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"Notwithstanding anything contained in any agreement or law to the contrary and subject to the provisions of Section 12, where a tenant is in possession of any building, he shall not to be liable to be evicted therefrom, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, except for some specified reasons."

Sub-section (2) provides, "A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant under Subsection (1) shall apply to the Controller let a direction in that behalf. . . . .."

The remainder of the sub-section prescribes the procedure to be followed by the Controller in dealing with such an application. If this section governs the present case, it follows that the plaintiff is not entitled to eject the defendants in execution of a decree, and that the procedure that he should follow in order to evict the defendants is an application under Sub-section (2) of Section 11. On behalf of the plaintiff, however, it is contended that this Act was entirely ultra vires the Provincial Government. This contention is founded on Sub-section (3) of Section 1, which declares that the Act shall remain in force for such period as the Provincial Government may, by notification fix, provided that the Provincial Government may, from time to time, by notification, extend such period. By notification No. 6208, dated 15th March 1947, the Provincial Government fixed one year as the period for which the Act should remain in force. By notification No. 5641, dated 1st March 1948, the period was extended for a further year, and by Notification No. 7804, dated 7th March 1949, for a still further period of one year. Sub-section (3) was repealed by the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control (Amending and Validating) Ordinance, 1949, and in its place was substituted the following : "(3) It shall remain in force for five years . . . .." The contention on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant is that by Sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act of 1947, the Provincial Legislature delegated legislative powers to the Provincial Government, and that the result of this is that the entire Act is ultra vires, and, accordingly, that the amendment attempted by the Ordinance of 1949 had nothing to operate upon. In short, the appellant's contention is that the Legislature did not itself fix the period for which the Act was to remain in operation, but left it to the Provincial Government, and this amounted to a delegation of its legislative functions. Prima facie, the contention is a surprising one. But for Sub-section (3) the Act would be an Act of indefinite duration which came into force on the date on which assent to it was published in the official gazette. Sub-section (3) of Section 1, conferred on the Provincial Government the power to curtail the period of its duration, and the proviso to that sub-section empowered the Provincial Government to extend the period of duration after having curtailed it by notification. It is a common feature of legislative Acts in this country for it to be provided in a statute that the statute shall come into operation as from a date to be fixed by the Provincial Government. In such cases, the Provincial Government should never fix a date for the statute to come into operation; it would remain ahead letter. The mere fact that the Legislature empowers the Provincial Government to fix the date from which an Act is to come into operation has, so fact as I am aware, never been urged as a ground for holding that the Legislature had delegated its functions to the Provincial Government. The present is the converse case. The Act of 1947 came into operation without any act of the Provincial Government, and, if the Provincial Government had not, by notification, 'fixed the period during which it was to remain in force, it would have remained in operation indefinitely.