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Analysis of this section shows that it consists of three parts. Under the first part, the trustee is competent to exercise the powers which have been conferred on him by the endower, thereby recognising the right of the trustee to manage the trust property according to the terms of the endowment. The second part lays down that "if any trustee is not found to be competent, then the Minister for Endow- ments may frame rules and regulations for the realisation of the objects of the endowment and for the better management of the same by which the trustee will be duly bound." Here again the management clearly remains with the trustee and he is only subjected to control by means of rules and regulations framed for the better management of the particular trust under the orders of the Minister for Endow- ments. Then comes the third part of the section which gives power in the alternative to the Minister for Endowments in case of incompetence of the trustee to appoint a Superintendent under the Rules. A Superintendent is defined in s. 2 as meaning a person appointed by Government for purposes of management. Thus the last part of s. 12 gives power to Government to appoint a Superintendent for purposes of management. This necessarily implies that on the appointment of a Superintendent to manage the endowed property under s. 12, the trustee is de- prived of the management of the property, and in effect is removed from trusteeship. This interpretation of the last part of s, 12 is supported by rules found under Chaps. XLIII, XLIV and XLV. Chapter XLIII deals with "Superintendence by Government", Chap. XLIV with "direct superintendence of Government" and Chap. XLV "'with munthazim (manager)." It may be added that in the definition in s. 2, the word "munthazim" has been translated' as "Superintendent" while in Chap. XLV that word has been translated as "manager". It is obvious that the Superintendent and the manager are the same thing. Rule 177 provides that if the Government takes over the endowed buildings under its superintendence, it shall have power to arrange for direct superintendence, or appoint any munthazim (Superintendent) or manage through any committee. Chapter XLIV then provides for direct superintendence by Government. Rule 182 in that Chapter shows that where direct superintendence is taken by Government the power of spending the recurring amounts as per the budget will be vested in the trustee in accordance with the powers possessed by him under these Rules and there is no removal of the trustee. It is only when a Superintendent is appointed under Chapter XLV that he has all the powers of a trustee mentioned in Chap. XXXI (see r. 187). The two orders of June 13 and 14, 1960, read together clearly show that even though they purport to be passed under r. 179, which refers to "direct superintendence by Government", the Government has gone further than provided in the rule when it decided to take over the management of the temple and vest the same in the Director of Endowments from June 14, 1960, with the result that the appellant has been deprived of the management and in effect removed from trusteeship. We presume that consequent on this a Superintendent would be appointed. The last part of s. 12 which provides for the appointment of a Superintendent under the rules in effect provides also for the deprivation of the trustee of his right of management and thus results in his removal. Now r. 67 deals with the removal of trustee and has laid down six conditions which would justify the removal of a trustee. The last of these conditions lays down that if any trustee is not fit for trusteeship due to some reason other than those contained in the first five conditions he would be removed from the post of trustee. But this removal can only take place if the matter is inquired into by a competent officer. Thus r. 67 contemplates that no trustee shall be removed from trusteeship unless an inquiry is held by a competent officer. This obviously means that the trustee will be given an opportunity to show cause why he should not be removed from trusteeship and it is only after a proper inquiry that a trustee can be removed from trusteeship. This provision is in consonance with the language of s. 12, where the words used are "if a trustee is not found to be competent". The use of the word "found" clearly shows that the legislature intended that action under the second and third part of the section would only be taken after a proper inquiry. Further, r. 68 provides that the power of removal of a trustee will lie vested in the Minister for Endowments. Thus after an inquiry has been made by a competent officer, it is only the Minister for Endowments, which in the present set-up means the Government, which can remove the trustee. We have already pointed out that we do not think it necessary in the present case to consider the question whether these provisions as to the removal of the trustee by Government can be upheld as constitutional. But assuming that these provisions are constitutional, the question that arises is whether the two orders passed on June 13 and 14, 1960, which must be read together and in effect amount to removal of the appellant from trusteeship can be justified under the Regulations and the Rules. Clearly these two orders have been passed by the Member, Board of Revenue while r. 68 contemplates that the trustee would be removed only by the Minister for Endowments, which in the present set-up, can only mean the Government. Further, r. 67 provides that a trustee cannot be removed from trusteeship unless an inquiry has been made by a competent officer. That means that notice has to be issued to the trustee to show cause why he should not be removed for reasons shown therein and it is only after an inquiry has been made and one of the six conditions provided in r. 67 is established that the trustee can be removed. In the present case no notice was ever issued to the appellant to show cause why he should not be removed from the trusteeship. It is true that in the notice dated December 31, 1957, it was stated that in case the appellant failed to respond to the notice (which was with respect to registration of the endowed property) the case would be completed taking the property under the Government's supervision and no more objection would be heard thereafter. The consequence of non-appearance to such a notice is to be found in s. 7 which provides that if no objection is filed the endowment would be registered and in s. 10(b) which deprives a person who does not appear to object in response to the notice of any right to file a suit as provided in s. 10(a). But there is nothing in r. 67 which gives power to the Government to remove a trustee simply because he fails to appear in reply to a noticed asking him to register the endowed property. The six conditions mentioned in r. 67 are : (i) insanity, (ii) contraction of a contagious disease of a certain type, (iii) conviction by a criminal court, (iv) going out of Hyderabad State without intimation for more than a month, (v) forsaking the religion with which the endowment is concerned, and (vi) unfitness for trusteeship due to some other reason. There is no provision therefore for removal of a trustee, merely because he has not appeared in answer to a notice under s. 6 of the Regulations for registration of the endowment. The orders therefore that were passed on June 13 and 14, 1960, which must be read together, cannot be justified under 'rr. 67 and 68, for the reasons that (i) no inquiry was held, (ii) the orders were not passed by the Minister of Endowments, i.e. the Government, and (iii) the removal in this case is for a reason which is not permissible therein. All that the Director of Endowments was entitled to do on the basis of the notice dated December 31, 1957, was to proceed to register the endowment, even if the appellant failed to appear in reply to that notice after making such inquiries as he thought proper and take such further action as may be justified by the other provisions of the Regulations. But on the basis of that notice it was not open to him to pass the orders which he did on June 13 and 14, 1960, which amounted to removal of the appellant from trusteeship and taking over of the management of the trust by the Government. These orders must therefore be set aside as ultra vires the Regulations and the Rules, assuming in the present case that the Regulations and the Rules providing for the removal of the trustee, are constitutional. We therefore dismiss the appeal with costs. The writ petition is allowed with costs and orders dated June 13 and 14, 1960, are hereby set aside.