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6. Mr. Sorabjee, learned counsel appearing on behalf of defendant No. 3, submitted that the object of the application for discovery was to obtain the names of the informants who would be probably the appellant's witnesses, and then to prevent them from deposing under the threat of legal action and such object is entirely impermissible and the Chamber Judge should have refused the relief to the plaintiff. The learned counsel urged that it is not permissible to compel the party at a stage prior to the trial to disclose the evidence. It was urged that the desire to ascertain the names of the persons who disclosed information to defendant No. 3 is with an object to file action against them and that being the primary object for seeking interrogatories, the Chamber Judge should have turned down the request. The learned counsel submitted that in the case of newspaper, it is a settled practice in England that source of information is not directed to be disclosed by interrogatories at an interlocutory stage and this rule which is known as "newspaper rule" is consistently followed in the cases of libel and slander. Mr. Sorabjee submitted that there is no reason why the same rule should not be applied in this country. Ms. Jaising, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff, on the other hand, submitted that the object of seeking disclosure of the names is certainly to take action against them but such d isclosure is also necessary to enable the plaintiff to substantiate the claim made in the plaint. The learned counsel urged that the contention that the disclosure of names amounts to seeking a list of witnesses to be examined on behalf of the defendants is not correct because the persons referred to in the article are not mere witnesses but are wrong-doers or tortfeasers along with defendant No. 3. It was also contended by the learned counsel that the disclosure is essential to enable the plaintiff to establish that the article was written by defendant No. 3 with malicious intention and that would enable the plaintiff to seek higher quantum of damages. It was urged that the newspaper rule is not an absolute rule and even if the rule is applied in this country, it should be made available only in cases where the publication is in public interest. The article complained of does not satisfy the requirement and, therefore, defendant No. 3 should not be allowed to seek protection under the newspaper rule.

7. Order XI, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure prescribes that in any suit the parties by leave of the Court may deliver interrogatories provided that the interrogatories which do not relate to any matters in question in the suit shall be deemed irrlevant, notwithstanding that they might be admissible on the oral cross-examination of the witness. This rule is enacted to enable the parties to know the nature of the opponent's case, but the rule does not entitle the party to ascertain the facts which constitute exclusively the evidence of the other side, the reason being that it would enable unscrupulous parties to tamper with the witnesses of the other side and to manufacture evidence in contradiction and so shape his case as to defeat justice. In cases where the plaint or written statement does not necessarily disclose the nature of the case, then interrogatories are administered to make good the deficiency. Interrogatories can also to be administered to obtain admissions from other parties to facilitate the proof of the claim. Order XI, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the interrogatories may be objected on the ground that it is scandalous or irrelevant or not exhibited bona fide for the purpose of the suit or that the matters inquired into are not sufficiently material at that stage. It is well settled that the parties are not entitled to administer interrogatories for obtaining discoveries of facts which constitutes evidence of its adversary's case or title.

The plaintiff has sought disclosure of names with the object of suing those persons or adding them as defendants to the suit and interrogatories administered with this object cannot be granted. It is not indispute that the cause of action against the defendants is complete and it is not the claim that the plaintiff would not be entitled to get a decree against the defendantsinabsenceof disclosure of source of information. The Court of Appeal in the case of Edmondson v. Birch & Co., Limited reported in (1905) 2 KB 523. considered this question and held that the interrogatories put in order to enable the plaintiff to bring an action against persons whose names would be disclosed are not put bona fide and should be declined. An action for libel was brought against a Company carrying on business in London in respect of a cablegram sent by the defendants. On the strength of this cablegram, the plaintiff who was engaged as defendants' representative in Japan was dismissed from employment and the plaintiff brought action complaining of the cablegram as libellous. The plaintiff applied for leave to administer the interrogatories, inter alia, seeking information as to from whom the information was derived by the defendants. The Master allowed the interrogatory, and on appeal, the Judge affirmed the order, but the Court of Appeal reversed that decision and Lord Justice Romer held that interrogatory was sought with an illegitimate motive as the plaintiff was really seeking to assert a right of action against some person other than the defendants and was not making the enquiry bona fide for the purpose of the action already instituted. The learned Judge held that the Court would be acting wisely in not allowing the interrogatory seeking the names of the persons from whom the information was derived by the defendants. In a subsequent decision in the case of Plymouth Mutual Co-operative and Industrial Society Limited v. Traders' Publishing Association Limited reported in (1906) 1 KB 403, which is also an action for libel, the defendants were directed to answer the interrogatories which required the defendants to disclose the names of persons from whom the information was obtained and which was relied in publishing the expressions of opinion. The defendants objected to answer the interrogatories on the ground that the same is irrelevant and not administered bona fide for any purpose of the suit. It was claimed that the effect of interrogatory was to compel the defendants to give the names of persons who would be their witnesses on the plea of justification and the object is to obtain the names in order to bring action against them. Lord Justice Vaughan Williams held that even though the interrogatory was relevant to the issue raised in the action, the defendants should not be compelled to answer it as it is put for some purpose altogether outside the action, for instance, for the purpose of bringing another action against some other person than the party interrogated. It was held that it would be right to refuse to a How interrogatory when it was plain that the interrogatory was put for some purpose outside the action. In the case of British Steel Corporation v. Granada Television Ltd, reported in (1981) 1 All ER 417, Sir Robert Mcgarry V-C while delivering judgment sitting in Chancery Division, observed that running through the previous decisions, there are two stands of reasoning for the rule for not forcing to disclose the source of information, one that the process of discovery ought not to be used for the ulterior purpose of enabling the plaintiff to discover the name of someone against whom one could bring another action. We are in respectful agreement with the principle laid down by these authorities. The interrogatories are not delivered to enable the plaintiff to gather casue of action for institution of separate action, which has no bearing to the action already instituted. In our judgment, as the plaintiff clearly asserted in the affidavit in support of the Chamber Summons that the plaintiff is interested in suing the persons whose names would be disclosed by defendant No. 3. the interrogatories should not have been granted.

8. Ms. Jaising submitted that the object of administering interrogatories was not merely tosue the persons whose names would be disclosed, but also with a view to enable the plaintiff to make the proceedings more effective and complete. We are unable to appreciate how the proceedings would be more effective and complete only if defendant No. 3 is compelled to disclose the source of information. We are in agreement with the learned Chamber Judge that the plaintiff has complete cause of action against the present defendants and it is not necessary for the plaintiff to join those whose names would be disclosed in order to succeed in the present suit. The claim that the proceedings would be more effective and complete only by disclosure of the names is, in our judgment, not correct, because the real object of delivering the interrogatories and the principal and dominant desire of the plaintiff is to sue those persons. It was also contended that one more object in administering the interrogatories was to substantiate the claim. We are afraid that this is not the true object with which the plaintiff approached the learned Chamber Judge. It is the case of the plaintiff that the claim of defendant No. 3 made in the article that the information was gathered from different persons in the industry and Unit is a figment of imagination and indeed no person has even given any such information to defendant No. 3. As the plaintiff has come to the Court with a specific case that no person had given any information to defendant No. 3 and the writing suggesting that the information is gathered from different persons is wholly untrue, it is difficult to appreciate how the plaintiff administered the interrogatories with the object of substantiating his case. The object seems to be that in case the defendant No. 3 took up the plea that indeed the information was gathered from the persons and she intends to examine those persons as witnesses at the trial, then the plaintiff should have prior information of the persons who are going to depose. It is, therefore, obvious that none of the grounds made out in support of the Chamber Summons for compelling defendant No. 3 to disclose the source of information are bona fide or relevant for the purpose of suit.