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17.5. The suggestions made in Report No. 41 were taken note of and incorporated by the Central Government while drafting the Code of Criminal Procedure Bill in 1970. Ultimately, the 1898 Code was replaced by the present CrPC. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the CrPC provides that the Government took the following important considerations into account while evaluating the recommendations of the Law Commission:

“3. The recommendations of the Commission were examined carefully by the Government, keeping in view, among others, the following basic considerations:

11. We are, in fact, faced with a situation where contrary to the observations in Joginder Kumar case [Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P., (1994) 4 SCC 260 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1172] how a police officer has to deal with a scenario of arrest, the trial courts are stated to be insisting on the arrest of an accused as a prerequisite formality to take the charge-sheet on record in view of the provisions of Section 170 CrPC. We consider such a course misplaced and contrary to the very intent of Section 170 CrPC.” Section 204 and 209 of the Code “204. Issue of process.—(1) If in the opinion of a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence there is sufficient ground for proceeding, and the case appears to be—

54. We wish to place reliance on the judgment of the Bombay High Court in The Balasaheb Satbhai Merchant Coop Bank Ltd. vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors., 2011 SCC OnLine Bom 1261:

“13. At this stage, it may be useful to quote the observations of this Court in "Ambarish Rangshhi Patnigere v. State of Maharashtra"

referred supra, which reads thus -

“17. It may be noted here that the learned Counsel for intervener contended that the Magistrate did not have jurisdiction to grant bail because the offences under Sections 467 and 409 IPC, carry punishment which may be life imprisonment. According to the learned Counsel, if the offence is punishable with sentence of death or life imprisonment, the Magistrate cannot grant bail under Section 437(1) Cr.P.C., unless there are special grounds mentioned therein. He relied upon certain authorities in this respect including Prahlad Sigh Bhati v. NCT, Delhi and Anr. JT 2001 (4) SCC 280. In that case, offence was under Section 302 which is punishable with death sentence or life imprisonment and is exclusively triable by Court of Sessions. The offence under Section 409 is punishable with imprisonment for life or imprisonment for 10 years and fine. Similarly, the office under Section 467 is also punishable with imprisonment for life or imprisonment for 10 years and fine. Even though the maximum sentence which may be awarded is life imprisonment, as per Part I of Schedule annexed to Cr.P.C., both these offences are triable by a Magistrate of First Class. It appears that there are several offences including under sec. 326 in the Penal Code, 1860 wherein sentence, which may be awarded, is imprisonment for life or imprisonment for lesser terms and such offences are triable by Magistrate of the First Class. If the Magistrate is empowered to try the case and pass judgment and order of conviction or acquittal, it is difficult to understand why he cannot pass order granting bail, which is interlocutory in nature, in such cases. In fact, the restriction under Section 437(1) Cr.P.C. is in respect of those offences which are punishable with alternative sentence of death or life imprisonment. If the offence is punishable with life imprisonment or any other lesser sentence and is triable by Magistrate, it cannot be said that Magistrate does not have jurisdiction to consider the bail application. In taking this view, I am supported by the old Judgment of Nagpur Judicial Commissioner's Court in Tularam and Ors. v. Emperor 27 Cri.L.J. 1926 page 1063 and also by the Judgment of the Kerala High Court in Satyan v. State 1981 Cr.L.J. 1313. In Satyan, the Kerala High Court considered several earlier judgments and observed thus in paras 7 and 8:-

“67. Human liberty is a precious constitutional value, which is undoubtedly subject to regulation by validly enacted legislation. As such, the citizen is subject to the edicts of criminal law and procedure. Section 482 recognises the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as are necessary to give effect to the provisions of CrPC “or prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice”. Decisions of this Court require the High Courts, in exercising the jurisdiction entrusted to them under Section 482, to act with circumspection. In emphasising that the High Court must exercise this power with a sense of restraint, the decisions of this Court are founded on the basic principle that the due enforcement of criminal law should not be obstructed by the accused taking recourse to artifices and strategies. The public interest in ensuring the due investigation of crime is protected by ensuring that the inherent power of the High Court is exercised with caution. That indeed is one—and a significant—end of the spectrum. The other end of the spectrum is equally important : the recognition by Section 482 of the power inhering in the High Court to prevent the abuse of process or to secure the ends of justice is a valuable safeguard for protecting liberty. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 was enacted by a legislature which was not subject to constitutional rights and limitations; yet it recognised the inherent power in Section 561-A. Post- Independence, the recognition by Parliament [ Section 482 CrPC, 1973] of the inherent power of the High Court must be construed as an aid to preserve the constitutional value of liberty. The writ of liberty runs through the fabric of the Constitution. The need to ensure the fair investigation of crime is undoubtedly important in itself, because it protects at one level the rights of the victim and, at a more fundamental level, the societal interest in ensuring that crime is investigated and dealt with in accordance with law. On the other hand, the misuse of the criminal law is a matter of which the High Court and the lower courts in this country must be alive. In the present case, the High Court could not but have been cognizant of the specific ground which was raised before it by the appellant that he was being made a target as a part of a series of occurrences which have been taking place since April 2020. The specific case of the appellant is that he has been targeted because his opinions on his television channel are unpalatable to authority. Whether the appellant has established a case for quashing the FIR is something on which the High Court will take a final view when the proceedings are listed before it but we are clearly of the view that in failing to make even a prima facie evaluation of the FIR, the High Court abdicated its constitutional duty and function as a protector of liberty. Courts must be alive to the need to safeguard the public interest in ensuring that the due enforcement of criminal law is not obstructed. The fair investigation of crime is an aid to it. Equally it is the duty of courts across the spectrum—the district judiciary, the High Courts and the  Supreme Court—to ensure that the criminal law does not become a weapon for the selective harassment of citizens. Courts should be alive to both ends of the spectrum—the need to ensure the proper enforcement of criminal law on the one hand and the need, on the other, of ensuring that the law does not become a ruse for targeted harassment. Liberty across human eras is as tenuous as tenuous can be. Liberty survives by the vigilance of her citizens, on the cacophony of the media and in the dusty corridors of courts alive to the rule of (and not by) law. Yet, much too often, liberty is a casualty when one of these components is found wanting.” (emphasis supplied)