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Showing contexts for: Statutory presumption in The Hon'Ble Supreme Court In The Case Of ... vs . State Of on 22 October, 2020Matching Fragments
21. On bare reading of these provisions, it becomes clear that the court shall presume the execution of a negotiable instrument for consideration unless and until the contrary is proved. Similarly, the Court shall also draw a presumption in favour of the complainant/holder of the cheque that the said cheque has been issued in discharge of legally enforceable debt or other liability.
22. There is a statutory presumption under section 139 of the act which arises in the favour of the complainant. This presumption is rebuttable and the accused is required to raise a probable defence. Burden of proof is hence upon the accused in such cases. Reliance can be placed on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.S Narayan Menon vs. State of Kerala (2006) 6 SCC 39, wherein the Hon'ble Court has discussed in detail the scope and ambit of statutory presumption under section 118 read with section 139 of the Act. The relevant extract of the judgment is reproduced below:
23. Further, it is also a settled proposition of law that the standard of proof which is required from the accused to rebut the statutory presumption under section 118 read with section 139 of the Act is prepondereance of probabilities. The accused is not required to prove his case beyond reasonable doubt. This onus on the accused can be discharged from the materials available on record and from the circumstantial evidences. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in M.S Narayan Menon case (supra) has interalia held the following:
"The standard of proof evidently is preponderance of probabilities. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials on record but also by reference to the circumstances upon which he relies"
24. Further as discussed above, it should also be noted that the standard of proof in order to rebut the statutory presumption may be inferred from the materials on record and circumstantial evidences. It is not always mandatory for the accused to examine its own witnesses in order to rebut the said statutory presumption. At this point, reliance may be placed on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Krishna Janardhan Bhat (supra), wherein the Hon'ble Court has categorically held the following:
25. This principle has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan (2010) 11 SCC 441 wherein while discussing the scope and ambit of statutory presumption under section 139 of the Act, the Hon'ble Court has held the following:
"27. Section 139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While section 138 of the Act specifies a strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable presumption under section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. However, it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by section 138 can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the defendant-accused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard of proof.