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4. Up to and including the assessment year 1961-62, the income of the trust was exempted from income-tax by the income-tax authorities under the provisions of section 4(3) (i) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. When the 1961 Act came into force of the first day of April, 1962, the question arose was exempt from tax under section 11(1)(a) read with section 2(15) of the Act. The Income-tax Officer, taking his stand on the definition of "charitable purpose" contained in section 2(15) of the Act, held that the income of the trust was taxable since its purpose was not charitable because it involved the carrying on of an activity for profit. Against the said order, the trustee appealed to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, who upheld the contention of the assessee on the ground that the restriction regarding the carrying on of an activity for profit applied to all the heads of charitable purpose referred to in the definition and that the word "profit" referred to in the definition clause meant "private profit". In the appeal preferred by the department to the Tribunal, the Tribunal held that the restrictive words "not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit" applied only to the last head of charitable objects; that the object of the trust would fall only under the last head; that the main object of the trust relating to supply of an organ of educated public opinion would not fall under the head "education"; that, in the context of section 2(15), "profit" could not mean private profit and it could only mean any surplus earned by an organised activity without any limitation of the extent of the distribution of such profits and that the activity of the trust could be carried on and its objects could be advanced without expecting any profit, and the income of the trust was, therefore, entitled to exemption under section 11(1)(a) of the Act.

5. Before we deal with the question referred, it is necessary to dispose of some of the grounds urged by the learned counsel for the Commissioner. Sri G. R. Ethirajalu Naidu, the learned counsel appearing for the Commissioner, urged that the first deed, dated 15th July, 1935, creating the National Literature Publication Trust was irrevocable and, therefore, the trust deed, dated 10th of April, 1947, was void and if the trust deed, dated July 15, 1935, is looked into, it will be seen that the object of the trust was not a charitable purpose but political and since this aspect of the matter has not been considered by the statutory authorities, we should call for a supplementary statement of the case from the Tribunal in exercise of our power under section 258 of the Act. Another ground he urged was that the conduct of a newspaper as such is not an object of general public utility and the question has to be decided on the facts of each case.

6. There are limitations on the powers of this court under section 258 of the Act. The High Court cannot send back the case to the Tribunal to find out fresh facts and embark on a fresh line of enquiry or to take additional evidence. Before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, the department did not contend that the objects of the trust are of a political nature. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner in paragraph 32 of his order states that it was not disputed that the objects of the trust are not of a political nature. Before the Tribunal also, the departments did not contend that the objects of the trust are of a political nature. No contention was raised that the trust deed, dated April 10, 1947, was void and that the objects of the trust have to be gathered from the earlier trust deed, dated July 15, 1935. The Income-tax Officer, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal have all proceeded on the basis that the trust in question was created by the deed, dated April 10, 1947. Since our jurisdiction is advisory and that jurisdiction is confined to the question of law referred, it is not open to us to call for further information on the question whether the trust deed, dated April 10, 1947, was void. In regard to the second ground urged by Sri Naidu, the Income-tax Officer and the appellate authority have all proceeded on the basis that the object of the trust was a charitable purpose under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, and it is solely by reason of the addition of the clause "not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit" in section 2(15) of the Act, that the income of the trust is not exempt as it has ceased to be a trust for a charitable purpose under the new definition. It was not the case of the department at any stage that the object of the trust was not supplying the Kannada speaking people with an organ of educated public opinion and that the object of the newspaper conducted by the trust was political. In that view, we cannot, in exercise of our powers under section 258 of the Act, call for a supplementary statement of the case and to embark on a fresh line of enquiry.

20. In our judgment the words "not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit" qualified the words, "advancement of any other object of general public utility" and not the first three heads of charitable purposes, viz., relief of the poor, education and medical relief. When a purpose appears to fall within one of the first three above categories, the court will assume it to be for the benefit of the community and charitable unless the contrary is shown. In the case of new or unfamiliar categories of purposes which fall under the 4th category, viz, the advancement of any other object of general public utility, the question whether of not the purpose is for the benefit of the community has to be considered by the court as to whether it is for a charitable purpose. In regard to the residuary head of charitable purpose, parliament has restricted the scope of that head by providing that in order to fall under the residuary head of "general public utility" it should not involve the carrying on of any activity for profit. A business undertaking is an activity for profit. Where a business undertaking is held under a trust and the object of the trust provides for carrying on the business undertaking, it involves the carrying on of an activity for profit and therefore ceases to be a charitable purpose under the Act. Parliament has deliberately added the restrictive words "not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit" which qualify the residuary head of charitable purpose and effect has to be given to the same. The restrictive clause does not apply to trusts created for the purpose of relief of the poor, education and medical relief. Where the trust is for the first three purposes, income derived from a business undertaking held under trust is exempt from taxation; but where a trust is for an object of general public utility and a business undertaking is held under the trust, it involves the carrying on of a commercial activity for profit and such a case ceases to be a trust for charitable purposes under the Act. When section 11 and section 2(15) of the Act are so construed, there ceases to be any conflict between sub-sections (1) (a) and (4) of section 11 of the Act. We are also unable to accede to the argument of Sri Kolah that the Word "profit" in section 2(15) has to be understood as "private profit". If that was the intention, Parliament need not have made any changes in the definition of "charitable purpose". As the old definition stood, the Judicial committee of the Privy Council had held that the words "any other object of general public utility" excludes the object of private gain, such as an undertaking for commercial profit. We have to give effect to the deliberate words used by Parliament in section 2(15).