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4) Whether the proceeding initiated by the Deputy Commissioner of Shivamogga in LRF.CR.2/2010-11, u/s. 79-B(3) of the Act, as against the Appellant Religious Institution, based on its declarations filed by u/s.79-B(2)(a) of the Act, i.e. after omission of Sec.79-B of the Act, from the principle Act, by virtue of Karnataka Ordinance No.23/2003 [the Karnataka Land Reforms (second amendment) Ordinance 2020], survive for consideration?"

3. Learned Sr. Advocate appearing for the Petitioner, argues that the Ordinance having been metamorphosed into a Statute by virtue of the Karnataka Act No.56 of 2020, the restrictions enacted inter alia in the provisions of Sections 79A & 79B of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, i.e., owning of agricultural land, have been done away with, although challenge to the same is still pending consideration in a PIL, there is absolutely no justification whatsoever for referring the matter to the Larger Bench for consideration, on the questions framed in the Reference Order. He further argues that what has been stated by the learned Judicial Member of the Tribunal perfectly accords with the change in legal regime, i.e., holding of agricultural land which otherwise could not have been held and that there is a statutory abatement of proceedings, therefore the version of Administrative Member to the contrary which ultimately led to reference to the Full Bench, is unsustainable. He adds, referring a matter to the Larger Bench cannot be done in a casual manner regard being had to the precious time of the Tribunal and the enormous pendency of cases before it, apart from the huge expenditure by the Exchequer. So arguing, he seeks invalidation of the impugned order and the consequent quashment of the Full Bench Notification mentioned above.

5. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having perused the Petition Papers, this Court is inclined to grant indulgence in the matter, for the following reasons:

(a) There is an appreciable unanimity at the Bar that all the four questions framed for the consideration of Full Bench of the Tribunal are structured on a foundational premise that the Petitioner-Mutt could not have held the lands in question because of the restrictions enacted in Sections 79A & 79B of the 1961 Act, as they were before the Amendment. If that be so, the Ordinance followed by the Amendment Act have brought about legal suicide of all the pending proceedings by virtue of abatement clause therein. Section 4 of the Amendment Act omits Section 79A and Section 5 of the Amendment Act omits Section 79B of the 1961 Act. What is significant is the word 'omitted' employed in these provisions and therefore, they go back to the date on which the 1961 Act is enacted. Sub-section (2) of Section 12 reads:

"(2) All cases pending before any Court, tribunal or other authority competent under the provisions of the Principal Act on the date of promulgation of the Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Ordinance, 2020 (Karnataka Ordinance 13 of 2020) pertaining to sections 79A, 79B and 79C shall hereby stand abated."

In more or less a similar fact matrix, the Apex Court in PT. MADAN SWAROOP SHROTIYA PUBLIC CHARITABLE TRUST VS. STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS (2000) 6 SCC 325 has considered the effect of abatement of legal proceedings by virtue of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 which has done away with the Principal Act and held that all pending proceedings abated on their own. The inner voice of this decision supports the case of Petitioner that the appeal proceedings arising from the confiscation orders being the continuation of the original proceedings, do abate. Such a abatement causes collapse of the substratum on which the Tribunal's order involving conflicting opinion arose followed by the Reference Order that puts the matter at the hands of its Full Bench. An abatement renders a thing as no longer existent and thus, the maxim ex nihilo nihil fit i.e., out of nothing, nothing comes out, becomes invocable. The net effect of this is: the confiscatory orders wither away; all proceedings including the appeals in which they are put in challenge also wither away. As a consequence, status quo ante is established qua the ownership and possession of the lands in question.

(c) The confiscatory proceedings instituted u/s 79B(2)(a) of the 1961 Act are by their very nature summary proceedings. It is always between the Revenue Department and the owner of the land who has allegedly acquired the same in contravention of statutory provisions. That being the position, a third party namely the Forest Department ordinarily cannot seek intervention. An argument to the contrary would upset the very statutory scheme enacted in the confiscatory provisions. Therefore, question No.3 framed for the consideration of the Full Bench has to be answered in the Negative. In other words, the proceedings taken under the provisions of Section 79B of the 1961 Act do not permit participation of Forest Department as a party or as an intervener and that no order can be passed by the Competent Authority in these proceedings bestowing the lands in question in favour of the Forest Department. The fourth question for Reference as to whether the initiation of proceedings u/s 79B(3) of the 1961 Act on the basis of the declaration filed by the Petitioner u/s 79B(2)(a) after the omission of Section 79B as a whole from the Principal Act, is valid, does not survive for consideration because of the clear intent of the legislature to give quietus to all such proceedings which otherwise would have resulted into confiscation of the land. If pending proceedings should abate, it sounds thoroughly illogical that fresh proceedings can be initiated. Had it been the intent of legislature, it would have made a provision enabling such a measure. The plain reading of English text of the Ordinance and the Amendment Act, does not support a contra view even in the least.