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13. Mr. Panchal, the learned counsel for the Petitioners made following submissions:

(i) The service conditions of the petitioner Smt. Suvarna Dadhakar were governed by the Maharashtra Civil Service Rules (for short the "MCS Rules") as per G. R. dated 10.5.2010.

However, the departmental action was taken against her under the Standard Code, which was repealed by the aforesaid G.R. WP. 7884, 7885-2016

(i) It is submitted that the grounds based of the repeal of the Standard Code and the Inquiry Officer being appointed, simultaneously with the issuance of the charge-sheet, were neither raised in the reply to the show-cause notice nor before the Tribunal. It is submitted that the ground so raised before this Court for the first time is by way of an afterthought and is not permissible.

(ii) It is submitted that the petitioner Smt. Dadhadkar had admitted in her reply that she was governed by the Standard Code. It is submitted that the Inquiry Officer / management or the Tribunal had no opportunity to decide any such question as to the applicability of the Standard Code, and therefore, the petitioner Smt. Dadhadkar cannot be allowed to raise this ground before this Court for the first time. It is submitted that the charge-sheet issued to the petitioner Smt. Dadhakar was not issued under the provisions of the Standard Code Rules, 1984. It is submitted that the same was issued under the provisions of the MCS Rules. It is pointed out that the petitioners were represented by an advocate in the departmental inquiry and they claim to be aware of the repeal of the Code, and therefore, there is no reason why any such ground was not raised earlier.

16. The ground that the action is non est as it is taken under the Standard Code, which is repealed.

. This ground is only pertaining to the case of Mrs. Suvarna Dhadkar who was a non teaching employee in the college. It indeed appears that by GR dated 20.5.2010 the government had repealed the standard code of the year 1984 and had directed that, till the application of common statutes, the provisions of the MCS Rules shall be applicable to the non teaching staff. It may be mentioned that the standard code was applicable since 1.5.1985. At the outset it appears that this ground was neither raised before the disciplinary authority/inquiry officer nor before the tribunal. Quite to the contrary the perusal of para 10 of the impugned judgment would show that it was the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner Mrs. Dhadkar that the provisions of Rule 46 of the Standard Code were not followed which has resulted into conduction of a biased inquiry. Normally this court would be slow in allowing a party to raise a ground, which was not raised before the authorities/tribunal below. For this alone the said ground in my considered view cannot be accepted. However in order to give a quitus to the matter and as the parties have addressed their rival contentions on the point I find it appropriate to consider the same. According to the respondent the charge sheet was not issued under the standard code and the same was issued under the MCS Rules. We are WP. 7884, 7885-2016 presently concerned with the contention on behalf of the petitioner that the charge-sheet was issued under the Standard Code which was repealed. In this regard it is necessary to note that the charge sheet does not make any reference to the standard code. A perusal of the memorandum dated 9.9.2011 shows that the action was proposed to be taken under the "provisions as applicable". As noticed earlier it was the contention on behalf of the petitioner Mrs Dhadkar that the provisions of Rule 46 of the standard code were not followed by the disciplinary authority which has been considered by the tribunal. Even in the reply dated 25.10.2011 sent by Mrs. Dhadkar to the chairman of the trust it was claimed that the charges are not levelled as per the standard code. Thus now the petitioner cannot be allowed to turn around and claim that the action was not taken as per the MCS Rules. It is also the contention of the respondent that even otherwise the procedure for issuance of the charge sheet and conduction of the inquiry is similar under the standard code and the MCS Rules. Although an attempt was made on behalf of the petitioner that there is a distinction in as much as the MCS rules only contemplate such misconduct at designated places and not out side, it is not possible to accept the same because assuming it to be so for the sake of arguments, the nature of the misconduct as alleged in this case is on the college premises also. For the aforesaid reason the ground based on WP. 7884, 7885-2016 the repeal of the standard code to my mind cannot be accepted.

27. The principles apart, all the three cases turned on their own facts. It is evident that whether a charge is specific or vague, whether it is proved by sufficient evidence and the issue of proportionality of the punishment, would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.

28. No preliminary investigation as mandated by Statute 444 of the Mumbai university was carried out vitiating the action. . This ground only pertains to the case of Petitioner Dr. Medhe. It appears that a similar ground was also raised in respect of petitioner Mrs. Dhadkar, on the ground of non compliance of Rule 46 of the standard code. However the later ground appears to have been given up, inasmuch as, it is now contended that the standard Code is repealed. Be that as it may, I have gone through Statute No 444 which speaks of preliminary investigation before initiating an action. In this case the management has examined Mrs. Suvarna Deo Vice Principal who has stated about conduction of the preliminary investigation. She had accordingly written to the Chairman on 30.6.2011. The only contention on behalf of the petitioner, is that no record of such investigation has been maintained. At least, on the basis of Statute no 444, it is not shown on behalf of the petitioner that the said statute WP. 7884, 7885-2016 contemplates or envisages a formal or a full-fledged investigation. Statute 444 does not provide in express terms about record of any such investigation being maintained. The learned counsel for the respondent appears to be right that in a given case such investigation could be discreet depending upon the nature of the allegations and the charges levelled. That apart in my considered view once the charges are proved on the basis of the evidence led in the inquiry the issue about absence of the record of any such preliminary investigation would pale into insignificance.