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5. The trial Court on issue No. 3 concerning the payment of court fee held that the value of the suit for the purposes of Court fee was Rs. 800/-and the plaintiff-respondent paid only Rs. 200/-. The suit was therefore, held to be not properly valued for the purposes of court fee and the same was dismissed. The learned Additional District Judge, however, did not record any finding on this issue but proceeded to decree the suit of the plaintiff-respondent.

6. Mr. J.S.Malik, learned counsel for the defendant-appellant has argued that once the trial Court has dismissed the suit on the ground of deficiency of court fee, the failure to make up the deficiency would result into dismissal of the suit and it must necessarily be presumed that the finding with regard to non-payment of court fee has been affirmed by the court below. According to the learned counsel, it was the duty of the plaintiff-re- spondent to raise the point with regard to the Court fee and the failure to pay the deficient court fee should have resulted into dismissal of the appeal by the learned Additional District Judge. He has drawn my attention to the order dated 22.10.2003 passed by this Court enabling the plaintiff-respondent to move an appropriate application for making up deficiency in court fee in terms of the judgment of the trial Court, He has pointed out that the aforementioned order was not complied with as is evident from another order dated 3.12.2003. In support of his submission the learned counsel has placed reliance on a Full Bench judgment of this court in Krishan Kumar Grover v. Parmeshwari Devi and Ors., 1 A.I.R. 1967 Punjab 389, Municipal Committee, Dhanaula v. District Magistrate, Sangrur and Anr.2- A.I.R. 1968 Punjab & Haryana 303 and Jabar Singh v. Shadi3 A.I.R. 1975 Punjab & Haryana 373 and argued that the court fee under Section 7 of the Court Fees Act, 1870 is payable as possession has been sought. On issue No. 2, it has been submitted that the approach adopted by the lower Appellate Court suffers from various legal infirmities.According to the learned counsel under Sections 91, 92 and 93 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short 'the Act'), parol evidence could not be relied upon to explain the ambiguity in the exchange deed Ex. Pl and therefore, reliance made by the lower Appellate Court on the statement made by Mian Ram PW3 is wholly unwarranted.

7. Mr. Ashish Kapoor, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has not been able to advance any argument with regard to the deficient court fee except stating that the plaintiff-respondent has not turned up to do the needful. On the question of issue No. 3, the learned counsel has submitted that there is no absolute principle debarring the exclusion of oral evidence. According to the learned counsel, parol evidence is admissible if it is adduced to explain a latent ambiguity as per the provisions of Section 93 of the Act.

8. The question which requires determination in this case is whether there is any ambiguity in the document Ex. Pl which has witnessed the exchange of plots between the parties. As far as the dimensions and location of the plot given by the plaintiff-respondent in exchange are concerned, the same are clearly identifiable. The plaintiff-respondent has given 20 sq. yards area to the defendant-appellant of Kill No. 541/1/1. The total area of the aforementioned Killa is 7 marla. It is thus obvious that the patent characteristics of 20 sq. yards area are evident as the Killa number has been described establishing identity of the portion on the western side. The dimension have been supplied by Giani Ram. PW-3 who was an attesting witness on the exchange deed Ex. Pl by stating that 15'xl2' western portion of killa number was given to the defendant-appellant by the plaintiff-respondent and the dimensions of the said plot are from North to South 15' and East to West 12'. Statement made by Giani Ram Lambardar is evidence of a latent fact removing any ambiguity. Therefore, the said statement is not excluded as per the provisions of Section 95 of the Act which is an exception to the principles laid down in Sections 91 and 92, concerning exclusion of oral evidence to the documentary evidence. Moreover, the document is silent with regard to dimensions and there is no bar even under Section 91 and 92 to supply dimensions by oral evidence as the same would not vary or contradict the terms of the exchange deed Ex.Pl. Proviso (2) to Section 92 of the Act specifically incorporates the principles that when a document is silent, the existence of any separate oral evidence which is not inconsistent with the terms incorporated in the document, may be proved. Therefore, I do not see any difficulty in accepting the parol evidence of Giani Ram PW3 with regard to furnishing particulars and dimensions of 20 sq. yards area situated on the western portion of killa No. 541/1/1.

9. It is well-established principle that the terms of a contract once reduced to writing, any extrinsic evidence is generally inadmissible. A classical statement of the aforementioned principle has been made by P.W.Lawrence J. in the case of Jacob v. Batavia and General Plantations Trust,4 (1924)1 Ch. 287. However, it was soon realised that the rigid application of the aforementioned principles of the parol evidence rule has caused much injustice. As a result,even the English common law started recognising various exceptions to the parol evidence rule. In this regard reference may be made to the judgments of the court of appeal in the cases of Curtis v. Chemical Cleaning and Dyeing Co., 5 (1951)1 Kings Bench 805 and Treital Law of Contract, 5th Edition at pp.141-142. However, Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 incorporate the afore- mentioned principles which read as unden:-