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(2) even if the provisions of the Act are not constituted as placing on the WTO any such statutory obligation, the requirements of natural justice demand that the assessed should have such an opportunity; and (3) the WTO can refer a matter to the Valuation Officer only if the conditions precedent therefore mentioned in s. 16A are fulfillled. These conditions require the formation of an opinion by the WTO that, for certain reasons mentioned in the section, such a reference was necessary. In the present case, despite the assessed's repeated requests, she was not supplied with the information or material on the basis of which the WTO had formed the opinion nor, have any such circumstances as would warrant the opinion of the WTO been brought out in the reply filed on behalf of the respondents. In these circumstances, the conclusion is irresistible that the WTO formed the opinion under s. 16A on no material and, therefore, the reference made to the Valuation Officer was liable to be quashed.

8. Reading this provision in the context of other provisions that provide that the Valuation Officer is one of the W.T. authorities specified under the Act (s. 12A) and that he has the same powers as the WTO of taking evidence, summoning witnesses, documents and account books, issuing commissions and so on (s. 37), the effect of s. 16A is that, once a reference is made by the WTO regarding any asset to the Valuation Officer, the latter steps into the shoes of the former for all practical purposes till he submits his report. On the submission of the report - whether accepting the assessed's valuation under sub-s. (3) or estimating it differently under sub-s. (4) - the proceedings revert to the WTO who completes the assessment, incorporating the effect of the report. But it is necessary to bear in mind that the Valuation Officer may not in most cases be called upon to express an opinion regarding all the assets of the assessed and will be asked to report on the value of only some of them. In fact, in every case, there will be assets capable of simple valuation like cash and movables and liabilities to be deducted in the computation and all these have to be considered and the net wealth and tax are determined only by the WTO. It is, therefore, clear that though the Valuation Officer may step into the shoes of the WTO for a limited purpose, the basic position that it is the WTO, who is the assessing officer, remains unaltered. It is the WTO's order that is the order of assessment leading to further consequences, on the one hand, by way of recovery of tax, etc., and, on the other, by way of proceedings in appeal, revision, etc., under the Act. In the context of these provisions, the first argument raised on behalf of the petitioner is that a reference to the Valuation Officer under s. 16A cannot be made unless, before that is done, the WTO serves on the assessed a notice under s. 16(2) and gives him an opportunity to produce such evidence as he may consider necessary to rely upon in support of the return filed by him. For the purposes of this argument, it has to be assumed that we are dealing with a case where such a reference is valid and is made in the circumstances outlined in s. 16A. The point raised is a purely technical one and, as we shall indicate later, no real prejudice has been caused to the assessed by the course adopted by the WTO. Its only object appears to be to delay the valuation proceedings and one really wishes that the department had dealt with the objection pragmatically. The WTO could have easily conceded the assessed's plea, withdrawn the reference to the Valuation Officer, given the assessed a notice under s. 16(2) and, then, if still unconvinced of the assessed's case, referred the matter to the Valuation Officer. Such a course would have met the assessed's objection and caused the department no prejudice of any kind whatsoever, except for a short delay. As it is, the stand taken by the department has delayed the process of valuation by at least five years and even though the assessments have been completed subsequently, the appeals have been kept pending and the recovery of the tax postponed till this writ petition is disposed of. However, both parties chose to take a stand on principle and the issue, therefore, needs to be resolved.

9. At first sight, it may appear that the assessed's contention is well founded. The language of s. 16(2) seems to be peremptory and to insist that a notice under s. 16(2) is a must before the completion of an assessment on figures different from those furnished by an assessed in his return. But two answers suggest themselves to our mind to repel this contention.

10. The first reply is that there is no requirement in s. 16(2) that the notice under that sub-section is to be served before the WTO makes a reference under s. 16A. Section 16(2) does not specify any point of time during the proceedings at which the notice there under should be issued or served. All that it requires is that such a notice must be served before the assessment is completed by the WTO. A "section 16(2) notice" as a condition precedent to the completion of an assessment rejecting the returned figure of net wealth; it is not expressly or even impliedly, a condition precedent to a reference under s. 16A. A reference under s. 16A cannot, therefore, be said to be vitiated because it was made before the WTO called upon the assessed under s. 16(2) to produce evidence in support of the return. We are conscious that this line of reasoning is open to one criticism which appears substantial but is not, in our opinion, really valid or forceful and it is this. It could be said that if a notice under s. 16(2) is not served and a reference is made to the Valuation Officer without such notice, the requirement of the sub-section would be rendered puerile and meaningless. No purpose would be achieved by the service of such a notice after the Valuation Officer has made his report, for, under s. 16A(6), the report of the Valuation Officer is binding on the WTO. In a situation where the WTO is statutorily bound to accept the report of the Valuation Officer and has no discretion to accept the assessed's figure even if he finds the evidence produced in response to the notice under s. 16(2) satisfactory, or even to modify the Valuation Officer's figures in the light of such evidence, the issue of a notice under s. 16(2) at this stage would be truly meaningless and any hearing in pursuance thereof a mere empty formality. So, the argument runs, the notice under s. 16(2) should precede and not follow the reference under s. 16A. We do not find much force in this criticism. It is true that s. 16(2) only embodies the principle of natural justice that if the WTO thinks that a return is not correct and complete the assessed should be called upon and given an opportunity of supporting it with evidence, before an assessment, rejecting it, is made. But can it be said that in adopting the interpretation indicated by us, natural justice is denied to the assessed ? We think not. The provisions of s. 16A make it clear that when the matter is referred to the Valuation Officer, the latter has full discretion to accept the figures as returned by the assessed. But if he does not do this he has to propose his valuation and then give sufficient opportunity to the assessed to show cause why the proposed figures should not be adopted. The assessed, therefore, gets a full opportunity of putting forward all the evidence that he desires and to persuade the Valuation Officer that his valuation deserves to be accepted. Hence, it is not correct to suggest that the interpretation of s. 16(2) indicated by us will prejudice the assessed in any manner whatsoever or really deprive him of an opportunity of producing evidence in support of the return before the officer whose judgment will really govern the issue. Moreover, s. 16(2) has no reference to any particular asset but to the assessment in general while s. 16A may be applied in respect of only some of the assets. All that s. 16(2) requires is that, before completing the assessment, the WTO should give a notice there under and it should be open to the assessed to place all the evidence he can in support of the return; only, in so far as the valuation of assets which has been referred to the Valuation Officer is concerned, there will be no duplication of the process. In this view, a notice under s. 16(2) in respect of assets other than the ones above referred to will still be necessary and meaningful. The interpretation of s. 16(2) suggested by us will not, therefore, render s. 16(2) meaningless or otiose in any way. On the other hand, to interpret the sub-section in the manner suggested on behalf of the petitioner will only introduce a double hearing on the question of valuation, once before the WTO and again before the Valuation Officer. It will be appreciated that the first of these is totally meaningless when it is the second officer who is required by the statute to adjudicate upon the valuation of the asset in question. An interpretation leading to such a redundance in procedure should be avoided.

"No doctrinaire approach is desirable but the court must be anxious to salvage the cardinal principle to the extent permissible in a given case."

19. We have, therefore, to examine the question before us in the context of the provisions which we are called upon to consider and the circumstances of this case and decide whether a hearing, before the WTO refers the matter to the Valuation Officer, is an essential element of fairplay and justice to the assessed. It seems to us that the answer to this question should be in the negative. The purpose of s. 16 is to enable a proper assessment being made by the WTO and this section provides the machinery to enable the WTO to arrive at a proper assessment. But, having regard to the nature of the problems that may arise, the Act envisages that the Valuation Officer may take the place of the WTO in so far as the process of valuation Officer may take the place of the WTO in so far as the process of valuation of certain assets is concerned. Section 16A is merely a procedural section which enables the Valuation Officer to step into the picture and into the shoes of the WTO. This transition from the WTO to the Valuation Officer does not affect the assessed's rights in any prejudicial manner. Surely, the assessed cannot claim a right to have his assets valued by the "lay" WTO rather than an "expert" Valuation Officer. The content of the assessed's rights is not in any other manner whittled down by the reference. There was some discussion before us whether the Valuation Officer was bound by the rules framed under the Act in regard to valuation (e.g., r. 1BB) in the same way the WTO was. But we express no opinion on that question as the valuation in the present case involves the consideration of no such rule and the issue is a debatable one. So far as the present case is concerned, it is fully open to the assessed to urge before the Valuation Officer every objection and plea that the she could have urged before the WTO including the plea that the valuer's report submitted by her is correct and complete and, therefore, acceptable. The assessed has had the opportunity of setting out the basis of the returned value in the return and its enclosures including the valuer's report. It is true that if the assessed knows what the WTO's reaction is to the valuer's report or his return, he may be able, in some cases at least, to correct or contradict the WTO's impressions, and the WTO may perhaps be acting wisely and prudently if he seeks, at that stage also, the assessed's clarifications on his doubts. But the question is whether the omission, failure or even refusal by the WTO to give this chance to the assessed offends one's sense of justice and fair deal. We think that, in this respect, the situation here is very much analogous to that of the taxpayer in the Wiseman's case [1970] 75 ITR 652 (HL) who, had he been confronted with the counter-statement of the Commissioners, would have been in a more advantageous and happier position to meet the prima facie case sought to be made out against him and, as in that case, so here, it seems to us that a failure on the part of the WTO to give a hearing before he formed his prima facie opinion and turned the proceedings over to the Valuation Officer does not offend the principles of natural justice or result in any unfairness, prejudice or inequity to the taxpayer.