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14. It is not disputed that a trust for charity generally or for education generally is not void for indefiniteness or uncertainty and that it is a perfectly good trust. Although charity is a term and education is an expression which applies or may apply to a variety of objects about which there may be a legitimate difference of opinion, charity, e.g., may be relief of poor, it may be relief of sick or it may be advancement of learning, etc. Education may be of a "maktab type" of a "pathshala type" or of a "gurukul type" or of a "public school type." It may be primary> secondary, High School or of University variety; it may be philosophical, scientific, literary and so on. Yet, it is not disputed that a trust in favour of education simpliciter will not be void for vagueness or indefiniteness simply because the term education applies to a variety of objects about which there may be a difference of opinion and different persons may have different ideas about it. The mere fact that in founding a charity the settlor has described it in general terms so that the description given by him applies to a number of objects does not render the trust void for indefiniteness or uncertainty. Indefiniteness or uncertainty in relation to charitable trusts arises where charitable trusts are mixed up with non-charitable trusts or where charitable trusts and non-charitable trusts are created by alternative clauses disjunctively used. But where trust is exclusively for charity or exclusively for a charitable object, and that charitable object has great many facts or includes a variety of objects within its denomination each of which in its terms is charitable, the diversity and multiplicity of objects to which charity may be applied and difference of opinion that may exist about including objects within its denomination will not render charity vague or indefinite. The essential thing to make a charity vague, indefinite or uncertain is that it should be mixed up with non charitable objects or it should include objects both of charitable and non-charitable nature alternatively or disjunctively or in such close alliance that it should lead to the application of trust funds to non-charitable purposes.

16. Questions of indefiniteness do arise when trusts are for alternative objects, one or the other of which may not be charitable and where it is open to a trustee to devote the entire funds on objects non-charitable without being called upon to answer a charge of breach of trust, e.g., where trust is for charitable or philanthropic or patriotic objects, where authority is given alternatively to devote funds for patriotic or philanthropic objects, some of which may not be charitable at all. The main problem in such cases is whether the alternative clauses are to be read disjunctively or conjunctively : see In re Macduff; Macduff v. Macduff (1896) 2 Ch. 451, Blair v. Duncan (1902) 1902 A.C. 37, Houston v. Burns (1918) 1918 A.C. 337, In re Tetley (1923) 1 Ch. 258 and In re Tetley; Attorney General v. National Provincial and Union Bank of England (1924) 1924 A.C. 262. Questions of indefiniteness also do arise where trust is for a vague or indefinite purpose like "dhararn", "philanthropy", "patriotism," expressions which include objects which may or may not be charitable. The leading case in India on this topic is the judgment of the Judicial Committee in 23 Runchordas Vandravandas v. Parvatibai ('99) 23 Bom. 725. But even in cases where a trust for charity is allied with non-charitable objects and it is possible to read clause conjunctively or charity overshadows other objects of trust and controls them the trusts are enforced : see In re Smith; Public Trustee v. Smith (1932) 1 Ch. 153 And it is difficult to see how a purely legal question of indefiniteness or uncertainty can arise with reference to a trust for a single object and single object only which is wholly charitable. The only question which may arise in such a case is whether the object has been sufficiently specified or not, which will be a question of fact depending upon the construction of a particular document with the aid of surrounding circumstances.

18. The gravamen of Sir Tej's charge is that a trust for national education is, in other words, a trust for teaching of nationalism or a trust for teaching of patriotism or politics and as such it is both indefinite and non-charitable. According to him it is allied on one side with those class of cases of which Bonar Law Memorial Trust v. Inland Revenue Commissioners (1938) 17 Tax Cas 508, a trust for political propaganda, is a leading example and on the other side it is allied with that class of cases of which In re Hummeltenberg (1923) 1 Ch. 237, a trust for teaching spiritualism and training of mediums, is another leading example. He also relies upon those English cases in which while dealing with alternative clauses, a trust for 'patriotic objects' was not regarded as charitable or definite, see In re Tetley (1923) 1 Ch. 258 and In re Tetley; Attorney General v. National Provincial and Union Bank of England (1924) 1924 A.C. 262 and upon the recent Indian case in Subhas Chandra Bose v. Gordhandas I. Patel ('40) 27 A.I.R. 1940 Bom. 76 in which a trust for "political uplift of India" was regarded indefinite and non-charitable.

20. The cases which lay down that the trust for "patriotic objects" are not charitable have no application because "patriotic objects" in plural may include objects some of which may be charitable and some non-charitable. Similarly, the cases which lay down that a trust for "political purposes" or a trust for "political uplift of India" is void for indefiniteness do not apply because political purposes or political uplift may include works which are non-charitable. The trust ex hypothesi is a trust for a single definite object namely to teach nationalism or patriotism. In this country where so many castes and communities and sects and divisions exist, and where there are so many conflicts and animosities, religious, communal or provincial, a trust for promoting unity and a sense of nationalism may well be regarded as a trust for an object of public utility and benefit and consequently of a charitable nature, and if it were necessary to do so, we should be prepared to hold that it is both charitable and definite. A trust for promoting nationalism and patriotism cannot be regarded per se as a trust for political propaganda or for political purpose or a trust for purposes so shadowy, or indefinite as teaching of spiritualism or training of mediums. But the point really does not arise because the trust created by the settlor in our judgment was for education and for founding a school in which education was to be imparted with certain special characteristics. These special characteristics were that the education was to be national according to the standard laid down by the Congress and for the propagation of which educational schools existed in the country and its special features in the conception of the settlor were that it was to be free from official restrictions, free from official management. Its medium was Indian vernaculars and the education was to lay special stress on giving instructions on spinning of yarns, weaving and also other kind of industrial and manual subjects and on creating in the students national feelings, love of motherland and purity of character.