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5. The next contenion, viz., that the pltf. is only entitled to a quarter share in the joint family properties has been the subject-matter of an elaborate argument before us. Before we proceed to discuss the true legal position, it is necessary to set out the relevant sections of the Hindu Womens' Eights to Property Act which fall to be construed by us. The Act has been enacted with a view to amend the Hindu law to give better rights to women in respect of property. Before the enactment of the Act women who belonged to the joint Hindu families had no right to property belonging to the joint family except that they were entitled to be maintained thereout by the male members of the joint family in whom the property vested. Even in regard to properties which were left as self-acquired properties by their deceased husbands, those properties devolved on their sons & the widows had only the right to be maintained thereout. They did not get any other rights in respect of those properties. This Act was enacted, therefore, in order to give women better rights in respect of property. Section 2 provided that notwithstanding any rule of Hindu law or custom to the contrary the provisions of Section 3 should apply where a Hindu died intestate. Even though this section was worded in such a wide manner, one must remember that there was no power which a member of a joint Hindu family as such possessed to dispose of by a testamentary writing his undivided share, right, title & interest in the joint family property. Section 2, therefore, contemplated those cases where a Hindu who had a right to make a testamentary disposition of his property died intestate in regard to the same. Section 3, Sub-section (1), provided for those cases where the deceased Hindu was governed by the Dayabhaga school of Hindu law or died leaving separate property which could be the subject-matter of inheritance. Section 3, Sub-section (2), provided for those cases where the deceased Hindu was governed by any school of Hindu law other than the Dayabhaga school or by customary law. If he had at the time of his death an interest in joint family property, it was enacted that his widow should, subject to the provisions of Sub-section (3), have in the property the same interest as he himself had. It is significant to note that the words used in this connection are that the widow would have in the joint family property the same interest as her deceased husband had. The deceased husband in such a case would have at the time of his death an undivided share, right, title & interest in the joint family property & that was the interest which the widow was to have in the property after his death. While thus enacting that the widow was to have in the joint family property the same interest as her deceased husband had, the Legislature defined the nature of that interest by Section 3, Sub-section (3). It laid down that any interest devolving on a Hindu widow under the provisions of this section should be the limited interest known as a Hindu woman's estate, provided, however, that she should have the same right of claiming partition as a male owner. Even though under Section 3, Sub-section (2), it was enacted that the widow was to have in the property the same interest as the deceased husband had, that interest was to be the limited interest known as a Hindu woman's estate subject to all the limitations known to Hindu law in regard to alienations, etc. To this was superadded a right to claim partition, which right otherwise she would not have had in enjoyment of a Hindu woman's estate but which right would be enjoyed by a male owner. This was, therefore, a specific right given to her when she was to have in the property the same interest as her deceased husband had. Her deceased husband, if he had been alive would have the right of claiming partition as a male owner. This was the right which was reserved to her under the terms o£ Section 8, Sub-section (3). Even though she would claim a partition in this manner & get property as falling to her share, she would continue to enjoy therein the limited interest known as a Hindu woman's estate, so that after her death the property which she had thus obtained on partition would go to her husband's reversionary heirs, as a necessary corollary of her interest being a limited interest known as a Hindu woman's estate. But unless & until she claimed such partition, she would only con tinue to enjoy the undivided share, right, title & interest of her husband in the property which was given to her by virtue of the pro visions of Section 3, Sub-section (2) of the Act. This is really the scheme of the Act & it would fall to be considered by us as to what was the nature & extent of the interest which the pltf. got in the properties belonging to the joint family under the circumstances obtaining in the pre sent case.

7. This is the conclusion which we have reached on a plain reading of the terms of the relevant sections of the Act. Our attention was, however, drawn by Mr. Murdeshwar to a certain decided case & a passage from Mayne's Hindu Law, nth Edn. based on those cases which appeared to support his contention that the pltf. had no more than one-quarter share in the joint family properties. He relied upon the passage at p. 708 of Mayne's Hindu Law, 11th Edn., where it is stated :

"When a widow succeeds to her deceased husband's interest in a joint family, she takes it only by inheritance & not by survivorship; for, she had no right by birth & she was not a co-owner prior to his death. There are no words in the Act by which she can be deemed to be a coparcener. The interest which devolves upon her is declared to be a Hindu Woman's estate. That means that on her death it will go to her husband's heirs which cannot mean all his coparceners. In other words, on her death whether before or after partition, her interest will go to her husband's male issue who will take it as ancestral property. Whether they will take it as tenants in common or as coparcenary property is a different question. In the absence of her husband's male issue, her interest will pass to the daughter, daughter's son, or other heirs of her husband."

9. Mr. Murdeshwar drew our attention to a decision of the Madras H.C. in Saradambal v. Subbarama Ayyar, I. L. R. (1942) Mad. 630 : (A. I. R. (29) 1942 Mad. 212). In that case the pltf. had obtained a decree for money against deft. 1 who died subsequent to the date of the decree. His wife, deft. 3 was brought on the record as his legal representative. The question that arose for determination was whether the properties which were in the hands of deft. 3 were liable to be attached in execution of the decree. The relevant provisions of the Hindu Women's Eight to Property Act were considered by the learned Judge in the second appeal which came before him & he observed that under Section 3 (2) of the Act the interest taken by the widow was the same interest as the husband himself had, that is, the interest of an undivided member of a joint family in the joint family property. The learned Judge, however, proceeded to say that the said interest was capable of definition, & so far as the Madras Presidency was concerned, it was liable to separation by partition & alienable inter vivos for valuable consideration & liable to be seized in execution of a decree for the personal debts of the member, & that giving the language its plain meaning, the widow took that interest subject to the rights & obligations attached to that interest & subject to the restrictions placed on her powers by Clause (3) of the Act. It was conceded that if the Act had not been passed, as the husband died without leaving a male issue, the property would have gone by survivorship to his undivided brother & his brother's son & the doctrine of survivorship would prevent the creditor from attaching that property. But it was stated that the Act bad taken away that rule of survivorship & allowed the property to descend to his wife & that once the rule of survivorship no longer operated, there was nothing to preclude a creditor from attaching the property. It waa further observed that the fact that a right of partition was conferred upon the widow went to show that the property was taken by her subject to all the rights & liabilities which the husband would have had because it was the same interest that was conferred upon her & therefore, giving the language its plain meaning, the property taken by her must be held to be liable for the payment of her husband's debts & was liable to be attached by the pltf. It was, however, assumed here by the learned Judge that the Act had taken away the rule of survivorship & allowed the property to descend to his wife. 'We need not repeat what we have stated above while discussing the passage from Mayne's Hindu Law, but exception can legitimately be taken to the user of the word "descend," if that is understood to mean an estate of inheritance. The interest which the widow takes on the death of her deceased husband is not an estate of inheritance. She merely steps into the shoes of her deceased husband. It is a devolution of an interest in her favour, but it is not an estate of inheritance which devolves upon her. No doubt she steps into the shoes of her husband & the consequences of that position would be that the creditor would, contrary to the position which obtained before the enactment of this Act, be able to attach the undivided share, right, title & interest of her husband in execution of a decree which he had obtained against the husband prior to his death. The undivided share, right, title and interest of the deceased husband, not having gone over to any other member of the joint family by survivorship but having devolved upon her in the manner contemplated by the Act, would be liable to attachment at the instance of the judgment-creditor who had obtained a decree against the deceased husband. From that point of view, the decision of the learned Judge in Saradambal v. Subharama Ayyar, I. L. R. (1942) Mad. 630 : (A. I. R. (29) 1942 Mad. 212) would be correct, but it cannot be justified on the principle that the widow had got that interest as & by way of inheritance. As we have stated before, the contradistinction is not necessarily between survivorship on the one hand & inheritance on the other, & it is not legitimate to say that if it is not survivorship, it can only be inheritance. This decision of the Madras H. C. which is cited by Mr. Murdeshwar, is no authority for the position which has been urged by him before us.

22. The Act in question has, if I may say so, introduced revolutionary changes in Hindu law. The Act has affected the law of coparcenary, the law of partition & the law of aliena-

tion. It has also, to some extent, affected the topics of inheritance & adoption. The present appeal is concerned with the question in so far as this Act a ects the law of partition. It is, therefore, necessary to closely examine the language of Section 3, Sub-sections (2) & (3). Prior to the passing of the Act a widow in a joint Hindu family was entitled only to maintenance & residence. But upon the passing of the Act, better rights have been conferred upon a widow in a joint Hindu family &, as the Act shows, the object of the Act ia to give better rights to women in respect of property. There are certain expressions in the two sub-sections whiah require careful examination. Thus, in Sub-section (2) of Section 3 a widow gets an interest in a Hindu joint family property which her deceased husband had in the property. A reference to Sub-section (3) shows that the interest which the widow gets is known as a Hindu woman's estate & under Sub-section (3) the widow gets a further right of claiming partition as a male owner. It is in that way that this Act has introduced a revolutionary change in Hindu law. Although a widow gets an interest in a Hindu joint family property, that does not mean that she sets the share of her husband. It is noteworthy that whereas Sub-section (2) refers to the expression "interest" acquired by a widow, Section 3. Sub-section (1) refers to a 'share" &, in my opinion, the use of two different expressions was deliberate, because in the case of a Hindu governed by the Daya-bhaga school of Hindu law, it can be predicated of a Hindu that he has a definite share. In the case of a Hindu governed by the Mitakshara law, a member of a joint Hindu family cannot say that he has a particular share in the family property. His share is to be ascertained when a suit for partition is filed & not before because the share which a member of a joint Hindu family has in the family property is liable to fluctuations. It may, for instance, be increased or decreased. It may bo increased if there are deaths in the family, & it may be decreased if there are births in the family. It is for that reason that the Legislature has chosen to use the expression "interest" in Sub-section (2) of Section 3. A female cannot be a coparcener. The expression "coparcenary" has a much narrower connotation than a Hindu undivided family. A coparcenary consists of males only, while a joint Hindu family may consist of males as well as females. In the case of coparcenary property the two main incidents are the right to acquire property by survivorship & the right to acquire an interest in the family property by birth & reading Sub-section (2) & Sub-section (3) of Section 3, it is, to my mind, clear that a widow of a deceased Hindu continues to be a member of a joint Hindu family which she was as his wife before, but upon the death of her husband she gets an interest in the family property exactly the same as was her husband's. Then reference has to be made to the expression ''devolving." Mr. Murdeshwar for the applt argues that the expression means that the Hindu widow gets the interest of her husband as & by way of inheritance. It seems to me that is not the correct interpretation of the expression devolving." What the expression "devolving" means is really acquiring. Again Sub-section (2) of Section 3 says that the widow has an interest in the family property which her husband had at his death. This is made clear by describing the interest taken by the widow which is said to be a Hindu woman's estate. On the footing that she is a member of a Joint Hindu family exactly in the same way as she was before her husband's death, the Act has further provided that the widow has a right to claim partition as a male owner. The Act, therefore, does not merely confer upon a widow a Hindu woman's estate but gives the widow a right to claim partition from the other members of the family. Before the passing of the Act, 1937, the widow would be entitled to maintenance & residence & she would have no rights of ownership in the property, & under this Act she is not given full proprietary interest in the family property but only an interest which is equal to the interest of a Hindu woman's estate. When the section, is analysed as above, it will now be convenient to deal with the two contentions urged in support of the appeal.