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4. Section 93(1), Agra Tenancy Act, provides that every decree or order for ejectment shall be enforced in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, relating to the execution of decrees for delivery of immoveable property. Whether the landlord holds a decree against a tenant or an order for ejectment against the same he must go to the execution Court and obtain an order from that Court for the execution of the same. In short, to obtain possession the landlord must have an order from the execution Court for the execution of his decree or order for ejectment. Bearing in mind the provisions of Section 93(1), Agra Tenancy Act, it is clear that the construction placed upon Section 97(2), Agra Tenancy Act, by the defendants-respondents, is the correct one. The material date in that subjection is the date of the order for execution of the decree or the date of the order for execution of the order for ejectment. In Section 97 (2), Agra Tenancy Act, 1926 the phrase 'after the date of the order for execution' governs both the word 'decree' and the phrase 'order for ejectment'. If the section was intended to mean what the present appellants contend, it would have read 'after the date of the order for execution of the decree or of the date of the order for ejectment'. In my judgment the fact that the crops were sown without permission after the order for ejectment in this case was made does not in itself disentitle the defendants to these crops.

5. The appellants, however, contend that even if this be so they were still entitled to the crops by reason of the fact that they were actually sown without permission after the date of the order for the execution of the order of ejectment. The tenants admit that the crops were actually sown after 29fch November 1929 when the execution Court first ordered the execution of the order for ejectment, but they contend that that order of the execution Court was recalled or set aside and that thereafter no order for the execution of the order for ejectment was in existence. That being so, they contended that they were entitled to sow these crops without the appellants' consent and to gather them when they had grown and ripened.

7. In my judgment the execution of the order for ejectment was merely suspended in this case because of the respondent's application to review the original order for ejectment. The appellants were in no way responsible for the delay which was due entirely to the acts of the respondents. In Chhattar Singh v. Kamal Singh A.I.R. 1927 All. 16 a Full Bench of this Court consisting of four Judges held that where the execution of a decree has been suspended through no act or default of the decree-holder he has a right to ask the Court to revive and carry through the execution proceedings which have been suspended and this right can be exercised by means of a proper application to that effect made within three years of the date on which the right to make it accrued as such application would be one for which no period of limitation has been expressly provided and would, therefore, fall under Article 181 of the schedule to the Limitation Act. The law as amended in Section 15, Limitation Act, does not prohibit either expressly or by necessary implication the making of applications for revival which the Courts both before and since the commencement of the Limitation Act have treated as competent. In my judgment this Full Bench decision governs the present case. In the case under consideration the execution of the order for ejectment had been suspended through no act or default of the appellants and therefore they had a right to ask the Court to revive and carry through the execution proceedings which had been so suspended. They did ask the execution Court to revive the proceedings on 29th August 1930 and in pursuance of such an application the proceedings were revived and possession actually given to the appellants on the following day. In my judgment the order for the execution of the order for ejectment remained in existence from the date upon which it was passed, viz., 29th November 1929. It is true that its operation was stayed, but it was never recalled or set aside. The order for the execution of the order for ejectment which was carried into effect on 30th August 1929 was not a new order passed on 29th August 1930 but the original order passed by the execution Court on 29th November 1929.

8. The crops in question were therefore, in my view, sown after the date of the order for execution of the order for ejectment and as this was done without the written permission of the appellants the latter were entitled to the crops when possession was delivered to them. Had the old order for the execution of the order for ejectment been set aside and possession actually given on 30th August 1930 in pursuance of a new order for the execution of the order for ejectment, then the defendants would have been entitled to the crops which they had sown without permission before such new order for execution had been passed. As the old order for execution remained and was actually carried out the defendants had no right to the crops which they had sown without permission after the date of such order.