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"The workmen whether before the Labour Court or in writ proceedings, were represented by the same union. A trade union registered under the Trade Unions Act is entitled to espouse the cause of the workmen. A definite stand was taken by the employees that they had been working under the contractors. It would, thus, in our opinion, not lie in their mouth to take a contradictory and inconsistent plea that they were also the workmen of the principle employer. To raise such a mutually destructive plea is impermissible in law. Such mutually destructive plea, in our opinion, should not be allowed to be raised even in an industrial adjudication. Common law principles of estoppel, waiver and acquiescence are applicable in an industrial adjudication."

10. The assumption that there is an absolute bar on inconsistent pleas being taken by a party, is also not sound. What is impermissible is taking of an inconsistent plea by way of amendment thereby denying the other side, the benefit of an admission contained in the earlier pleading. Mutually repugnant and contradictory pleas, destructive of each other may also not be permitted to be urged simultaneously by a plaintiff/petitioner. But when there is no inconsistency in the facts alleged, a party is not prohibited from taking alternative pleas available in law. Similarly, on the same facts, different or alternative reliefs can also be claimed. When the case of the workers is that the contract was sham and nominal, they could seek a relief that they should be declared as the direct employees of the principal employer; and if that contention failed and it is found that the contract was valid, then they can seek issue a direction to the Central Government to consider their representation for abolition of contract labour. Similarly where the workers contend that the contract between principal employer and the contractor was sham and merely a camouflage to deny them the benefits of labour laws, and if their prayer for relief under CLRA Act is rejected, they can then seek relief under the ID Act. The contention of IOC that on account of the dismissal of the first petition, the second petition for a different relief was barred either by principle of res judicata or by principle of estoppel is liable to be rejected.

11.2) The said award of the Labour Court was challenged in the High Court. A learned single Judge allowed the writ petition and directed the Union of India to treat the writ petition as a petition submitted by the Union raising an industrial dispute in terms of section 2(k) read with section 12(1) of the ID Act as also under the provisions of CLRA Act. The learned Judge further directed the central government to refer the said dispute to the Industrial Tribunal. The appeal filed against the said judgment of the learned Single Judge was dismissed by a division bench. Aggrieved thereby SAIL approached this Court. It is in that background this Court held that the workmen having taken a definite stand that they were working under the contractors, and as the dispute that was referred was one which arose under the CLRA Act, the workmen could not, by amending the claim statement filed before the Labour Court, take a contradictory and inconsistent plea that the contract between VISL and the contractor was sham and bogus and they were the direct employees of VISL. This Court observed that it was impermissible to raise such mutually destructive pleas in law, having regard to the principles of estoppel, waiver and acquiescence which were also applicable in industrial adjudication. 11.3) We have referred to the factual situation in detail to demonstrate that the said observations made in the context of the peculiar facts of that case, where the reference by the state government under the ID Act was in regard to a specific dispute that they were employees of the contractor and that after prohibiting the contract labour system under section 10 of the CLRA Act, they should be absorbed as direct employees of VISL. This court therefore held that in such a reference under ID Act, raising a contention that the contract between VISL and the contractor was bogus and sham and that they were direct employees of principal employer contradicted the case on the basis of which the reference was sought and reference was made, and the two contentions being mutually destructive, such a plea which would destroy the very reference could not be permitted to be raised. The decision in SAIL-II is therefore of no assistance to the respondents. What was held to be impermissible in SAIL-II was raising inconsistent and mutually destructive pleas in the same proceedings. It does not bar a particular relief being sought in a writ petition, and when it is found that such a relief was inappropriate, then seeking appropriate relief in a different proceedings. 11.4) The facts are completely different here. The issue in the first writ petition was with reference to section 10 of CLRA Act. The issue in the second petition was whether the dispute (relating to their claim that they were the direct employees of IOC) should be referred under section 10(1)(c) of the ID Act. The decision in SAIL II will not therefore apply. When the parties are different, issues are different, reliefs are different, the question of either res judicata, or finality of proceedings, acquiescence or estoppel will not arise. Re : Question (ii)