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15. Now I may deal with the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the appellant. In Bhikraj Jaipuria Vs. Union of India (AIR 1962 Supreme Court 113) it was held that where a contract between the Dominion of India and the private indiviual is not in the form required by Section 175(3), it cannot be enforced and therefore the Dominion of India cannot be sued by the private individual for compensation for breach of contract. In another case State of West Bengal v. M/s B.K. Mondal and Sons their Lordships of the Supreme Court reiterated the view taken in the earlier case and observed that since Section 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935 has been held to be obligatory, it inevitably follows that contravention of the said section implies the nullification of the contract. In Laliteshwar Prasad Sahi v. Biteshwat Prasad and Ors. (3) () it was held by majority that a more agreement entered into in contravention of Article 299 of the Constitution and in fact not ratified could not be called a "contract" within Section 7(d) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. In Mulamchand v. State of Madhya Pradesh (4) () it was found that there was no formal compliance of the provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution but it was found that the bids had been accepted by the Deputy Commissioner, Kalaghat and the acceptance had also been communicated to the appellant who worked the contracts and actually collected lac in the forests in question. The trial court refused to grant a decree to the appellant in this case with regard to the claim on the ground that the contract was not void and although there was no conformity with the provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution there was nothing to prevent the ratification of such contracts if they are for the benefit of the Government. The trial court further observed that the appellant had performed his part of the contract and worked and collected lac from the jungles in pursuance of the agreement and was therefore not entitled to refund the amount in deposit. This finding was affimed by the High Court. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court however held that the reasoning adopted by the High Court was not correct and after referring to the earlier cases on the point, they were pleased to hold that the provisions embodied in Section 175(3) of the Government of India Act and Article 299(1) of the Constitution based on the ground of public policy cannot be waived and dispensed with and that there is no question of estoppel by ratification in such a case. Thus, their Lordships treated the contracts as void but held that the provisions of Section 70 of the Indian Contract Act can be invoked by the aggrieved party to the void contract. In a still later case Abdul Rahiman Khan v. Sadasiva Tripathi (AIR. 1969 Supreme Court 302) in a matter arising out of the Representatson of the People Act, 1951 where no final contracts had been executed as contemplated by Article 299(1) of the Constitution their Lordships were pleased to observe as follows:

The appellant proceeded on the footing that there was a binding contract under which he had undertaken the work of construction for the State, and the State allowed work and had offered to pay him for the work done at the rates set out in Form K-2 The appellant could not by virtue of Article 299 sue in a civil court on the agreement in Form K-2 for compensation for breach of contract. But we are unable to hold that the appellant was not disqualified under Section 9A of the Representation of the People Act merely because the contracts were not enforceable against the State because of Article 299(1) of the Constitution.

16. The law thus appears to be well settled that the provisions of Article 299(1) of the Constitution of India are mandatory in character and the contravention of these provisions nullifies a contract and makes it void, In other words it would be no contract at all and could not be enforced either by the Government or by other person as contractor. Even in cases arising out of election matters under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 their Lordships of the Supreme Court have made it clear that contracts in contravention of the provisions of Article 299(1) of the Constitution cannot be enforced even though under certain circumstances the parties entering into such contracts may be disqualified under the provisions of the Representation of the People Act. There is therefore no escape from the conclusion that there cannot be ratification or waiver in the matter of a contract entered in contravention of the provisions of Article 299(1) of the Constitution. It is therefore to be seen whether in the present case the provisions of Article (1) of the Constitution have been complied with The Deputy Government Advocate has strenuosly urged that the notification marked Ex A. 4 was issued by the Commissioner, Civil Supplies Department of Rajasthan on behalf of the Government of Rajasthan and that the acceptance of the tender by the same officer vide letter dated 27th December, 1952 marked as Ex. 6 must be deemed to be on behalf of the Governor of Rajasthan It is urged that the acceptance of the tender must be deemed to have been expressed in the name of the Government and therefore there was compliance with the provisions of Article 299(1) of the Constitution even though no formal agreement expressed to be made by the Rajpramukh of the State of Rajasthan was executed.

17. After having bestowed my most careful and anxious considerstion on the matter, I find myself unable to accede to the submission made the the learned Deputy Government Advocate. A brief analysis of the cases decided by their Lordships of the Supreme Codrt referred to above gives a clear indication that in their Lordships' view a strict compliance with the provisions of Article 299(1) of the Constitution is indispensable in case of agreements entered into by the Union or a State. In other words, their Lordships seem to be of the view that execution of a formal agreement in accordance with the provisions of Article 299(1) cannot be overemphasised. In the present case admittedly no agreement was executed even though the Government was anxious that the agreement in this respect must be executed before the contract is carried out. In the letter of acceptance (Ex.6) the Commissioner of Civil Supplies has directed the plaintiffs to contact the Collector Kota and jhalawar for execution of agreement and the Collector, Jhalawar also in his letter dated 17 th of February, 1954 (Ex.1) addressed to the plaintiffs clearly stated that the Government was not prepared to purchase the food grains from the plaintiffs as the latter had not executed the agreement. These letters make it. abundantly clear that the Government wanted a formal agreement to be executed before the contract was carried out. Apart from that it cannot be said definitely that the notification inviting tenders Ex. 44 was issued by the Government of Rajasthan and so far as the letter of acceptance of the plaintiffs' tender is concerned even the learned Deputy Government Advocate had to concede, and in my opinion rightly, that the acceptance was not issued on behalf of the Government of Rajasthan. But his submission was that by reading the letter of acceptance with reference to the notification Ex. 44 it must be deemed to have been issued by the Commissioner of Civil Supplies on behalf of the Government of Rajasthan. There is nothing to show that the Commissioner of Civil Supplies had accepted the tender, on behalf of the Government of Rajasthan or in the name of the Governor of Rajasthan or was authorised to issue the same on behalf of the Government of Rajasthan. In this view of the matter apart from there being no formal agreement as contemplated by Article 299(1) of the Constitution it cannot be laid that the notification inviting tenders was issued by or on behalf of the Rajpramukh of Rajasthan or the acceptasee of the plaintiff's tender was expressed to be made in the name of the Rajpramukh or was made by a person authorised in that behalf. The inevitable conclusion of the fore going discussion is that no valid contract came into existence between the plaintiffs and the Government of Rajasthan and the latter was consequently not entitled to forfeit the amount of deposit.