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4. It was urged on behalf of the applicants in the first place that this Court was competent, to make the two sentences run concurrently under Section 397(1) of the Code and reliance was placed on the decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in Ulfat v. State 1967 All W R (HC) 757 : 1970 Ori LJ 767.

5. The relevant part of Section 397 of the Code provides:

When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life, such imprisonment or imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previously sentenced unless the Court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence:

8. 16 was contended that if the sentence under the subsequent conviction is made to run concurrently with the previous sentence even after the final judgment has been passed in the subsequent trial or in the appeal arising therefrom that would not amount to a review or alteration of the judgment within the mesning of Section 369 of the Code. Reliance for this argument was sought from Ulfat's case (supra) wherein it was observed that by making the subsequent sentence concurrent with the earlier sentence neither the subsequent sentence is reduced not its nature changed and it retains its earlier characteristic. It was also observed that the power to make the subsequent sentence concurrent with the previous sentence is not an appellate power but is a separate and distinct power conferred by Section 397, Criminal Procedure Code. A reference in this connection was also made to the observation made by a learned single Judge of the Patna High Court in Baijnath Kurmi v. The State to the effect that "an order nude by a Court under Section 397(1) as to the commencement of the sentence need not be a part of its judgment, and may, there, fore, be made by the Court passing the subsequent sentence after the judgment is signed." With respect we find it difficult to endorse the aforesaid reasoning. It is not only the order of conviction but also the sentence awarded and the directions given in that behalf that constitute integral parts of the judgment and cannot be reviewed or altered after the judgment has been pronounced. The direction contained in a judgment with regard to the sentences imposed on the accused, i. e., whether they shall run concurrently or consecutively is as much an integral part of the judgment as his convietion consequent upon a finding regarding the guilt of the accused. In a case where there is no such specific direction the law would take its court and, as pointed out earlier, the general rule, embodied in the Code is that the sentences would run consecutively. This principle is applicable both in the case of trial and appellate courts. The prohibition against reviewing or altering the judgment is equally applicable to both trial and appellate courts. The word 'alter' means 'to cause to become different in some particular characteristic (as measure, dimension course, arrangement, or inclination) with out changing into something else'. A change in the 'course' or 'arrangement' of the sentence would certainly amount to an alteration of the sentence which forms a part of the judgment. We are of the opinion that neither the trial court nor the appellate court is competent to exercise the discretion conferred under Section 397(1) of the Code after the judgment has been signed.

12. The discretion to make the sentence on subsequent conviction run concurrently with the previous sentence must be based on some sound principle and is not meant to be exercised in an arbitrary manner. It would be proper exercise of discretion to make the sentence on a subsequent conviction to run concurrently with the previous sentence where aspirate trials are held for offences which while constituting distinct offences, are inherently or intimately connected with each other. A person employed to realise money for his mister from persons who it to him in connection with business dealings may misappropriate money realised from some debtors during the course of a cartain period and may be tried separately for each item of money misappropriated and may consequently be sentenced to separate terms of imprisonment It would be a proper exercise of discretion to make the sentence run conenrrently in the exercise of the discretion conferred by Section 397(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code and, if that stage is over, by the High Court under Section 561 A of the Code. A person may be put up for trial for offences punishable under Sections 399/402, I.P.C. He may be separately tried for on offence punishable under Section 25, Arms Act in respect of a weapon recovered from his possesion at the time of his arrest. It would be a proper exercise of discretion if the sentences on subsequent conviction is made to run con currently with the previous sentence. There may be a cause where although it is brought to the notice of the Court holding the subsequent trial or to the appellate court hearing appeal from the subsequent conviction that the accused was already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment as a result of his conviction in an earlier criminal trial but due to an oversight the Court omits to exercise its disertion of making the sentence on subsequent conviction run concurrently with the previous sentence, it would be a fit case for exercise of the inherent power of the Court under Section 561-A of the Code to male the two sentences run concurrently on the principle that the accused should not be made to suffer on account of the omission of the Court to apply its mind to the diacretionary power vested in it under the Code. If the fact of the previous conviction and sentence is brought to the notice of the Court dealing with the subsequent trial, whether as an original court or as an appellate court, it is the duty of the Court dealing with the subsequent trial to apply its mind to the question whether the sentence on subsequent conviction should be made concurrent with the previous sentence and if the Court for one reason on the other fails to apply its mind to that question, it would be in the interest of justice that the High Court rectifies that mistake under its inherent power. In such a situation the Court would not be acting contrary to any provision of the Code or against any express or implied prohibition contained in it.

15. Learned Counsel for the applicants referred to us certain cases in which this court in exercise of its inherent powers directed that the sentence on subsequent conviction should run concurrently with the previous sentence. In Ulfat's case 1967 All WR (HC) 757 : 1970 Cri LJ 767 (supra) it was observed that the conviction of the applicants was based on identification and there was no allegation against them of any rapacity or undue violence while committing the dacoity. The same reasoning was applied in Shamley v. State 1969 All W R (HC) 200. In Mohammad Ali v. State 1969 All W R (HC) 496, the only ground for making the sentence run concurrently was that the eonviction in both the cases rested on evidence of identification, The fact that the conviction of the accused persons was based on identification could not be a relevant consideration in making the sentence under the subsequent conviction run concurrently with the previous sentence in exercise of the inherent power under Section 561-4, of the Code. The fact that there was no allegation of any rapacity or undue violence while committing the dasoity could also not furnish a valid consideration for exercisa of the inherent power of the Court. A dacoit may not indulge in baating or terrorising the victims because no resistance is offered during the commission of the crime and not because of any humane or noble trait in his own character. Where offences giving rise to separate trials and convictions are distinct and are not intimately connected, the sentences should be made to take the normal coarse and it would not be a proper exercise of judicial discretion more so in the exercise of the inherent power of the court, to make them run concurrently. The applications of Mulaim Singh and Sukh Ram do not make out any case for making their sentences concurrent.