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In this Court the view taken in Raj Kumar's case (supra) was sought to be supported by the learned counsel for the, respondent. The provisions of the Fruit Order and of the Adulteration Act, it was contended, could not harmoniously co-exist on the statute book, as compliance with one would, in certain contingencies, result in violation of the other some respects. With respect to the particular charges tried in the cases in appeal, however, no attempt was made on behalf of the respondents to show that there was any fatal conflict or inconsistency between the two provisions. The question before us accordingly lies within a very narrow compass. The appellant urged that there is no implied repeal of the Adulteration Act by the Fruit Order in so far as the sale of vinegar is concerned, whereas the case of the respondent is that there is an implied repeal and the respondents are not liable to be prosecuted under the Adulteration Act for violating its provisions. Shri Bishan Narain sought support for his submission from Om Prakash Gupta v. State of U.P. (1) and T. S. Baliah v. T. S. Rangachari (2). In the former case S. 5 (1 ) (c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act was held not to repeal s. 409 I.P.C. The decision of the Punjab High Court (Khosla and Falshaw, JJ.) in State v. Gurcharan Singh(3) holding to the contrary was overruled. In the latter case s. 52 of the Income tax Act, 1922 was held not to repeal s. 177, T.P.C. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the facts of all the eight cases separately as no such reference was made by either side at the bar. Shri Bishan Narain for the appellant, by way of illustra-

The general principles governing implied repeal appear to us to have long since been settled. The difficulty is normally experienced in their application to a given case. From the passage quoted by Kapur J., from the unreported Bench decision in Raj' Kumar's case (supra) upholding the implied repeal of the Adulteration Act by the Fruit Order it seems to us that the Division Bench did not correctly and fully grasp them. We accordingly, consider it proper to broadly restate the general rule. It was laid in Paine v. Stater(1) that when two Acts are inconsistent or repugnant the later will be read as having impliedly repealed the earlier. As the legislature must be presumed in deference to the rule of law to intend to enact consistent and harmonious body of laws, a subsequent legislation may not be too readily presumed to effectuate a repeal of existing statutory laws in the absence of express or at least clear and unambiguous indication to that effect. This is essential in the interest of certainty and consistency in the laws which the citizens are enjoined and expected to. obey. The legislature, which may generally be presumed to know the existing law, is not expected to intend to create confusion by its omission to express its intent to repeal in. clear terms. The courts, therefore, as a rule, lean against implying a repeal unless the two provisions are so plainly repugnant to each other that they cannot stand together and it is not possible on any reasonable hypothesis to give effect to both at the same time. The repeal must, if not express, flow from necessary implication as the only intendment. The provisions must be wholly incompatible with each other so that the two provisions operating together would lead to absurd consequences, which intention could not reasonably be imputed to the legislature. It is only when a consistent body of law cannot be maintained without abrogation of the previous law that the plea of implied repeal should be sustained. To determine if a later statutory provision repeals by implication an earlier one it is accordingly necessary to closely scrutinise and consider the true meaning and effect both of the earlier and the later statute. Until this is done it cannot be satisfactorily ascertained if any fatal inconsistency exists between them. The meaning, scope and effect of the two statutes, as discovered on scrutiny, determines the legislative intent as to whether the earlier law shall cease or shall only be supplemented. If the objects of the two statutory provisions are different and the language of each statute is restricted to its own objects or subject, then they are generally intended to run in parallel lines without meeting and there would be no real conflict though apparently it may appear to be so on the surface. Statutes in pari materia although in apparent conflict should also so far ,is reasonably possible, be construed to be in harmony with each other and it is only when there is an irreconcilable conflict between the new provision and the prior statute relating to the same subject matter, that the former, being the later expression of the legislature, may be held to prevail, the prior law yielding to the extent of the conflict. The same rule of irreconcilable repugnancy controls implied repeal of 'a general by a special statute. The subsequent provision treating a phase of the same genera subject matter in a more minute way may be intended to imply repeal pro-tanto of the (1) [1883] 11 Q.B.D. 120.

We may now briefly refer to the Prevention of Food Adultera- tion Rules, 1955 (hereafter called the Adulteration.Rules). These rules were made by the Central Government under s. 4(2) and s. 23(1) of the Adulteration Act and were published in the Official Gazette as per notification dated September 12, 1955. The rules other than those contained in Part III- Appendix B-Item A.12 Margarine, Part VI and Part VII came into force on the date of their publication in the Official Gazette : the rules contained in Part III, Appendix B, Item A.12 Margarine came into force on June 1, 1956 and the rules contained in Part VI and Part VII came into force on December 1, 1956-: vide r. 1(3). Under S. 23(2) (prior to its amendment in 1964) all rules made under sub-s. (1) had to be laid as soon as possible before both Houses of Parliament. By Act 49 of 1964 sub-s. (2) was amended so as to provide for every rule made under sub-s. (1) to be laid before each House of Parliament while in session, for a total period of 30 days in order to afford an opportunity to the two Houses to study and to modify or annul it for, future if both Houses so agree. We have referred to this amendment as some of the rules were amended thereafter. The effect of the subsequent amendment of some of the rules will be noticed later. The Adul- teration Rules clearly bring out the anxiety of their authors to see that wholesome food is sold to the citizens. The duties and powers of Food Inspectors as contained, inter alia, in rr. 9 and 1 3, broadly illustrate this anxiety. These rules also indicate that the framers of the Rules were not unaware of the different provisions of the Fruit Order. By way of illustration reference may be made to r. 50 which prescribes conditions of licence to manufacture, sell, stock, distribute or exhibit certain articles of food. In cl. (1) of sub-r. (1) of this rule the fruit-products covered under the Fruit Order and some other articles have been excluded from the operation of this rule. This clause was amended twice, once in November, 1956 and again in April, 1960. Had the Adulteration Act been intended to be impliedly repealed by the Fruit Order (which would also mean implied repeal of the rules) it would have been unnecessary to expressly exclude such fruit-products from the operation of this rule. Rule 5 and Appendix B of these Rules came into force on December 1, 1956 after the promulgation of the Fruit Order. According to r. 5 the standard of quality of the various articles of food specified in Appendix B are as specified therein. In Appendix B item at sl. no. A.16 deals with "fruit products". But the articles of fruit products dealt with in A. 16.01 to A. 16.12 clearly show that vinegar is not included in the expression "fruit products". Vinegar is dealt with in A.20 and synthetic vinegar in A.20.01. Both these items were added in April, 1960.

the Adulteration Act even a purchaser may, without any such sanction, institute a prosecution merely by producing along with his complaint a certificate from the Public Analyst. He also drew our attention to s. 20-A of the Adulteration Act according to which, unlike the Fruit Order, the Court trying an offence under that Act is empowered to implead the manufacturer, distributor or dealer of any article of food, it is satisfied that he is also concerned with, that offence, and proceed against him as though the prosecution had been instituted-against him under s. 20. We do not think this section in any way reflects the legislative intention of implied repeal of the Adulteration Act by the Fruit Order. The two statutory provisions can operate within their respective spheres without giving rise to any absurdity or such grave inconvenience as would impel the court to sustain the plea of implied repeal., Incidentally it may also be pointed out that this section was added by Act 49 of 1964 which came into force on March 1, 1965 long after 1960 when the present cases were started. Shri Daphtary developed his argument by adding that if the respondents have manufactured for sale and have sold vinegar in accordance with the terms of the licence granted to them under the Fruit Order then imposition of further restrictions under the Adulteration Act and Rules with a threat of severe penal consequences for violation of those provisions would be in direct conflict with the mandate or directions under the Fruit Order. The counsel contended that at least the freedom to manufacture and sell vinegar as permitted by the Fruit Order is curtailed or further circumscribed by the Adulteration Act and Rules and this must necessarily cut across the provisions of the Fruit Order. He illustrated his point by submitting that under the Fruit Order use of colouring matter is more liberal than under the Adulteration Act and Rules. In view of these conflicting provisions the Adulteration Act and Rules, according to Shri Daphtary must be held to have been impliedly repealed by the Fruit Order. We are unable to agree with this submission. The two statutory provisions, for the purpose of effectuating their respective objects, have imposed ,different restrictions on the respondents when they manufacture and sell vinegar whether brewed or synthetic. We are, however, '.Informed at the bar that in the present case the disputed vinegar is synthetic. In the interest of public health the respondents have to comply with the provisions of Adulteration Act and Rules and in the interests of equitable distribution of essential commodities including the articles of food covered by Essential Commodities Act and the Fruit Order they have to comply with the provisions of the Fruit Order. The provisions of the Adulteration Act and of the Fruit Order to which our attention was drawn seem to be supplementary and cumulative in their operation and no provision of the Fruit Order is shown to be destructive of or fatal to any ,provision of the Adulteration Act or the Rules made thereunder So as to compel the court to hold that they cannot stand together. If the Adulteration Act or Rules impose some restrictions on. the manufacturer, dealer and seller of vinegar then they have to comply with them irrespective of the fact that the Fruit Order imposes lesser number of restrictions in respect of these matters. The former do not render compliance with. the latter impossible, nor does compliance with the former necessarily and automatically involve violation of the latter. Indeed, our attention was not drawn to any provision of the Adulteration Act and Rules, compliance with which would result in breach of any mandate, whether affirmative or negative, of the Fruit Order. We are, therefore, unable to find any cogent or convincing reason for holding that the Parliament intended by enacting the Essential Commodities Act or the Fruit Order to implidely repeal the provisions of the adulteration Act and the Rules in respect the statutes can function with full the provisions of the Adultera of the vinegar in dispute. Both vigour side by side in their own parallel channels. Even if they happen to some extent to overlap. s. 26 of the General Clauses Act fully protects the guilty parties against double jeopardy or double penalty. This section lays down that where an Act or omission constitutes an,' offence under two or more enactments then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those enactments but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence. If, therefore, the provisions of the Adulteration Act and those of Fruit Order happen to constitute offences covering the same acts or omissions then it would be, open to the prosecuting authorities to punish the offender under either of them subject to the only condition that a guilty person should not be punished twice over.