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3. The stand of the decree-holder is that the possession of Som Parkash is illegal and, therefore, he is liable to be evicted in pursuance of the ejectment order dated 22-7-1994, which has the force under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act.

4. Som Parkash also filed a civil suit that he be not dispossessed from the shop in question illegally and forcibly; this was a suit for declaration with consequential relief of permanent injunction, which was filed against the decree-holder Smt. Santosh Rani. He also filed an application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C., praying that during the pendency of the suit he be not evicted from the demised premises. The objector -- Som Parkash earlier obtained stay order from the Civil Court on 1-4-1995 in the suit filed by him. The decree-holder -- Smt. Santosh Rani filed an application for the vacation of the stay but the said order dated 1-4-1995 was confirmed on 20-9-1995, Santosh Rani filed an appeal under Order 43, C.P.C. against the order dated 20-9-1995 on 27-9-1995 and this appeal was disposed of on 20-11-1995 by the Court of Additional District Judge, Sirsa, who accepted the appeal of the decree-holder and the order dated 20-9-1995 was set aside. In this manner the application of Som Parkash under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. was dismissed. It was held by the learned Additional District Judge, Sirsa, that possession of Som Parkash was not as a tenant since 1st November, 1980 as claimed by him. On the other hand Som Parkash entered into the shop in question after the passing of the ejectment order dated 22-7-1994 and so he is liable to be ejected in execution of the ejectment order, which was passed against Sunil Kumar, as the possession of Som Parkash was through Sunil Kumar. In other words, it was held by the appellate Court that Som Parkash must go from the demised premises with the original tenant-judgment-debtor. Against the order dated 20-11-1995 passed by the Additional District Judge, Sirsa, Som Parkash Objector filed Civil Revision No. 4335-M of 1995 in the High Court, which affirmed the order dated 20-11-1995 passed by the first appellate Court by holding that there was no ground for interference with the said order. In this manner the order dated 20-11-1995 got the finality. Vide para No. 19 of the judgment dated 2-11-1995 it was indicated that defendant No. 2 Sunil Kumar was not pulling on well with his sister Santosh Rani due to litigation between them and for this reason he intentionally gave the possession of the disputed shop to plaintiff Som Parkash to harm the interests of decree-holder Smt. Santosh Rani. It was also held that there was no collusion between Smt. Santosh Rani and Sunil Kumar, rather. Sunil Kumar and Som Parkash had joined hands in order to cause harm to Smt. Santosh Rani. It may also be stated that the Civil Suit filed by the objector Som Parkash for declaration and injunction is still pending in the Civil Court. With regard to the matter of interim relief, Som Parkash had already lost upto the High Court. While dismissing the objections of Som Parkash, it was observed by the executing Court that it had reached to a firm conclusion that the objector was also liable to be evicted in pursuance of the ejectment order dated 22-7-1994 and his possession was not liable to be protected even if he was not a party to the eviction proceedings. Against this order dated 9-5-1995 objector Som Parkash filed an appeal in the Court of Additional District Judge, Sirsa, who vide the impugned order dated 8-6-1996 came to the considered opinion that consideration of objections by the executing Court did not necessarily include nor did it cast a mandate on the executing Court to frame the issues and record the evidence, if those objections were prima facie without merit. It also held that if the executing Court finds that the objections of the judgment-debtor are frivolous, then framing of issues and recording of evidence would be of no use. Also it was observed that the objections of Som Parkash were more in the nature of prolonging the litigation so that the decree-holder may not be able to reap the fruits of the decree. Such a course in favour of the objector would mean to give him an illegal profit. From the impugned order dated 8-6- 1996 it is also clear that the Court of Additional District Judge took into consideration that the documentary proposed evidence, which was sought to be produced by the objector Som Parkash, and after perusing the same the lower appellate Court came to the conclusion that the objector had no case to successfully resist the ejectment order and ultimately finding no merit in the appeal, it was dismissed.

quired by the executing Court which had taken into consideration all these factors and then dismissed the objections and allowed the application of the decree-holder. Further the first appellate Court also considered all the aspects of the case and also examined the documents which could be produced by the objector and then it came to the conclusion that the objector had no case. In this manner there is no force in this revision which should be dismissed as the intentions of the objector are not sincere, who is bent upon to frustrate the ejectment order dated 22-7-1994 which had been obtained by the decree-holder after a hot contest. The said order of ejectment was not collusive, rather it has been obtained after four years of the filing of the ejectment application. According to the learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1 Smt. Santosh Rani, Sunil Kumar (respondent No. 2) judgment-debtor, had no case. Therefore, he intentionally inducted Som Parkash into the shop in question. The possession of the objector is more or less of a trespasser and he must go with the original judgment-debtor. Also it was pleaded by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1 that the decree-holder is taking possession in execution of a valid ejectment order, which does not amount to illegal entry and, therefore, the revision petition should be dismissed.

10. The submissions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner may look assuring on its first flush, but on my deeper scrutiny I have found the same without any substance. A person, who wants stay in the shape of equity must do equity also. What is an adjudication is necessarily a question which depends upon case to case. I have already stated above that the entire objections of the objector were based on the ground that he had been inducted as a tenant in the shop in question since 1980 much prior to the purchase of the property by Smt, Santosh Rani, who purchased this property in the year 1989. His possession was continued since 1980 and that Sunil Kumar had been put up by Smt. Santosh Rani and she obtained the decree of ejectment against him. This stand of the objector has been properly adjudicated and considered and appreciated by the Civil Court, which was supposed to see prima facie case before granting the stay order. What further adjudication was required on the part of the executing Court, which could not set aside the legal orders passed by the Civil Court in a different suit filed by the objector himself. So much so, the objections of the objector were considered right upto the High Court, which did not find any merit in the same; rather the Courts came to the conclusion that the present objector is the creation of the judgment-debtor and must vacate the premises in execution of the ejectment order dated 22nd July, 1994 obtained by the decree-holder. Adjudication does not mean that framing of issues is always necessary for the executing Court. If the pleas raised by the objector in the objection petition have been considered prima facie by the executing Court and the first appellate Court, in my opinion, it is a proper application of mind on behalf of both the Courts, for which then there should not be any grouse to the present objector Som Parkash. It is not the case that the objections of the objector were thrown straightway, rather the impugned order dated 9-5-1996 passed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Sirsa, indicate that all the possible stands of the objector were duly considered and thereafter he came to the conclusion that the objections had no force. In para No. 5 of the order, the executing Court took into consideration all those factors which went right upto the High Court when it dismissed the revision of the objector on 17-1-1996. The executing Court also took into consideration before dismissing the objections that the objector was not paying anything to the decree-holder but was enjoying the possession of the shop in dispute despite the ejectment order in favour of the decree-holder Santosh Rani. The plea of the objector that he was not party to the ejectment petition was also duly considered and the executing Court came to the conclusion that the objector had already exhausted his remedies regarding protection of his possession by means of filing a civil suit and his claim was not admitted even upto the High Court, therefore, it could not be held that he was not heard or that he was then entitled independently to protect his illegal possession. By opening a new chapter, as propounded by the objector, would mean to nullify all those valid orders which were obtained by the decree-holder in the suit for declaration filed by the objector. The contention of the objector regarding his independent possession was also considered on the basis of the authority reported as Noorali Babul Thanewale v. K. M. M. Shetty, 1990 Har Rent Rep 59 : (AIR 1990 SC 464), and it was held that the decree-holder was entitled to execute the decree for eviction against all persons who were in possession of the property. Even the order of the learned Additional District Judge shows that the objector failed to make out any case before him. In these circumstances it cannot be said that there was no adjudication by the executing Court as requited under the provisions of Order 21, Rules 97 and 98, C.P.C. The data was made available to the executing Court by the objector in order to protect his possession and after due consideration that data was found without any substance. In the citation reported as Subhendu Gupta's case, (1995 (3) Rec Rev Rep 443) (Cal) (supra) the objections of the objector were dismissed in a summary fashion without determining the right, title or interest of the objector and for that reason the impugned order of the said case was set aside. In Noorduddin v. Dr. K. L. Anand, 1995 (2) RRR 556; (1994 AIR SCW 5093), the dictum of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is that the objections should be decided after considering the pleas of the objector. Of course, in the ejectment order the present objector was not a party but the suit was definitely initiated at his instance. Firstly, he lost in the first appellate Court and then before the High Court. After losing the battle in the High Court against the successful decree-holder now a shelter of the objections has been taken, which objections have been considered and rejected in the light of the earlier chain of litigation. In the present case the present objector does not gel any independent right in the property. He failed to show his tenancy" and in these circumstances his illegal possession pending adjudication could not be protected by passing any interim order. The counsel Shri Mohunta also relied upon an authority of the Supreme Court reported as Ram Chandra Verma v. Jagat Singh Singhi, 1996 (2) SU 1545 : (AIR 1996 SC 1809), which authority is not applicable to the facts in hand. In this cited case the objector successfully showed to the executing Court his legal possession which was interpreted as a licence on behalf of the judgment-debtor. That interpretation of the Court was illegal and for this reason the possession of the objector was protected. It may be mentioned here that at no point of time the objector ever made an effort to become a party to the ejectment proceedings in support of the alleged allegations that he was claiming his tenancy since 1980.