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     skc/dss                                                                         5.13 - J.odt




              62]   Mr. Samdani and Mr. Kadam further submitted that                  even

otherwise there is no merit in the plea as raised. They submitted that it has been a consistent practice that the CEO, SRA acts for the SRA in the matters of appointment and removal of developers. In such routine matters, if the SRA which is a body comprising of 14 members including the Chief Minister is expected to act, the approvals of schemes / implementation of projects would be delayed. The SRA, being a body corporate has to act through some official and the CEO, as per dictionary meaning would be 'principal leading head' or the 'highest executive head'. Further, in terms of Section 152 of MRTP, there is clearly a valid delegation of powers from SRA to its CEO. Such delegation enures not merely for the grant of approvals and making of appointments of developer, but also extends to revocation of approvals and removal of developers.

The Petitioner, in the course of such proceedings, placed strong reliance upon the order / communication dated 15.06.2009 issued by the CEO, SRA, declining to change the Petitioner as a developer on earlier occasion. Even in the memo of appeal preferred before the HPC impugning the order dated 24.02.2012, there is no clear ground raised by the Petitioner that powers under Section 13(2) of the Slum Act have to be exercised only by the entire body of SRA skc/dss 5.13 - J.odt and not merely its CEO. There was a vague plea raised that the CEO, SRA lacks power under Section 13(2) of the Slum Act. But the same was in the context of the plea that in absence of declaration under Section 3C(1) of the Slum Act, Chapter I-A is itself inapplicable and consequently the appropriate authority to initiate action under Section 13(2) of the Slum Act would be the Competent Authority as defined under Section 3 of Slum Act, and not the CEO, SRA. The HPC however appears to have taken note of the Petitioner's submission and rejected the same. All these aspects establish that the Petitioner did 'take its chance' before the CEO, SRA and merely because the decision is adverse to the Petitioner, the Petitioner has now raised such issue. Such conduct cannot be encouraged in proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The writ court, in such circumstances can decline to go into the issue as raised, particularly since the Petitioner has failed to lay a proper factual foundation by raising such issue at the earliest instance.

6. Thus under all the relevant provisions of law i.e. under the MRTP Act, Slum Act, DCR, it is the SRA which is the Planning Authority and is conferred the power to approve the plans as per Section 45 of the MRTP Act.

7. Section 12(10) expressly is made "subject to law in relation to town planning (MRTP)".

8. Since SRA is constituted by an specific enactment i.e. Slum Act, even if proviso to Section 152(4) permits delegation of authority to CEO, such delegation by SRA could only be done under the provisions of the Act constituting it i.e. the Slum Act.

(emphasis supplied) 71] In the aforesaid note, Mr. Sancheti virtually concedes delegation under Section 3S of the Slum Act by the SRA to the CEO. If this be the position, then the further contention that CEO, SRA has the power to appoint a developer but lacks the power to revoke such appointment even when it is established that such skc/dss 5.13 - J.odt developer has breached the terms subject to which such appointment came to be made, does involve serious inconsistencies and contradictions. As noted earlier, both Section 12(10) and Section 13(2) as applicable to Chapter I-A of the Slum Act, make reference in its text to the 'SRA' and not to 'CEO, SRA'.