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4. The next objection is one which arises on the view of the law which I have just stated. Mr. Krishnaswami Aiyar has urged the broad proposition that where any benefit is reserved by or accrues to a party entitled to make the appointment, the appointment is bad whether it be by compromise or by agreement. He has relied strongly on the analogy of the exercise of the power of appointment by a donee of a power and has quoted a large number of English cases. The Advocate-General, on the contrary, has invited our attention to a number of cases in which a reservation of rights was not held to vitiate the appointment. In my opinion a great deal turns on the question whether the circumstances relied on to impeach the appointment, constitute a motive for the appointment or whether the appointment was made with the intention of securing a benefit. But I do not think it necessary to examine the cases as in my opinion, although the principles applied in these cases may be of some assistance, they have not sufficient bearing to require detailed consideration. The Advocate-General has relied on the principles by which "an adoption agreement made by a Hindu widow under which she acquires a distinct benefit is not illegal and asks us to apply that rule. I think the analogy still more remote and I will not deal with the cases. I would adopt the language of the Chief Justice in 28 M.L.J. 410 at page 418 in respect of this very question of compromise by a Pandarasannadhi. In that case the position of a Pandarasannadhi as regards alienations had been compared to that of a Hindu widow and the learned Chief Justice in delivering the judgment of the Court said as follows : "We agree with the observation of Sadasiva Aiyar, J. in Muthusami Iyer v. Sreemethanithi Swamiyar (1913) 25 M.L.J. 393 that it is dangerous to press these analogies too far." In the case of an incumbent of a religious office whose rights and duties are mainly governed by usage and whose duties extend to a religious public that knows nothing of the arrangements under which he succeeds to the office, I would prefer to confine myself to the very simple test laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Ramalingham Pillai v. Vythilingham (1893) I.LR. 16 Mad. 490. This decision was on an appeal from our own Court and the question to be determined was whether the appellant was the lawful Dharmakartha or trusses of the Rameswaram temple. On the 30th January 1894 the High Court removed one Ramanatha Pandaram from his office and on the same day he appointed the appellant as his successor purporting to make the appointment on a consideration of the fact that the appellant was a man of learning and of good character. The appointment was held to be bad, because Ramanatha Pandaram had already been removed and had therefore no power to appoint. But their Lordships further observed as follows : "Another objection to the appointment of the appellant is that both Courts have found that it was not made bond fide... The Judges of the High Court, Referring to the proved facts, say; - 'With these facts before us, we cannot say that the Subordinate Judge was not warranted in finding that the appellant's appointment was made by the former Pandaram in furtherance of his own interests and that it was not a bona fide exercise of his power, if any. This finding of both Courts invalidates the whole appointment. It applies to the headship of the Mutt as well as the office of the Dharznakartha". In my opinion we have but to apply this language. The object in that case was certainly more grossly apparent than in this case, because the Pandaram had arranged for a personal allowance to himself after his dismissal, but the principle laid down by the Board seems to me to be of general application. On the conclusion that I have arrived at on the facts, viz., that the appointment was not made with the intention of benefiting the institution but really to protect his own position which was in serious danger, I am of opinion that it is one which could not be upheld if attacked in the proper manner and at the proper time.