Bombay High Court
Balsara Hygiene Products Ltd. And ... vs D.S. Saxena And Another on 15 July, 1993
Equivalent citations: 1994(2)BOMCR164, [1994]208ITR623(BOM)
JUDGMENT
M.L. Pendse J.
1. By this petition filed under article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners are seeking a declaration that the amendment made to section 37 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, by section 17(b) of the Finance Act, 1983, by inserting sub-sections (3A) to (3D) is bad in law, illegal, invalid and violative of the petitioners' fundamental rights. The facts which gave rise to the filing of the petition are as follows :
Petitioner No. 1 was incorporated as a public limited company on April 29, 1978. Prior to its incorporation, the business was carried on by a partnership-firm known as Balsara Hygiene Products. The partnership-firm was engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of air purifiers, water filters, lavatory cleansers and mosquito repellent cream. In the year 1978, the partnership-firm entered the filed of dental hygiene with the introduction of a new tooth paste called "Promise". It is the claim of the petitioners that the tooth paste earned high acclaim and won many awards on account of quality and price. From the year 1980, the business of the partnership-firm was taken over by the company. The petitioners' claim that from the year 1981, sales of the tooth paste have gone up dramatically and the company exports large quantities abroad and the earnings of the company run into crores of rupees. The company spends large amounts on advertisement, publicity and sales promotion to compete with the tooth pastes marketed by multinational manufacturers. The sale of tooth paste climbed from Rs. 557 lakhs in the year 1981 to Rs. 1,077 lakhs in the year 1983. The expenses on advertisements, promotion, etc., in respect of the sale of tooth paste also jumped from Rs. 116 lakhs in the year 1981 to Rs. 138 lakhs in the year 1983. For the year ending June 30, 1983, the company incurred expenditure on advertisement, publicity and sales promotion totalling Rs. 197 lakhs and out of this amount Rs. 138 lakhs were spent on advertisement in newspapers, films, television and radio.
2. The petitioners' claim that expenditure incurred on advertisement, publicity and sales promotion was allowed as a deduction in the computation of its income subject to certain small disallowances under rule 6D of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, made pursuant to section 37(3) of the Act. In the year 1978, section 37 of the Act was amended by the Finance Act, 1978, by inserting sub-sections (3A) to (3D). The effect of the amendment was to disallow a portion of the expenses incurred by an assessee on advertisement, publicity and sales promotion in excess of Rs. 40,000. Representations were made by various associations and small scale industries to the Central Board of direct Taxes against these amended provisions and, consequently, the amended provisions were withdrawn by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1980, with effect from April 1, 1981.
3. Parliament by the Finance Act, 1983, again amended section 37 by inserting sub-sections (3A) to (3D) and, inter alia, provided that 20 per cent. of the expenditure incurred on advertisement, publicity and sales promotion, running and maintenance of aircraft and motor cars and payments made to hotels would be disallowed if the expenditure exceeded Rs. 1,00,000. It is necessary to set out the amended provisions which are under challenge :
"(3A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where the expenditure or, as the case may be, the aggregate expenditure incurred by an assessee on any one or more of the items specified in sub-section (3B) exceeds one hundred thousand rupees, twenty per cent. of such excess shall not be allowed as deduction in computing the income chargeable under the head 'Profits and gains of business or profession'.
(3B) The expenditure referred to in sub-section (3A) is that incurred on -
(i) advertisement, publicity and sales promotion; or
(ii) running and maintenance of aircraft and motor cars; or
(iii) payments made to hotels.
Explanation. - For the purposes of sub-sections (3A) and (3B), -
(a) the expenditure specified in clause (i) to clause (iii) of sub-section (3B) shall be the aggregate amount of expenditure incurred by the assessee as reduced by so much of such expenditure as is not allowed under any other provision of this Act;
(b) expenditure on advertisement, publicity and sales promotion shall not include remuneration paid to employees of the assessee engaged in one or more of the said activities;
(c) expenditure on running and maintenance of aircraft and motor cars shall include, -
(i) expenditure incurred on chartering any aircraft and expenditure on hire charges for engaging cars plied for hire;
(ii) conveyance allowance paid to employees and, where the assessee is a company, conveyance allowance paid to its directors also.
(3C) Nothing contained in sub-section (3A) shall apply in respect of expenditure incurred by an assessee, being a domestic company as defined in clause (2) of section 80B, or a person (other than a company) who is resident in India in respect of expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively on -
(i) advertisement, publicity and sales promotion outside India in respect of the goods, services or facilities which the assessee deals in or provides in the course of his business;
(ii) running and maintenance of motor cars in any branch, office or agency maintained outside India, for the promotion of the sale outside India of such goods, services or facilities.
(3D) No disallowance under sub-section (3A) shall be made -
(i) in the case of an assessee engaged in the business of operation of aircraft, in respect of expenditure incurred on running and maintenance of such aircraft;
(ii) in the case of an assessee engaged in the business of running motor cars on hire, in respect of expenditure incurred in running and maintenance of such motor cars."
4. The petitioners claimed that for the years ended June 30, 1983, the gross receipts of the company amounted to Rs. 16,94,77,023 whereas the total expenditure for the same period amounted to Rs. 16,96,92,618. The petitioners claimed that the loss as per the books of account for the year ended June 30, 1983, was Rs. 2,15,595, but the loss to be computed under the provisions of the Income-tax Act would work out to Rs. 5,74,457. The petitioners claim that there was no liability for payment of income-tax or surtax under the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964, in the absence of the impugned amendments. However, on account of the impugned amendments, the total amounts to be disallowed will be Rs. 40,23,123 and the break-up of the disallowed amounts is Rs. 39,49,089 on advertisement and business promotion, Rs. 44,036 on motor car expenses and Rs. 30,000 on hotel payment. The petitioners apprehended that on assessment, the company will be liable to pay income-tax of about Rs. 19,45,000 and surtax of about Rs. 20,000. The petitioners, therefore, challenged the amendment made to section 37 by section 17(b) of the Finance Act, 1983, claiming that the amended sections are violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed under articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India. The challenge in the petition is no the ground of violation of articles 14, 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. Counsel for the petitioners did not press the challenge based on articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution in view of the decision of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Mysore Kirloskar Ltd. v. Union of India (1986) 160 ITR 50. The decision of the Karnataka High Court was challenged before the Supreme Court but the special leave petition was dismissed by a Bench consisting of Chief Justice Pathak and Justice Venkatachaliah, as he then was, by order dated November 10, 1987.
5. Shri Chinoy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, submitted that the amended provisions are violative of article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India and are liable to be struck down as the fundamental rights of the shareholders of the company are assailed by the State action. Learned counsel urged that freedom of speech and expression includes the right of a businessman to advertise, publicise and promote sales of his products and which is popularly referred to as "commercial speech". It was urged that the impugned amendments constitute an unreasonable restriction on the petitioners' right of freedom of commercial speech and the direct and inevitable effect of the amendments is to curtail or restrict the petitioners' fundamental rights. Shri Chinoy submitted that commercial speech results in the education of the citizens of this country endowing them with sufficient choice in their consumption pattern, and the amendment seeks to limit the circulation of information to which citizens are entitled by virtue of the constitutional guarantee. It was further contended that the main source of income for the newspapers is from advertisement and the direct and inevitable effect of the impugned amendments would be to reduce the advertisements and, thereby, to curtail the circulation of the newspapers, which would directly affect the freedom of the press. Shri Jetly, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Department, on the other hand, contended that the challenge to the amended provisions as violative of article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India is not correct. It was submitted that the assumption of the petitioners that there is a restraint on commercial speech and the direct and inherent effect of the amendments would affect the freedom of the press is not accurate. Learned counsel urged that the amendments provide for denial of exemption to large business houses who incur expenditure over the sum of Rs. 1,00,000 on advertisements and running and maintenance of aircraft, motor cars and payment made to hotels. It was submitted that denial of 20 per cent. of excess tax over one hundred thousand rupees while computing the deduction on the income chargeable can by no stretch of imagination be violative of article 19(1)(a) as there is no absolute immunity to the advertisements from taxation. It was urged that the fiscal statute cannot be struck down when the direct and inevitable effect of the impugned amendment is not to curtail or to restrict the right to advertisements but merely to regulate them. In view of the rival submissions, the question which requires answer is whether the amended provisions are violative of the protection guaranteed under article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.
6. Article 19(1)(a) of the constitution of India provides that all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression. Article 19(2) provides that nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the sub-clause provided it is in the interest of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State. Friendly relations with foreign States, etc. Shri Chinoy submitted that while introducing the Finance Bill, the reasons given by the Finance Minister in support of the impugned amendments were as follows (see [1983] 140 ITR (St.) 31) :
"Honourable members must be aware of lavish and wasteful expenditure by trade and industry, particularly on travelling, advertisement and the like. With a view to inculcating a climate of austerity and providing a disincentive to non-productive, avoidable and ostentatious spending by trade and industry, I propose to provide that 20 per cent. of such expenditure will be disallowed in computing the taxable profits."
7. Learned counsel urged that the intention of carrying out the amendment is not to levy tax but to prevent non-productive, avoidable and ostentatious spending by the trade. It was suggested that from the speech of the Finance Minister, an inference is inevitable that the amendments were introduced with a view to curtail or restrain commercial speech. Learned counsel placed strong reliance upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) P. Ltd. v. Union of India [1986] 159 ITR 856; Sakal Papers (P.) Ltd. v. Union of India, and Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India, , in support of the submission. Before adverting to the decisions relied upon and to determine whether the amended provisions directly put a restraint upon commercial speech or the freedom of speech and expression on businessmen to advertise, it is necessary to refer to the exact ambit of the amended provisions under challenge.
8. Section 37 of the Income-tax Act provides that any expenditure not being expenditure of the nature described in sections 30 to 36 and not being in the nature of capital expenditure or personal expenses of the assessee, laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the business or profession shall be allowed in computing the income chargeable under the head "Profits and gains of business or profession". To the general rule, the exception is carved out by the amended provisions of sub-section (3A) of section 37. The sub-section provides that where the expenditure incurred by the assessee on any one or more of the items specified in sub-section (3B) exceeds one hundred thousand rupees, twenty per cent. of such excess shall not be allowed as deduction in computing the income chargeable under the head "Profits and gains of business or profession". The items specified in sub-section (3B) are :
(a) advertisement, publicity and sales promotion; or
(b) running and maintenance of aircraft and motor cars; or
(c) payments made to hotels.
Sub-sections (3C) and (3D) are not relevant for the challenge raised by the petitioners. A perusal of the amended provisions makes it clear that normally sub-sections (3A) and (3B) would come into play in case of large business houses who incur expenditure of more than Rs. 1,00,000 on advertisement, running and maintenance of aircraft and motor cars and payments made to hotels. It is unlikely that the expenditure would cross the limits of Rs. 1,00,000 unless the turnover of the assessee is far in excess of a lakh of rupees.
9. The gravamen of the complaint urged on behalf of the petitioners is that commercial advertisements constitute speech and expression as contemplated under article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. The petitioners claim that speech and expression cannot be curtailed or restricted because the Government considers such speech and expression to be socially unproductive. It is further claimed that tax or other fiscal measures cannot be imposed for the purpose of curtailing or restricting the volume of expression or for controlling its content and any fiscal measure taken for such purposes must necessarily be unconstitutional unless protected by article 19(2) of the Constitution. Shri Chinoy submitted that a perusal of the Finance Minister's speech establishes the object of the levy and the situation it was sought to remedy and, therefore, the impugned fiscal levy directly seeks to curtail the volume of advertising on the ground that the Government considers such expenditure/activity wasteful and unproductive. Shri Chinoy submitted that the decision of the Supreme Court in Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India, , indicated that commercial advertising would not fall within the expression "speech and expression" under article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India but the subsequent decisions in Sakal Papers (P.) Ltd. v. Union of India, and Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Private Ltd. v. Union of India, [1986] 159 ITR 856 (SC) clearly establish that commercial speech can also come within the ambit of article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India.
10. At this stage, it would be convenient to make a reference to the decisions cited by Shri Chinoy in support of the submission. In the case of State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara [1951] SCR 682 : AIR 1951 SC 318, the Supreme Court examined the expression "commending" in section 23(a) and section 24(1)(a) of the Bombay Prohibition Act to determine whether the expression "commending" intoxicant are said to conflict with the fundamental right guaranteed by article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court observed that there can be no doubt that the prohibition against "commending" intoxicant is a curtailment of the right guaranteed and it can be supported only if it is saved by clause (2) of article 19 of the constitution of India. The next decision referred to is Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India, where the question of the constitutionality of the Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act, 1954, arose for consideration. The Supreme Court in paragraph 17 of the judgment observed that an advertisement is no doubt a form of speech but its true character is reflected by the object of the promotion of which it is employed. It assumes the attributes and elements of the activity under article 19(1)(a) which it seeks to aid by bringing it to the notice of the public. When it takes the form of a commercial advertisement which has an element of trade or commerce, it no longer falls within the concept of freedom of speech for the object is not propagation of ideas - social, political or economic or furtherance of literature or human though, but the commendation of the efficacy value and importance of certain goods. Shri Chinoy suggested that the decision in Hamdard's case, , indicates that commercial advertisement will not attract article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. The submission is not accurate because the Supreme Court observed in paragraph 18 of the judgment (at page 563) :
"It cannot be said therefore that every advertisement is a matter dealing with freedom of speech nor can it be said that it is an expression of ideas. In every case, one has to see what is the nature of the advertisement and what activity falling under article 19(1) it seeks to further."
10. From the above observations, it is obvious that the Supreme Court never intended to lay down a principle that commercial advertising does not constitute speech and expression within article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. The next decision replied upon is Sakal Papers (P.) Ltd. v. Union of India, . The constitutional validity of the Daily Newspaper (Price and Page) Order, 1960, came up for consideration. The effect of the Act and the impugned order was to regulate the number of pages according to the price charged, prescribe the number of supplements to be published and prohibit the publication and sale of newspapers in contravention of any order made under section 3 of the Act. The Act also provided for regulating the size and area of advertising matter in relation to other matters contained in a newspaper. Mr. Justice Mudholkar, speaking for the Bench, observed (at page 313) :
"It may well be within the power of the State to place, in the interest of the general public, restrictions upon the right of a citizen to carry on business but it is not open to the State to achieve this object by directly and immediately curtailing any other freedom of that citizen guaranteed by the Constitution and which is not susceptible of abridgment on the same grounds as are set out in clause (6) of article 19. Therefore, the right of freedom of speech cannot be taken away with the object of placing restrictions on the business activities of a citizen. Freedom of speech can be restricted only in the interests of the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence. It cannot, like the freedom to carry on business, be curtailed in the interest of the general public. If a law directly affecting it is challenged, it is no answer that the restrictions enacted by it are justifiable under clauses (3) to (6). For the scheme of article 19 is to enumerate different freedoms separately and then to specify the extent of restrictions to which they may be subjected and the objects for securing which this could be done. A citizen is entitled to enjoy each and every one of the freedoms together and clause (1) does not prefer one freedom to another. That is the plain meaning of this clause. It follows from this that the State cannot make a law which directly restricts one freedom even for securing the better enjoyment of another freedom. All the greater reason, therefore, for holding that the State cannot directly restrict one freedom by placing an otherwise permissible restriction on another freedom."
11. The next decision in Bennett Coleman and Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, where the import policy for newsprint for the year April, 1972, to March, 1973, was challenged on the ground of infringement of the fundamental right guaranteed under article 19(1)(a). The Supreme Court observed that the tests of pith and substance of the subject-matter and of the direct and incidental effect of the legislation are relevant to questions of legislative competence but they are irrelevant to the question of infringement of fundamental rights. It was them observed in paragraph 39 of the judgment that the true test is whether the effect of the impugned action is to take away or abridge fundamental rights. It was further observed (at page 119) :
"If it be assumed that the direct object of the law or action has to be direct abridgment of the right of free speech by the impugned law or action, it is to be related to the directness of effect and not to the directness of the subject-matter of the impeached law or action. The action may have a direct effect on a fundamental right although its direct subject-matter may be different."
12. The last decision of the Supreme Court to which reference was made is Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) P. Ltd. v. Union of India [1986] 159 ITR 856. The challenge was to the validity of the imposition of import duty on newsprint imported from abroad under section 12 of the Customs Act and the levy of auxiliary duty under the Finance Act. The Supreme Court, after exhaustively setting out the importance of the freedom of speech and expression which includes the freedom of the press proceeded to consider whether it is open to the Government to levy any tax on any of the aspects of the press and the question posed was "Do newspapers have immunity from taxation ?" After exhaustive consideration of the subject, the Supreme Court held that newspapers cannot claim immunity from taxation. As to whether the tax levied on the newspaper industry transgresses into the field of freedom of expression and stifles that freedom, the Supreme Court observed (at page 893) :
"As long as it is within reasonable limits and does not impede freedom of expression, it will not be contravening the limitations of article 19(2). The delicate task of determining when it crosses from the area of profession, occupation, trade, business or industry into the area of freedom of expression and interferes with that freedom is entrusted to the courts."
13. The Supreme Court then examined the earlier decisions in Sakal Papers (P.) Ltd.'s case, and Bennett Coleman and Co.'s case, , and observed that the impugned provisions have the direct consequence of the curtailment of advertisements. The freedom is violated by placing a restraint upon the integral part of the freedom or by placing a restraint upon something which is the essential part of the freedom.
14. Shri Chinoy referred to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 48 US SCR 346. The question examined was whether protection of the First Amendment is available for "commercial speech". The issue arose as the pharmacists published the advertisement of prescription drug prices and the nature of advertisement was summarised in the following words :
"The 'idea' he wishes to communicate is simply this : "I will sell you the X prescription drug at the Y price."
15. The Supreme Court examined whether this communication is wholly outside the protection of the First Amendment. After taking into consideration various decisions, it was held that the communication is not outside the protection of the First Amendment. The decisions referred to on behalf of the petitioners do establish that commercial advertising constitutes speech and expression within article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India.
16. The real question which requires determination is whether the impugned amendments in section 37 of the Income-tax Act restrains or curtails commercial speech. In the decisions in Express Newspapers (P.) Ltd. v. Union of India , the question arose as to whether the wage board specifying the wages and conditions of service of working journalists and imposing a certain financial burden was an infringement of the right of freedom of the press and Bhagwati J., speaking for the Bench, observed (at page 620 of AIR 1958 SC and page 285 of 14 FJR) :
"Unless these were the direct or inevitable consequences of the measures enacted in the impugned Act, it would not be possible to strike down the legislation as having that effect and operation. A possible eventuality of this type would not necessarily be the consequence which could be in the contemplation of the Legislature while enacting a measure of this type for the benefit of the workmen concerned."
17. The Supreme Court referred with approval to the decision in Grosjean v. American Press Co. [1935] 297 US 233 for the proposition that a statute imposing a tax on the business of publishing advertisements would be void if it was found to be a deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of information to which the public was entitled by virtue of the constitutional guarantees.
18. Bearing this principle in mind, it is necessary to examine whether the provisions of section 37(3A) of the Income-tax Act put a restraint or curtail the right of the advertiser to publish commercial advertisements so as to attract the prohibition contained in article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. In our judgment, it is impossible to accede to the submission that Parliament had found deliberate and calculated device in the guise of the tax to limit the right of advertisers of commercial speech. It is also difficult to accede to the submission that the enactment of sub-sections (3A) and (3B) of section 37 of the Income-tax Act has the direct inevitable consequence of infringing upon the protection guaranteed under article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. As mentioned hereinabove, sub-section (3A) prescribes that when the aggregate expenditure incurred by the assessee exceeds one hundred thousand rupees, then 20 per cent. of such excess shall not be allowed as deduction in computing the income chargeable under the head "Profits and gains of business or profession". It is necessary to bear in mind that there is no restriction whatsoever on the expenses which an assessee can incur on advertisement, publicity and sales promotion or running and maintenance of aircraft and motor cars or payments made to hotels. The Legislature has provided for levy of tax by prescribing that 20 per cent. of the excess shall not be allowed as deduction in the cases where the aggregate expenditure exceeds one hundred thousand rupees. The Supreme Court in the case of Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) P. Ltd. [1986] 159 ITR 856 held that even newspapers are not immune from taxation. In the present case, we are concerned not with the taxation in regard to newspapers but taxation of assessees who incur expenditure in excess of one hundred thousand rupees in respect of items specified in sub-section (3B) of section 37 of the Income-tax Act and which, inter alia, refers to the expenses in regard to advertisement, publicity and sales promotion. The principle that even though the commercial speech falls within the ambit of article 19(1)(a) is accepted, that would not give immunity to an assessee from payment of taxes in respect of advertisements. In this connection, it is interesting to note that earlier by the Finance Act, 1978, sub-sections (3A) to (3D) were inserted in section 37 of the Act and those sub-sections were omitted by the Finance Act, 1980. In those sub-sections, the aggregate expenditure which was in excess of Rs. 40,000 was not allowed deduction at a certain percentage depending upon the turnover. The Legislature in its wisdom raised the limit of aggregate expenditure of one hundred thousand rupees before depriving 20 per cent. of such expenses from deduction in computing the income chargeable. In our judgment, the contention of the petitioners that the tax or the fiscal measure under sub-section (3A) and sub-section (3B) was imposed for the purpose of curtailing or restricting or controlling commercial speech is not correct. The sub-sections do not curtail or restrict the expenditure which an assessee desires to incur, nor do they restrict the contents of such advertisements but merely provide that in case the assessee exceeds a particular limit, then 20 per cent, of such excess shall not be allowed as deduction. In our judgment, the provisions of sub-sections (3A) and (3B) of section 37 of the Income-tax Act do not have the consequence of transgressing the freedom of publishing advertisements either directly or even remotely. It is well-settled that unless the impugned provisions have the direct or inevitable consequence of transgressing upon the freedom of speech, it is not possible to strike down the legislation as having that effect and operation. The reliance by Shri Chinoy on the speech of the Finance Minister at the time of introduction of the Finance Act cannot lead to the conclusion that the fiscal levy seeks to curtail the volume of advertising on the ground that such expenditure is wasteful and unproductive. The speech of the Finance Minister must be read in its proper context and it cannot be overlooked that the provisions of sub-section (3B) of section 37 do not refer merely to expenditure incurred on advertisements but also to the running and maintenance of aircrafts and motor cars and payments made to hotels. The Speech of the Finance Minister cannot be limited only to the expenditure incurred on advertisements and, reading it in its proper perspective, it is obvious that the fiscal levy is not a restraint on the speech and expression of the advertiser in publishing the advertisements.
19. While examining the complaint of restraint on advertisements, it is not possible to equate the right to publish advertisements with the freedom of speech guaranteed to newspapers. The complaint of Shri Chinoy that the restriction on the advertiser in view of the provisions of sub-section (3A) of section 37 of the Act would indirectly affect the revenue of the newspaper leading to the decrease in circulation and, therefore, impinges on the freedom of speech guaranteed to the newspapers cannot be accepted. The claim is far-fetched and of remote conscience as there is no restriction on the assessee to incur expenditure beyond Rs. 1,00,000 on advertisements and, consequently, the complaint that the freedom of press will be violated is imaginary. In our judgment, the challenge to the provisions of sub-sections (3A) to (3D) of the Section 37 of the Income-tax Act as introduced by section 17(b) of the Finance Act, 1983, is without any merit and the petition must fail.
20. Accordingly, rule is discharged with costs.