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9. The Constitution Bench decision in Kalawati (supra) may not be of much assistance in this case since the facts are completely different. The co-accused was convicted under Section 302 of the IPC for the main offence, and in the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case, this Court deemed it fit to convict Kalawati only under Section 201 of the IPC.

10. Relying on Palvinder Kaur (supra), this Court in Suleman Rehiman (supra), made the following observation:

“6. The conviction of Appellant 2 under Section 201 IPC depends on the sustainability of the conviction of Appellant 1 under Section 304-A IPC. If Appellant 1 was rightly convicted under that provision, the conviction of Appellant 2 under Section 201 IPC on the facts found cannot be challenged. But on the other hand, if the conviction of Appellant 1 under Section 304-A IPC cannot be sustained, then, the second appellant’s conviction under Section 201 IPC will have to be set aside, because to establish the charge under Section 201, the prosecution must first prove that an offence had been committed not merely a suspicion that it might have been committed — and that the accused knowing or having reason to believe that such an offence had been committed, and with the intent to screen the offender from legal punishment, had caused the evidence thereof to disappear. The proof of the commission of an offence is an essential requisite for bringing home the offence under Section 201 IPC — see the decision of this Court in Palvinder Kaur v. State of Punjab.” It is necessary to note that the reason for acquittal under Section 201 in the above case was that there was no evidence to show that the rash and negligent act of appellant No.1 caused the death of the deceased. Hence, the court acquitted appellant No. 2 under Section 201. The observation at paragraph 6 has to be viewed and analysed in that background.
(III) person charged with the offence under Section 201 IPC should have caused disappearance of evidence or should have given false information regarding the main offence; and (IV) the act should have been done with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment.”
13. In Sukhram v. State of Maharashtra6, this Court discussed Kalawati (supra), Palvinder Kaur (supra), Suleman Rehiman (supra) and V.L. Tresa (supra) among others. The essential ingredients for conviction under Section 201 of the IPC have been discussed at paragraph 18:
“18. The first paragraph of the section contains the postulates for constituting the offence while the remaining three paragraphs prescribe three different tiers of punishments depending upon the degree of offence in each situation. To (2001) 3 SCC 549 (2007) 7 SCC 502 bring home an offence under Section 201 IPC, the ingredients to be established are: (i) committal of an offence; (ii) person charged with the offence under Section 201 must have the knowledge or reason to believe that an offence has been committed; (iii) person charged with the said offence should have caused disappearance of evidence; and (iv) the act should have been done with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment or with that intention he should have given information respecting the offence, which he knew or believed to be false. It is plain that the intent to screen the offender committing an offence must be the primary and sole aim of the accused. It hardly needs any emphasis that in order to bring home an offence under Section 201 IPC, a mere suspicion is not sufficient. There must be on record cogent evidence to prove that the accused knew or had information sufficient to lead him to believe that the offence had been committed and that the accused has caused the evidence to disappear in order to screen the offender, known or unknown.” In Sou Vijaya @ Baby v. State of Maharashtra7, though this Court held that the decision in V.L. Tresa (supra) was of no assistance to the State in the particular facts, it re-iterated that “there is no quarrel with the legal principle that notwithstanding acquittal with reference to the offence under Section 302 IPC, conviction under Section 201 is permissible, in a given case.” (2003) 8 SCC 296

18. The High Court, in appeal, however, took the view that the appellant was not liable to be convicted under Section 498A of the IPC. However, his conviction under Section 201 of the IPC was liable to be maintained. To quote:

“5... We have re-appreciated and re-evaluated the evidence on the touchstone of the latest decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court. Taking into consideration the fact that the complaint was lodged almost after a period of four months of the incident in question, the fact remains is that no post mortem was performed of the deceased. Even if the case of defence is accepted, it was a premature and unnatural death and therefore the mandatory requirements under the law, at least to inform the police of the death and to get the post mortem of the deceased done, were not fulfilled. Admittedly, nothing has come on record to show that the post mortem was carried out and/or the police complaint was immediately filed. Considering the said aspect, we have all reasons to believe that the offence is made out under section 201 of the IPC. However, so far as offence punishable under Section 498A of the IPC is concerned, we believe the contention of Mr. Anandjiwala, learned senior advocate for the accused No.1, that almost after a period of four months, the complaint was lodged and there is nothing on record to substantiate the case of the prosecution qua cruelty being perpetrated to the deceased for want of dowry and on the contrary, the accused No.1 had helped the father of the deceased and gave Rs.1 lakh. Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the learned trial judge has rightly convicted the accused No.1 for the offence punishable under Section 201 of the IPC, however, has committed an error in holding conviction of the accused No.1 for the offence punishable under Section 498A of the IPC and same is not sustainable.”