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12. Jurisdictional parameters of Section 33(1)(2) and (3) are same and there is no change or alterations in the width and depth or length of such jurisdiction. It is said to be only a supervisory jurisdiction as a whole under Section 33. In the case of permission under Section 33(1) and 33(3), the same yardsticks are to be applied while granting or refusing to grant permission as is applied in the case of approval application. There is absolutely no change in the principles to decide these applications. The principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the applications for permission and applications for approval are identical. I need not enumerate the judgments of the Supreme Court on this issue as it is very well established that the tribunal or the authority has to consider that a prima facie case for action existed; that a prima facie case for grant of permission/approval existed; that the action of the employer in both the cases is a bona fide exercise of powers and that it does not suffer from mala fides or any malice or is not vitiated by the stigma of victimization or unfair labour practice. In both the cases, the authority has to find out whether a fair and proper enquiry has been, held before the action was taken and that the workman was given a reasonable and adequate opportunity to defend himself in such enquiry and that the punishment was not shockingly disproportionate to attract the charge of mala fides or legal victimisation. These are the common tests which are invariably applied in the cases under Section 33(1) or 33(2)(b) or 33(3) of the I. D. Act. It is nowhere laid down that while considering the question of permission other principles are to be applied and the same principles could not be applied in the case of an application for approval. In my opinion, there is absolutely no change in the tests or principles to be applied to the cases under Section 33(1), (2) and (3) i.e. applications for permissions or approval. In both the categories the authority has to find out a prima facie good case justifying the action taken and justifying the case for permission or approval. The only difference which the Legislature has drawn is that in one category of the disputes, the workmen are connected with the pending dispute and in the second category of the disputes workmen are not connected with the pending dispute before the authority. In the case of protected workmen as stated by me earlier, there is a complete ban to touch them without the express permission of the authority. Even the time prescribed by the Legislature for disposal of the permission application and the approval application is the same, i.e. three months. It is not that the permission applications are disposed of early and the approval applications get delayed disposal. Both are sailing the same boat of delay and the underlying cause for grant of relief to the workman in the case of Fakirbhai (supra) is the delay in disposal of such applications. The Supreme Court was pained to realise the burning question of delay in disposal of the labour matters, where the workmen whose jural relationship subsisted, were made to starve on the ground that the application for permission or approval was pending. It was mere a coincidence that the case before the Supreme Court was that of an application for permission under Section 33(1) of the I. D. Act. The basic and the foundational question which the Supreme Court considered was that the workman had no means of livelihood to defend himself before the tribunal, though the jural relationship with the employer continued. The workman was denied even the subsistence allowance to enable him and his family to survive the litigation, the end of which none could forecast. The distinction which Shri Patel tries to draw between the case of permission and the case for approval is totally immaterial and irrelevant for our purpose. The Supreme Court has not confined the ratio of the Fakirbhai's case only to the applications under Section 33(1) or 33(3) seeking permission to take action of dismissal or discharge of the workman concerned. It equally applies to every application under Section 33 of the Act.

14-B. The basic underlying principle in both the judgments viz., Fakirbhai and Jaipur Zilla (supra) is that when jural relationship of master and servant subsists and continues, the workman should not be made to starve and his family should not be subjected to misery of starvation. It would be entirely different when jural relationship comes to an end as is in the case of an ordinary dismissal or discharge of workmen, whose case does not fall under Section 33 of the Act. Even the legislature has recognised the principle of mitigating the miseries of unemployment when the jural relationship subsists. The principles which the Supreme Court had laid down in the case of Fakirbhai (supra) have been vividly reflected in the Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Legislature has amended the Act to provide for wages during the pendency of proceedings before the High Court filed by the employer against the award of the labour court/tribunal granting reinstatement to the dismissed/discharged workman. The legislature recognises the principle that when at the end of the adjudication before the competent authority, the workman succeeds to get reinstatement but the higher court stays such an award of reinstatement, in that case, he must be paid monthly wages to enable him to survive the proceedings before the higher court. The underlying philosophy of this provision is very clear that the employer once severes the relationship of employer employee by passing an order of dismissal/discharge and the competent court/tribunal having set aside the said orders and having restored the jural relationship of Master and servant by ordering reinstatement of such workman, he becomes entitled to get his monthly remuneration during the pendency of the proceedings before the higher courts. We, therefore, have to recognise and accept the principle that so long as jural relationship subsists, the workman is ready and willing to work for the employer but he is prevented by the employer from doing his work, he is entitled to get monthly wages which he would have earned by working. Merely because the employer passes an order of dismissal/discharge and refuses to allow the workman to work, though the jural relationship subsists, it cannot be said that the workman is not entitled to get any remuneration till his jural relationship is brought to an end lawfully, Jural relationship in my opinion, is of paramount importance. The unilateral severance of contract of service is not permissible without any compensation or reward to the other party to the contract. I fail to understand why a workman who is facing the proceedings under Section 33(2)(b) should be thrown out of the employment even when the jural relationship continues. The de facto snapping of relationship can be justified only in the rare cases where the workman is held guilty of serious acts of violence or misappropriation or of theft of the employers property. Even in such cases, the magnitude of the offence must be borne in mind. In my opinion, therefore, in ordinary cases of misconducts for which the employer has taken an action of dismissal/discharge and has approached the tribunal for approval, such a workman should be continued in employment so that he works and earns his bread till his fate is decided in the approval application. It is true that neither the workman nor the employer has control over the time limit of the proceedings before the tribunal or the authority. Considering this fact also the employer should continue such a workman in employment so that the employer gets work from the workman and pays him therefor. In such cases, the employer would be saving a lot in case the authority refuses to grant approval to the action taken by the employer. If the workman is kept out of employment and approval is not granted, in that case, the employer has to pay for the entire period the full wages without any work or without any production.

These Articles are meant to do justice and to overreach injustice and not to thwart the course of justice on the feeble law point.

18. I need not stress the fact that wage is the real content of the Article 21. If we were to take out the wage content from this Article 21 it would be reduced t o a dead letter not worth even for a decoration. In the absence of the source of livelihood which is protected by Article 21, the other fundamental rights would sound hollow and empty words and would collapse in no time as a dilapidated house. The workman and his family should not be made to starve merely on the pretext that proceedings under Section 33(2)(b) for approval of the action taken by employer is pending though he is told by law that the jural relationship continues and he still carries the label that he is an employee of the applicant employer before the tribunal. This jural sense of employment must put bread in his empty belly. He cannot be denied the wage content of his jural relationship by drawing a fine distinction of law point that he has factually ceased to be in employment as the employer has already passed an order of dismissal/discharge though he still continues to be in the employment of the employer in Jaw. In the case of Fakirbhai, (supra) the Supreme Court was very much conscious of the delay in disposal of discharge/dismissal matters where the workmen concerned needed relief very badly. The Supreme Court has, therefore, considering the crucial aspect of the delay has given a great solace to the working class whose fate is covered under Section 33 of the Act as a whole not to be sub-divided by the sub-sections.

21. It however, needs to be clarified that this ratio is based on the firm foundational fact that the jural relationship of employer-employee subsists and not in other cases where the jural relationship comes to an end.

22. In the aforesaid circumstances, I do not find any fault with the reasoning of the Tribunal and there is no illegality or impropriety in the impugned order passed by the tribunal awarding remuneration equivalent to the suspension allowance or subsistence allowance under the Rules. The petition, therefore, stands dismissed with no orders as to costs.