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We must naturally, therefore, proceed to evamine whether, before the enactment of the Contempt of Courts Act. 1971, truth was held to the a defence to a charge of contempt.

28. It must be stated that there is not a single binding judgment in which such a defence was raised and was upheld. Mr. Jethmalani, however, has sought to rely upon certain observations to be found in some of the judgments to which naturally we must now turn.

29. Bathina Ramkrishna Reddy v. State of Madras, , has discussed the relative scope of the offence of defamation and of the Contempt of Court because that was the question prominently raised on the facts of that case. In this connection, it may be noted that the Supreme Court said that when the act of defaming a Judge is calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or proper administration of law, it would certainly amount to contempt. The Supreme Court also pointed out that the offence of contempt is really a wrong done to the public by weakening the authority or influence of courts of law which exist for the public good. In the last paragraph of this judgment, certain observation have have been made which, according to Mr. Jethmalani, suggest that truth can be a defence to a charge of contempt of Court. After mentioning that the article in question was a scurrilous attack on the integrity and honesty of a judicial officer and after also mentioning that specific instances have been taken where the officer is alleged to have taken bribe, the Supreme Court stated as follows :-

Thereafter it was stated as follows :-

"It may be that truthfulness or factual correctness is a good defence in an action for libel, but in the law of contempt there are hardly any English or Indian cases in which such defence has been recognised."

32. Despite this Mr. Jethmalani suggested that the Supreme Court said that there are hardly any cases, it did not mean that there are no cases, it did not mean that there are no cases at all. In our opinion, if the Supreme Court had accepted the proposition that truth could be a defence, it would not have obviously failed to mention so. If Mr. Jethmalani failed to mention so. If Mr. Jethmalani's contemption that Bathina Jethmalani's contemption that Bathina Ramkrishna Reddy's case (1952 Cri LJ 832) recognised truth as a defence to a charge of contempt of Court is to be examined, then we fail to see how the Supreme Court did not in the case of Perspective Publication Ltd. (1971 Cri LJ 268), recognise such a defence especially when Bathina Ramkrishna Reddy's case was brought to the notice of the Supreme Court. In the same paragraph, namely paragraph 18, of the judgment, the Supreme Court mentioned that in the case of Bhathina Ramkrishna Reddy, there was some discussion about the bona fides of the person responsible for the bona fides of the person responsible for the publication, but that was apparently does to dispose of the contention which has been raised on the point of the bona fide nature of the publication. According to Mr. Jethmalani, the latter part of this paragraph deals with the other question, namely, the question of bona fide which was also decided in Bhathina Ramkrishna Reddy's case and does not shake the proposition which, according to him, is to be found in the Bhathina Ramkrishna Reddy's case that truth can be a defence. We are unable to accept such strained interpretation of what has been mentioned by the Supreme Court in paragraph 18 of the judgment in the Perspective Publication Ltd.'s case. The obiter dicta of the Supreme Court are undoubtedly binding, but looking to the contention raised and the manner in which it has been disposed of by the Supreme Court, it is clear to us that in the case of Perspective Publications Ltd., the Supreme Court Court did not accept the argument that truth can be a defence to a charge of contempt of Court.

37. We have mentioned earlier that the viability of the judiciary as an institution depends on continued public assumption that the judiciary is an honest and incorruptible institution and any allegations of corruption, ostensibly or apparently deriving their veracity from some facts, are bound to undermine the status of the judiciary. It is for this reason that the Courts in contempt proceedings refuse to examine the strength of the allegations. It has been stated that an invisible fiction is maintained that Judges are incorruptible and that "a public examination of the truth of any allegations may give rise to a public spectacle which will only further perpetuate the damage caused by, the initial publication even if the allegations are ultimately proved to be false." (See Contempt of Court and the Press. page 166. published under the joint auspices of The Indian Law Institute and The Press Council of India - N. M. Tripathi Pvt. Ltd. - 1982). May be, it is better to suffer a Judge against whom prima facie true allegations of lack of integrity are made than expose the entire judiciary to a public trial which must necessarily result if in contempt proceedings the truth of the allegations is allowed to be examined. This is probably the price which we are called upon to pay for the proper and effective functioning, though not whoily satisfactory function in, of an institution such as the judiciary. In so far as the members of the lower judiciary are concerned, it is open for persons who are interested in cleansing that judiciary to lay before the Hiah Court the facts and request for action. In the case of the Judges of the High Court, the procedure for setting things right is more cumbersome, but that is inevitable, if we accept, as we have accepted. that the effective functioning of thejudiciary rests upon the public acceptance of its independence and integrity. It is this that will be seriously damaged if truth is allowed to be pleaded and examined as a defence to a charge of contempt of Court.

38. We have already mentioned above that there is not a single case in which truth has been pleaded as a defence to a charge of contempt of Court and has been accepted as a defence. We may, however, refer to a couple of decisions in which such defence has not been allowed to be raised. In Advocate General v. Seshagiri Rao. , the contemner had been convicted for casting aspersions upon a member of the lower judiciary. It was held that the allegations ex facie amounted to contempt of Court in that they constituted an attack on the competence and integrity of the judicial officers. It was held that in a proceeding for contempt the truth is no defence at all. While so holding, the Andhra Pradesh High Court referred to its earlier decision against the same person wherein it had been stated as follows :-