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2. Aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal, the Union of India has challenged the correctness of the said order in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

3. The facts in the present case are hardly in controversy. The Tribunal relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Milind Katware and Ors. AIR 2001 SC 393, held that the respondent was entitled to the relief prayed for. It will be useful to notice at the very outset that, as noticed even by the Tribunal, the Supreme Court in Milind's case had framed two questions and while answering them, it was categorically held that the Scheduled Tribe Order must be read as it is. It is not even permissible to say that a tribe, sub-tribe, part of or group of any tribe or tribal community is synonymous to the one mentioned in the Scheduled Tribes Order if they are not so specifically mentioned in it. It was further held that it was not open to the State Government or the Courts or Tribunals or any other authority to modify, amend or alter the list of Scheduled Tribes specified in the notification issued under Clause (1) of Article 342 of the Constitution of India. In the present case, first we have to examine what the respondent had done. The respondent had made an application claiming himself to be belonging to Halba, Scheduled Tribe and it was on the basis of that certificate that he was given employment by the petitioners. Clause 20 of the letter of appointment was binding upon the parties and it was obligatory upon the respondent to produce the original certificate, a copy of which he had annexed to the application. The certificate which the respondent subsequently produced was not a certificate of Halba, Scheduled Tribe. In terms of the letter of appointment, the appointment was to take effect from 26th June, 1995 and prior to that date, the respondent should fall in the category against which he applied. Vide letter dated 4th August, 2001, the respondent was directed to produce the original caste certificate and even to produce the supporting documents and appear before the committee. The verification was in relation to the caste certificate issued on 23rd August, 1988. Again vide letter dated 22nd October, 2001,the respondent was called upon to produce the original certificate within seven days of the receipt of the letter but the respondent failed to do so. The Scrutiny Committee in its report noticed in great detail the conduct of the respondent as well as failure on his part to produce the relevant documents. The following extract from the order of the Scrutiny Committee can be usefully referred to.

7. During the hearing, a copy of Police Vigilance Cell report was served on the candidate and he was given an opportunity to submit his say within 17 days. The candidate submitted his say dated 19.11.2003, stating that he agrees with the contents of the Police Vigilance report. Thus, Koshti is a separate caste and it is not included in the list of Scheduled Tribe. Moreover, the weaving as an occupation is a taboo in Halba/Halbi, Scheduled Tribe community. The scrutiny Committee on the basis of facts came up during the Police Vigilance Cell enquiry, social characteristics, traits, ethnic linkage and affinity test reaches the conclusion that the candidate does not belong to Halba, Scheduled Trib.

After evaluating and verifying the case, in the light of information collected by the Police Vigilance Cell and observations made by the Research Officer, the Committee has come to the conclusion that the candidate does not belong to Halba, Scheduled Tribe community. Hence, the Scrutiny Committee passes the following order:

ORDER After considering all the documents, facts and in exercise of the power vested vide Maharashtra Act quoted in the preamble at Sr. No. 1, the Caste Scrutiny Committee has come to the conclusion that Shri Dipak Yadawrao Gotephode does not belong to Halba, Scheduled Tribe & hence his claim towards the same is held invalid. His Caste Certificate granted by the Executive Magistrate, Bhandara vide R.C. No. 285/MRC81/ 88-89, dated 23.8.88 is hereby cancelled and confiscated.
4. The Court cannot substitute the notification as the same has to be strictly construed as the competent authority in its wisdom chooses to restrict the benefit to the clauses specified in the notification. It is not permissible for the High Court to go into the question whether castes are equatable and what caste the applicant belongs to. In the case of Milind (supra), the Supreme Court categorically stated thus:
The jurisdiction of the High Court would be much more restricted while dealing with the question whether a particular caste or tribe would come within the purview of the notified Presidential Order, considering the language of Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution these being the parameters and in the case in hand, the Committee conducting the inquiry as well as the Appellate Authority, having examined all relevant materials and having recorded a finding that respondent belong to Koshti caste and has no identity with the 'Halba' 'Halbi' which is a Scheduled Tribe under Entry 19 of the Presidential Order, relating to State of Maharashtra, the High Court exceeded its supervisory jurisdiction by making a roving and indepth examination of the materials afresh and in coming to the conclusion that 'Koshtis' could be treated as 'Halbas'. On the showing of the documents used by the respondent, he belongs to Koshti and there is no notification on record which includes Koshti as a Scheduled Tribe in the State of Maharashtra. The Government circular was issued on 15th June, 1995, which can hardly be of any help to the respondent. The Government notification would be effective prospectively and the respondent can hardly derive any benefit therefrom. Even otherwise, the respondent had made misrepresentation at the time of seeking employment and thus he cannot take any advantage of such a fact. It was argued on behalf of the respondent that the respondent had served for a considerable time, confirmed on 8th September, 1998, and his services were terminated on 25th August, 2004. The petitioner can hardly take any advantage of this argument as the investigation in terms of Clause 20 of the letter of appointment had started in the year 1995 itself and it took considerable time to complete the investigation. The respondent was put to notice and, in fact, he delayed the proceedings before the Scrutiny Committee as well as in the submission of documents. The delay in any case will not be of much consequence as the Supreme Court in the case of Bank of India v. Avinash D. Mandivikar and Ors. has stated that mere delay in making a reference does not invalidate the order of the Scrutiny Committee. In the case of R. Vishwanatha Pillai v. State of Kerala and Ors. , the Court further held as under.