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10. It is thus clear that the main or predominant object of training is that the person should learn his work during the period of training when such person is engaged as apprentice. The Hon'ble Division Bench has also noted that there can be instances that despite a person undergoing training, he can be an employee. The case in hand is such a case where in the guise of appointing him as a Trainee Helper, the 1 st respondent was in fact employed to do all work like regular employee of the petitioner in the so called period of training during which he was not imparted any training by the employer. The 1st respondent was in fact supplementing the work of regular staff as seen from his evidence and therefore, was an employee even during his so called training period. In the matter of Tata Engineering & Co., Locomotive Co. Ltd (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court was dealing with the matter under the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948. When that matter was being decided, the definition of the term 'employee' found in Section 2(9) of the said Act was not including any person engaged as apprentice as an employee under the said Act. However, with effect from 20.10.1989, that definition has undergone change and any person engaged as an apprentice, not being an apprentice engaged under the Apprentices Act, 1961, becomes an employee. The said judgment is explaining the term 'apprentice' as a person who is not an employee but mere trainee for a particular period and therefore, the employer is not bound to employ him after the training period is over. Thus this judgment is not relevant for the case in hand.

11. In the matter of Central Arecanut & Coca Marketing and Processing Coop Ltd (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court was dealing with the matter under the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 and had considered the definition of the term 'employee' given under Section 2(f) of the Act. On fact it was held that the trainees were apprentice under the model standing order and therefore, not employees. The definition of the term 'employee' under the said Act includes apprentice but excludes apprentice engaged under the Apprentices Act, 1961. The last judgment relied by the petitioner is in the matter of General Manager, Yellamma Cotton, Woollen & Silk Mills (supra). In that case, the learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court was pleased to hold thus in paragraph 10:

"On these rival contentions, there is ample authority to support the proposition that a trainee cannot be held to be entitled to gratuity. A trainee could, at the best be, considered as a "workman" in terms of the definition under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, but in the absance of any statutory provision under the Payment of Gratuity Act which could be pressed into service a trainee cannot be held entitled to gratuity. It is not possible to subcribe to the view in S. Arunachalam's case. On the other hand, the several decided cases under the Apprentices Act, 1961, where apprentices are held to be "trainees" and hence not entitled to wages like regular employees-would render the tenor of Section 2(e) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, entirely un-favourable to the respondents".

7. Further, while the provisions of any Act is interpreted, the Court has to read the provisions literally in its ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning as used by the legislature. The Supreme Court in the judgment reported in Jugalkishore Saraf v. M/s. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd., 1955 SC 376 has held that when any of the provisions of Statute is interpreted, the provision has to be read in its ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. I had an occasion to consider the said judgment of the Supreme Court as to the interpretation of the Statute in W.P.No. 17927 of 1994 dated 14.8.2001. After considering the said judgment, I had also taken the view that while interpreting a statute, the object of the Act also has to be kept in mind. The object of Payment of Gratuity Act is to provide a scheme for payment of gratuity to the employees engaged in factory, mine, oilfield, port, railway company or shop, or other establishments. The Act is mainly intended to the provisions for payment of gratuity. As per the definition of Section 2(e) of "the Act", all employees arc entitled to the payment of gratuity except an apprentice which would necessarily mean that the Legislature intended to exclude the applicability of the provisions of the Act only in case of apprentice. They have done it so in clear terms by excluding only an apprentice from the applicability of the provisions of the said Act. As laid down by the Supreme Court in the judgment referred to supra, if the literal meaning of apprenticeship is considered along with the meanings given in the various dictionaries, it would be clear that the petitioner who has been appointed for a definite period and who has been assigned various duties and not only to a particular designated trade cannot be called as apprentice. In support of the above conclusion, the judgment of the Orissa High Court reported in Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd. rep. by Chairman-cum-Managing Director v. Controlling Authority under Payment of Gratuity Act -cum -Assistant Labour Commissioner and others, 1994 (2) LLN 1130 may be also referred to wherein the Orissa High Court while considering the applicability of the provisions of Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, held that a trainee employee under a contract of employment is not an apprentice under the Apprentices Act unless he is undergoing apprentice training in designated trade in pursuance to a contract of apprentice. The Orissa High Court had in fact considered the definition of "apprentice" under the provisions of Apprentices Act, 1961 wherein the apprentice has been defined in Section 2(a) of the Apprentices Act, 1961 as follows: