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Showing contexts for: Definite information in T. Manavedan Tirumalpad Senior Raja Of ... vs The Commissioner Of Income-Tax on 21 July, 1955Matching Fragments
6. The first two questions have, therefore, to be confined to the validity of the recourse to Section 34 for the two assessment years, 1939-40 and 1940-41. The first question assumes that it had been found by the Tribunal as a fact that the Patna decision in Province of Bihar v. Pratap Udi Nath (1941) I.T.R. 313, constituted "definite information" within the meaning of Section 34. That assumption itself appears to be wrong. In paragraph 4 of its appellate order the Tribunal recorded:
It is perhaps unnecessary to determine whether the Patna ruling in fact constituted some new information as to the state of the law or not, because the term 'discover' would include a measure merely of belief, and provided the belief is honest and such as a reasonable person would entertain there would be 'discovery' within the meaning of this section.... There is no doubt that at least the Income-Tax Officer definitely considered the Patna ruling to put an entirely new complexion on the point at issue. In these circumstances we would hold that the Income-tax Officer had definite, information which justified the action taken by him.
No doubt the Patna decision was rendered in April, 1941. When that decision was brought to the notice of the Income-tax Officer is not clear from the material placed before us. There was nothing either in the printed record or even in the files of the Income-tax Officer to indicate that, when he recorded in his order, dated 28th February, 1942, that in his view the income, that is, the income, we have referred to for purposes of convenience as forest income, did not fall within the scope of agricultural income exempt from tax that was on the basis of the Patna decision. That probably explains the findings of the Tribunal in paragraph 4 of its appellate order, that the honest belief entertained by the Income-tax Officer would be sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement of definite information prescribed by Section 34 of the Act. It is true that in the assessment order for 1942-43 the Income-tax Officer referred to the Patna decision, and that notices under Section 34 of the Act were issued only subsequent to that order of the Income-tax Officer, dated 9th March, 1943. But even on 28th April, 1942, the Income-tax Officer had come to the conclusion, possibly without the aid of the Patna decision, that the forest income of the assessee was not agricultural income and was therefore liable to be taxed. If that belief of his was strengthened by the Patna decision which came to his notice subsequently, it cannot be said either with reference to the income to be assessed in 1942-43 or with reference to the income of any of the preceding years, that the Patna decision constituted definite information within the meaning of Section 34 of the Act. The Income-tax Officer himself never treated the Patna decision as the definite information on the basis of which he decided to issue notice under Section 34 of the Act. The Tribunal referred to the honest belief on the part of the Income-tax Officer even before 28th February, 1942, that the forest income was taxable. In that case it would amount only to a change of opinion on the part of the Income-tax Officer. No doubt it was on a question of law, but nonetheless it was only a change of opinion, and that change of opinion was even before 28th February, 1942. It is well settled now that a mere change of opinion on the part of the Income-tax Officer is not definite information within the meaning of Section 34 of the Act.
7. In the course of the assessment proceedings for 1941-42 which terminated on 28th February, 1942, the Income-tax Officer came to the conclusion that the forest income of the assessee was taxable income, and that conclusion was reached apparently without any reference to the Patna decision. It is difficult to hold that the Income tax Officer waited till after 9th March, 1943, to "discover" that the forest income had escaped assessment in the assessment years 1939-40 and 1940-41. Whether or not the Patna decision was information or definite information within the meaning of Section 34, it certainly did not lead to any discovery. The Income-tax Officer knew even on 28th February, 1942, that he had refrained taxing the forest income that year, and he should certainly have realised then that in the previous years the forest income had not been taxed. The realisation that the forest income had escaped assessment therefore preceded any information or knowledge that could be traced to the Patna decision. What Section 34 requires is "definite information", and as a consequence of that definite information a "discovery" by the Income tax Officer that a portion of the assessee's income had escaped assessment. Neither condition was satisfied in this case.
8. We are not called upon to consider even with reference to 1939-40 and 1940-41 the legal consequences of the possibility of the Patna decision having come to the notice of the Income-tax Officer before 28th February, 1942. Nor need we decide the question, whether, if the Patna decision constituted definite information as a consequence of which alone the Income-tax Officer discovered that the forest income had escaped assessment in the assessment years in question, the delay in issuing notice under Section 34 till 4th May, 1943, made that information any the less definite information or the discovery any the less a consequence of that definite information. On the facts established in this case we have held that the Patna decision came to the notice of the Income tax Officer only after he had reached the conclusion on his own that the forest income was assessable to tax, and that was in the course of the assessment proceedings for 1941-42.