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4. In the year 2003, the State Government issued the Gazette Notification dated 3-5-2003 notifying the Assam General Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 2003 amending Section 8 of the Assam General Sales Tax Act, 1993 by inserting Explanation 3(ii) after Explanation 3(i) to Section 8(1) of the Assam General Sales Tax Act, 1993 declaring that in the case of country spirit mentioned in serial number 27A of Schedule-II, the Officer-in-Charge of the country spirit excise warehouse who sells or supplies such items to a licensed retail vendor shall be deemed to be the first point seller who shall be liable to pay tax on the sale price of the items as defined in clause (34) of Section 2 including excise duty, vend fee, bottling charges and other duty or fee by whatever name called, payable thereon. The retail vendor while depositing cost price and excise duty shall also deposit the tax payable under this Act into the Government account in the manner prescribed by a separate challan and hand over one copy of the challan to the Officer-in-Charge of such warehouse. According to the petitioner, the aforesaid Notification has clarified the settled position of law that a transport contractor like him is not a first point seller of country spirit and is not, therefore, liable to pay sales tax against the supply of country liquor made by him and that it is rather the Officer-in-Charge of the Country Spirit Excise Warehouse, who is the first point seller of the spirit and is thus liable to pay the sales tax on such sale price. However, contrary to this settled law, contends the petitioner, the respondent No. 3 issued notice to him to show cause as to why the submitted returns should not be rejected and assessment should not be completed under Section 17(5) including taking action as per the provisions of the Assam General Sales Tax Act, 1993. The application of the petitioner for extending the time to submit his show cause reply was not granted by the respondent No. 3, who, instead, proceeded to issue the impugned assessment order on the basis of the best judgment assessment. It is contended by the petitioner that the impugned assessment order is unconstitutional, illegal arbitrary, unfair and unreasonable and is liable to be quashed. It is also the contention of the petitioner that Section 4 of the Assam General Sales Tax Act, 1993, in so far as it seeks to bar a person from calling into question the jurisdiction of the revenue authorities before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, has encroached upon the field of judicial review, which is the basic structure of the Constitution and is, therefore, ultra vires the Constitution and is liable to be struck down. The petitioner also alleges that there are a number of excise warehouses in the State of Assam, which were also leased out on similar terms and conditions to other contractors for the same period, but they were not assessed for payment of sales tax like him, and he has been singled out for hostile discrimination thereby denying him equality before the law or of equal protection of law: his fundamental right to equality guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution has thus been infringed. This is how these writ petitions have been filed by the petitioner.

19. It is the next contention of the learned senior counsel that Section 4 of the Assam General Sales Act, 1993 barring any person from calling into question the jurisdiction of any authority after receipt of any notice under this Act from such authority, is violative of the basic structure of the Constitution as it takes away the power of judicial review vested in the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. His argument runs along the following lines. Under our constitutional scheme, every High Court has, by virtue of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the power to issue prerogative writs or orders to all authorities and instrumentalities of the State which function within its territorial jurisdiction. In such situation, no authority or Tribunal located within the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court can disregard the law declared by it. The impugned provision, in so far as it seeks to divest the High Court of its power of superintendence over all revenue authorities, situated within its territorial jurisdiction, violate one of the basic features of the Constitution. He relies on the decision of the Apex Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 to fortify his submissions. Section 4 of the Act reads thus:

20. Reading the two provisions in juxtaposition, it becomes, prima facie, clear that while Section 4 insulates any notice issued by any of the authorities envisaged by Section 3 after 90 days thereof from any challenge by a person before any court including a High Court or the Supreme Court, Section 39 only ousts the jurisdiction of a court to examine the legality of the assessment made and order passed under the Act or the Rules made thereunder and grants immunity to the State Government and its officers for anything done or intended to be done in good faith under the Act. As far as the first limb of Section 39 of the Act is concerned, the law is now well-settled and was reiterated by the Apex Court very recently, while construing Section 28 of Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, which is virtually couched in similar language, that though the section bars the jurisdiction of the civil courts from entertaining suits relating to matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Custodian, that cannot bar the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution (See Shakara Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. M. Prabharka, (2011) 5 SCC 607). As noticed above, Section 4 appears to have even barred a writ court from entertaining any complaint against the exercise of jurisdiction by the revenue authorities appointed under Section 3 after the expiry of 90 days from the date of the receipt by him of any notice from such authorities. In L.Chandra Kumar (supra), it has been re-affirmed by the Apex Court that the power vested in the High Courts to exercise judicial superintendence over the decisions of all courts and tribunals within their respective jurisdictions is also a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. In our opinion, revenue authorities appointed under Section 3 of the Act are also tribunals or, at any rate, have the trappings of a tribunal as they are exercising quasi-judicial functions. Ouster of jurisdiction by statutory provision may either be express or implied. When the exclusion of jurisdiction is also not expressly stated in the statute, it can be implied. In instant case, though the language of Section 4 does not say so in many words that even the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue a writ of certiorari is barred, yet it is to be necessarily implied. When the Legislature intends to oust the jurisdiction of only civil courts and not the High Courts or the Supreme Court, it has been made apparent by them as indicated by Section 39 of the Act. We, therefore, hold that Section 4 violates the basic feature of the Constitution, and cannot be sustained in law. But then, this Court cannot be too trigger happy in striking down legislations as tersely observed by his Lordship, V.R. Krishna Iyer, J (Retd.) in Bhim Singhji v. Union of, (1981) 1 SCC 166:

Section 4 of the Act, in so far as it ousts the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to question the legality of the exercise of jurisdiction by the revenue authorities under Section 3, is violative of the basic structure of the Constitution and is, therefore, declared as unconstitutional.

(b) However, instead of striking down Section 4 lock stock and barrel, the words "except in the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution" shall be read into between the words "call in question" and "the jurisdiction of any authority under Section 3" of Section 4 of the Act.