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11. On the question of sexual intent and sexual assault, the learned AAG has submitted that in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Attorney General of India v. Satish & Anr and other related criminal appeals, reported in 2021 SCC Online SC 1076 at paragraphs 31, 32, 33 & 36 has touched on the issue 'sexual intent' as could be found in Section 7 of the POCSO Act. It is therefore submitted that this is not a fit case for this Court to interfere with the impugned order.

12. Having heard the submissions of the learned counsels for the rival parties and on due consideration of the same, this Court looking into the entirety of the matter, the facts and circumstances having been stated as above, the main consideration would be as to whether the alleged act of the petitioner against the alleged victim girl would attract the provision of Section 7 of the POCSO Act.

13. Section 7 of the POCSO Act reads as follows: -

"7. Sexual Assault.- Whoever, with sexual intent touches the vagina, penis, anus or breast of the child or makes the child touch the vagina, penis, anus or breast of such person or any other person, or does any other act with sexual intent which involves physical contact without penetration is said to commit sexual assault."

14. To better understand how this section has been viewed by the courts, in the case of Attorney General of India v. Satish & Anr (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has dwell at length to elaborate on the meaning and purpose of the term 'sexual assault' vis-à-vis 'sexual intent'. At paragraph 72 an analysis of Section 7 has been given as:

"72. A close analysis of Section 7 reveals that it is broadly divided into two limbs. Sexual assault, under the first limb is defined as the touching by a person - with sexual intent - of four specific body parts (vagina, penis, anus or breast) of a child, or making a child touch any of those body parts of "such person" (i.e. a clear reference to the offender) or of "any other person" (i.e. other than the child, or the offender). In the second limb, sexual assault is the doing of "any other act with sexual intent which involves physical contact without penetration".

15. Touching the four specific body parts of a child (contained in Section 7) by a person with sexual intent would amount to sexual assault. However, even any act which involves physical contact of a child without penetration if it is done with sexual intent would also amount to sexual assault. Therefore, the key word here is 'sexual intent'.

16. At paragraph 77 of the said Attorney General's case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that the circumstances in which touch or physical contact occurs would be determinative of whether it is motivated by 'sexual intent'. There could be a good explanation for such physical contact which include the nature of the relationship between the child and the offender, the length of the contact, its purposefulness; also, if there was a legitimate non-sexual purpose for the contact. Also relevant is where it takes place and the conduct of the offender before and after such contact.