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The plaintiff has sought disclosure of names with the object of suing those persons or adding them as defendants to the suit and interrogatories administered with this object cannot be granted. It is not indispute that the cause of action against the defendants is complete and it is not the claim that the plaintiff would not be entitled to get a decree against the defendantsinabsenceof disclosure of source of information. The Court of Appeal in the case of Edmondson v. Birch & Co., Limited reported in (1905) 2 KB 523. considered this question and held that the interrogatories put in order to enable the plaintiff to bring an action against persons whose names would be disclosed are not put bona fide and should be declined. An action for libel was brought against a Company carrying on business in London in respect of a cablegram sent by the defendants. On the strength of this cablegram, the plaintiff who was engaged as defendants' representative in Japan was dismissed from employment and the plaintiff brought action complaining of the cablegram as libellous. The plaintiff applied for leave to administer the interrogatories, inter alia, seeking information as to from whom the information was derived by the defendants. The Master allowed the interrogatory, and on appeal, the Judge affirmed the order, but the Court of Appeal reversed that decision and Lord Justice Romer held that interrogatory was sought with an illegitimate motive as the plaintiff was really seeking to assert a right of action against some person other than the defendants and was not making the enquiry bona fide for the purpose of the action already instituted. The learned Judge held that the Court would be acting wisely in not allowing the interrogatory seeking the names of the persons from whom the information was derived by the defendants. In a subsequent decision in the case of Plymouth Mutual Co-operative and Industrial Society Limited v. Traders' Publishing Association Limited reported in (1906) 1 KB 403, which is also an action for libel, the defendants were directed to answer the interrogatories which required the defendants to disclose the names of persons from whom the information was obtained and which was relied in publishing the expressions of opinion. The defendants objected to answer the interrogatories on the ground that the same is irrelevant and not administered bona fide for any purpose of the suit. It was claimed that the effect of interrogatory was to compel the defendants to give the names of persons who would be their witnesses on the plea of justification and the object is to obtain the names in order to bring action against them. Lord Justice Vaughan Williams held that even though the interrogatory was relevant to the issue raised in the action, the defendants should not be compelled to answer it as it is put for some purpose altogether outside the action, for instance, for the purpose of bringing another action against some other person than the party interrogated. It was held that it would be right to refuse to a How interrogatory when it was plain that the interrogatory was put for some purpose outside the action. In the case of British Steel Corporation v. Granada Television Ltd, reported in (1981) 1 All ER 417, Sir Robert Mcgarry V-C while delivering judgment sitting in Chancery Division, observed that running through the previous decisions, there are two stands of reasoning for the rule for not forcing to disclose the source of information, one that the process of discovery ought not to be used for the ulterior purpose of enabling the plaintiff to discover the name of someone against whom one could bring another action. We are in respectful agreement with the principle laid down by these authorities. The interrogatories are not delivered to enable the plaintiff to gather casue of action for institution of separate action, which has no bearing to the action already instituted. In our judgment, as the plaintiff clearly asserted in the affidavit in support of the Chamber Summons that the plaintiff is interested in suing the persons whose names would be disclosed by defendant No. 3. the interrogatories should not have been granted.

The third decision is in the case of Knapp v. Harvey reported in (1911) 2 KB 725 where the action was brought by the plaintiff to recover damages for personal injuries occasioned to him through being bitten by a dog belonging to the defendant. It was alleged in the statement of claims that the dog was of a fierce and mischievous nature, and accustomed to attack and bit mankind, and that the defendant wrongfully kept the said dog well knowing that it was of such fierce and mischievous nature and so accustomed. The defendant traversed the allegations and applied for and obtained an order directing the plaintiff to disclose any specific occasion or occasions on which the dog had bitten a man, woman or a child. The plaintiff delivered the particulars by asserting that the defendant's dog bit a man in Stanford Street in the month of June or July, 1908, and man in Tachbrook Street, Pimlico in the month of July or August, 1908 and on both the occasions, the defendant was verbally informed of the fact. The defendant subsequently applied in Chamber for leave to administer the interrogatories, one of which was what is the name of the person alleged to have been bitten by the dog in June or July, 1908 and in July or August, 1908. The Master allowed the interrogatories and the plaintiff subsequently appealed before the Court of Appeal and it was claimed on behalf of the defendant that the defendant is entitled to interrogate the plaintiff as to any facts material to the issues raised in the action, although those facts may not be directly in issue, and it is no objection that the answering of the interrogatory may incidentally involve the disclosure of the name of a witness who will be called by the party interrogated. Lord Justice Vaughan Williams while allowing the appeal held that it is plain that the identity of the person is not material to the actual issues in the matter and the defendant wants their names in order that he may make inquiries about them, and, if necessary, may interview them. It was held that where a party in an action is asking for the names of persons who will be witness of his opponent, it is necessary to show that the names were relevant for the purpose of establishing some material facts, not necessarily a fact directly in issue, but some fact is material to the proof of his case. Lord Justice Moulton sounded a warning by observing that one danger inallowing a litigant to obtain information as to the evidence upon which his opponent intends to rely is that he may in this way find out, not that his opponent's case is untrue, but that his opponent is not aware of some awkward fact or facts, and he may for that reason be emboldened to persevere with an unrighteous defence. Lord Justice Buckley observed that the argument for the defendant really comes to this, that, it he knew in advance whom the plaintiff was going to call as witnesses, he would be in a better position to meet their evidence and that is an inadmissible contention. Once the conclusion is reached that the objectof the interrogatories is to find out what the evidence adduced by the plaintiff in support of his case is going to be, or what witnesses he intends to call, it follows that the interrogatories cannot be supported. These three decisions, in our judgment, clearly sets out the principle that the interrogatories should not be permitted to enable the party to ascertain which witnesses would be examined by the other side at the trial. Mr. Sorabjee is right in his contention that the object of seeking disclosure of source of information from defendant No. 3 is to find out as to whom defendant No. 3 would examine at the trial and if possible to reach them. In these circumstances, the interrogatories should not have been administered and the relief sought by the plaintiff should have been denied.

10. Ms. Jaising submitted that the disclosure of names is relevant for the plaintiff to establish that the article was written and published by the defendant with a malicious intention. It was contended that the motive in publishing the article is very relevant to determine the quantum of damages which the plantiff would be entitled to recover. The learned counsel urged that in case, defendant No. 3 had no names to disclose, then it would be established that the article was a total figment of imagination and was penned with malice todestroy the reputation of the plaintiff and his wife. Mr. Sorabjee countered this submission by urging that in case the defendants fail to establish their assertion that the contents of the article are substantially true and correct and the expression of opinion are faircomment, then the defendants would be liable to pay the damages and possibly, even the entire claim made by the plaintiff may be decreed, but the question as to whether the article was written with malicious intention or not does not depend upon the disclosure of source of information. The learned counsel relied upon the decision in the case of Adams v. Sunday Pictorial Newspapers (1920) Ld. and Champion reported in (1951) 1 KB 354, where in an action claiming damages for libel, the defendants pleaded fair coment made bona fide on a matter of public interest, making use of what is commonly called the "rolled-up" plea. The plaintiff claimed that the words complained of were published with express malice and leave was sought to administer to the dependents' interrogatories. Interrogatory No. 5 was what steps and/or precautions did you take and what inquiries did you make before publishing the words complained of, or causing them to be published, to ascertain whether the expressions of opinion contained therein were founded on facts. The interrogatory in question was disallowed by the Master and in appeal by Mr. Justice Parker, and the Court of Appeal also turned down the request. Lord Justice Somervell referred to R.S.C., Order 31, Rule 1A which provides that in an action for libel or slander where the defendant pleads that the words or matters complained of are fair coment on a matter of public interest or were published on a privileged occasion, then no interrogatories as to the defendants' sources of information or grounds of belief shall be allowed. It was observed that though the issue of express malice was raised by the plaintiff, the interrogatory comes within the class of interrogatory prohibited by the rule. Lord Justice Denning observed that the burden is on the defendant who pleads fair comment and that is quite heavy enough. Lord Denning further observed that if the plaintiff has any evidence for alleging malice, all well and good, let him call the evidence at the trial, but if he has no evidence, or insufficient evidence, I do not see why the Court should assist him by allowing him to cross-examine the writer about it before the trial.