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6. On the Question referred, one of the contentions of the learned counsel for the assessee is, that although the notice under Section 34 of the Act was couched in general language, it was based on an information received by him on a certain item only of the income, that had escaped assessment. It was argued that it was not open to the Income-tax authorities to subject the income to an assessment with respect to other items of escaped income. Mr. Sibal, for the assesses, argued that within the period of limitation as fixed in Section 34, the Income-tax Officer could issue to the assessee, as many notices, as there were items of the escaped income, and as often as, he went on receiving definite information regarding any escaped income. But he stressed that, reassessment of the escaped income, must be confined to those items only which the Income-tax Officer had discovered, in consequence of definite information which he had received.

9. In general, the term "information" means the act or process of informing, communication, or reception, of knowledge. It may be knowledge acquired directly as by observation or study, or derived inferentially, or from communication from others. The first condition, before machinery under Section 34 can be put into operation, is definite knowledge regarding escapement, coming into possession of the Income-tax Officer at the time when intimation is sent to the assessee. What is "definite information", must in the nature of things, differ with the circumstances of each case. A precise and all embracing definition so as to cover all situations and exigencies cannot be attempted. The object of the Legislature in insisting upon "definite information" being in the possession of Income-tax Officer, before an action was taken under Section 34, was to protect the assesses from harassment, which in all likelihood would result, if action was taken on the basis of mere suspicion, gossip or rumour.

According to Chief Justice Chagla in Haji Ahmad Haji Esak and Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City, 1951-19 ITR 331, at p. 341 : (AIR 3951 Bom 299 at p. 303) (B):

"Information must be a knowledge or mental awareness of the facts which are revealed by the materials."

12. In In re Badar Shoe Stores, 1946-14 ITR 431 (All) (C), it was observed--

"What is 'definite information' must necessarily vary with the circumstances of the case. We think that the words 'definite information' ere placed in Section 34 of the Income-Tax Act to protect the subject against an assault by the Income-tax Officer based upon mere suspicion. The 'definite information' which is something more than mere gossip or rumour, must lead to the discovery or belief as we have described it above. But we are not prepared to engage ourselves to the view that, provided the information is definite and does lead to that belief, it need not necessarily be information of fact, though in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred it would inevitably be information of fact. Still less need it be information of actual escape from assessment or under-assessment. It may well be information of circumstances not themselves amounting to under-assessment or escape from assessment, but leading to the belief of under assessment or escape from assessment. In short it may be circumstantial evidence."

19. From the above discussion, I am persuaded to conclude, that the language of Section 34 of the Act has not in any manner crippled or fettered the powers of the Income-tax Officer regarding the receiving of "definite information" in consequence of which any escapement of income, profits or gains has been discovered. The words "definite information" and "discovers", in this context, do not beat any rigid, or narrow etymological meaning, but are to be interpreted in their broad and generally accepted sense. The only restriction in using the words "definite information" which the framers of Section 34 had in view, as it emerged after the passing of the amending Act of 1939, was to prevent the Income-tax Officers from making assessments blindly and officiously or on the basis of rumours, gossips or vague apprehensions. The Income-tax Officer was not called upon to discover the exact quality or quantity of the omission; it was sufficient if he found, that there had been some omission, and it would be immaterial if it was greater or smaller, than he had supposed it to be. It would be no less a discovery, when the actual omission was of some different kind to the supposed omission. In the words of Vaisey J., Special Commissioner, -- who discharges duties similar to those of Income-tax Officer under Section 34 of the Act--on discovering an omission, could very well say: