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41. That the Local Legislature has exercised such powers is shown by the Oudh Courts Act, U.P. Act IV of 1925, which states in the preamble that the Governor-General has given his previous sanction required by Section 80-A Sub-section (3) of the Government of India Act. Section 3 states:

On and from the commencement of this Act there shall be established for Oudh a Chief Court hereinafter referred to as the Chief Court."

42. The Local Legislature, acting under Rule 17 of the Devolution rules, obtained previous sanction and passed this Act setting up a Chief Court. The rule refers to the High Courts and Chief Courts in precisely the same terms. The appellant's learned Counsel, Mr. Kunzru, in an elaborate address referred to many rulings, and he argued that local Legislatures could not pass laws affecting the powers of High Courts. None of these rulings referred to Rule 17 Part II of the Devolution Rules under which this power has been given in 1920 to Local Legislatures. If the argument of Mr. Kunzru were correct, it would apparently follow that since 1925 the Oudh Chief Court has been functioning without jurisdiction.

52. On Page 1544 Page of 34 B.--[Ed.] he stated:

but the powers conferred on the High Court by Section 107 of the Government of India Act, which is an Act of the Imperial Parliament, cannot be controlled by the Governor-General. That, in my judgment, is the effect of Section 65 of the Act and the Fifth Schedule.

53. Now the learned Chief Justice and his colleagues did not anywhere refer to the powers of legislation given under the Devolution Rules of 1920 to the Indian Legislature. The ruling therefore is no authority on the interpretation of those portions of the rules which have been quoted. Apparently these rules were not brought to the notice of the court and the court proceeded on the assumption that the only powers of legislation were those quoted from Section 65 of the Act and the Fifth Schedule, both of which provisions date from the earlier Government of India Act of 1915, and not from the later Act of 1919 which gave wider powers in accordance with the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms. Presumably the powers of the Governor General to make ordinances under Section 72 were also widened, as the restrictions for those powers are stated in Section 72 to be the same as the restrictions for the Indian Legislature. Owing to this important omission the ruling is not an authority for the doctrine of ultra vires in the present case. But in one respect it is useful as it lays down that Section 107 applies because in the Ordinance the High Court has power to hear appeals in certain cases.

72. On Page 532 Page of 47 A--[Ed.] it is stated:

The ordinary rule is that where the statute which creates the right also prescribes a specific remedy, the person aggrieved is limited to the remedy so prescribed.

73. The court found against the appellant on all points, that there was no right of appeal revision, or suit. Since that decision the law against the applicant has become clearer, as the present District Boards Act of 1922 was passed after the Government, of India Act of 1919, and the Devolution Rules of 1930, which state clearly the power of the local Legislature to pass laws affecting the jurisdiction and power of High Courts. In Bhagwat Das v. Chhedi Koeri 95 Ind. Cas. 559 : 24 A.L.J. 537 : A.I.R. 1926 All. 398 : L.R. 7 A 273 Rev, it was held that no revision lay from an order of the District Judge sitting as a Revenue Court in a second appeal from the appellate order of the collector. The procedure was under the Agra Tenancy Act II of 1901, in a suit for arrears of rent. On Page 538 it was held: