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12. In Abu Isa Thakur v. Dinabandhu Banik. AIR 1947 Cal 426, Das, J., held that Section 4 should be liberally construed and after relying on the definition of the words "to sue" in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, the learned Judge observed that the object of Section 4 is to prevent intrusion of strangers into the dwelling house of an undivided family and that this object would be frustrated if a stranger purchaser forces himself into the dwelling house of an undivided family and drives the other co-owner to file a suit as plaintiff and then figuring as a defendant is allowed to defeat the claim for pre-emption under Section 4 on a narrow and literal interpretation of the section."

"So far as this Court is concerned, the above statutory provision has almost always been liberally construed and widely Interpreted in favour of the members of the family and strictly against the stranger purchaser. ..................
It is also well settled in this Court that the above statutory provision (Section 4 of the Partition Act) applies not only in the case of a suit by the stranger purchaser as plaintiff, but, also, to a case where the said stranger purchaser is sued as a defendant for partition."

19. In Banchhanidhi v. Balaram, AIR 1951 Orissa 180 a Single Judge of that Court held that "the language of Section 4 does not preclude a defendant from availing himself of the provisions of that section if the stranger transferee happens to be arrayed as a party defendant and should not be strictly limited only to those cases where the transferee figures as the plaintiff."

20. In a subsequent decision Sundari Bewa v. Ranka Behara, AIR 1968 Orissa 134 a discordant note was struck by another Judge sitting singly and it was held that only in a case where a stranger purchaser is suing for partition of his share as against the joint family that the need for exercising the right of pre-emption under Section 4 of the Act arises and hence in a case where the stranger-purchaser even claims partition of his share as a defendant in the suit for general partition. Section 4 of the Act is not attracted. The learned Judge observed that the stricter view is more reasonable and is in accord with the plain and literal meaning of the section. Both these cases came up for consideration before a Division Bench of that Court in Alekha v. Jagabandhu, AIR 1971 Orissa 127 and AIR 1968 Orissa 134 (supra) was overruled. The learned Judges also differed from the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in AIR 1957 All 356 (FB) and held that to attract the operation of Section 4 of the Act, it is not necessary that the stranger-defendant should have also claimed a partition of his own share in that dwelling house, Thus this is the extreme view in favour of a member of an undivided family.

Where the transferee of a share of a dwelling-house belonging to an undivided family is not a member of the family, nothing in this section shall be deemed to entitle him to joint possession or other common or part enjoyment of the house. Second Part of this section excludes the right of a stranger-purchaser of a share in a dwelling house to joint possession. As has been observed in Khirode Chandra v. Saroda Prosad, (1910) 7 Ind Cas 436 (Cal) Section 4 of the Act is a logical sequel or corollary to Section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act. The latter Act denies the right of joint possession to a stranger-purchaser who is left only with the right to sue for partition. It was felt that the partition of a dwelling house specially of small dimensions would divide it into unsuitable parcels and may in some cases introduce undesirable neighbours. The Partition Act, 1893 was therefore enacted so as to come to the rescue of the members of an undivided family, and gave them the right to purchase shares obtained by strangers to the family. There is no denying the fact that the object underlying Section 4 of the Act is to prevent the transferee of a share in the family house, who is an outsider from forcing his way into the dwelling house in which the other members of the transferor's family have a right to live. Consequently an interpretation which would advance the object of the Act must be put if that can be done without sacrificing or disregarding the terms of the section.