparceners property by a member is void. In other words it is settled law that a disposition intra vivos by gift of coparcenary property except either with the consent of other coparceners or between coparceners or in exceptional circumstances is void. Since the gift being not for consideration is void in toto and operates eo instanti during the lifetime of the donor, it is not a testamentary succession under Section 30 of the Act. Section 30 of the Act, therefore, brought about change in law of testamentary disposition of a Hindu coparcener of his interest in coparcenary property governed by Mitakshara school of Hindu Law worked out in accordance with Section 55 read with Schedule III of Indian Succession Act or any other law in force to the above extent. The appellant, donee acquires no interest by devolution under the gift to represent the interest of the deceased plaintiff under Order 22 Rule 10 of CPC. Therefore, though for different reasons, we uphold the finding of the High Court in this behalf that the appellant is not a successor-in-interest by devolution by operation of Order 22 Rule 10. Accordingly we reject the claim of the appellant on that premise"