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(Underlining added)

7. When we see the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Head Master, Lawrence School, Lovedale (supra) alongwith Regulations 18 (ii) & 20 it is clear that a probationary employee unless specifically confirmed is deemed to be on probation i.e there will have to be a specific order of confirmation of probation and in the absence of any specific order of confirmation of probation merely because the period of three years of probation expires, it cannot be said that probationary employee‟s services are deemed to be confirmed after three years as per Regulation 20. At this stage, I may state that the expression "not" appearing in Regulation 18(ii) is actually a typing mistake and this expression should not have been there and which becomes clear from the immediately succeeding words of the said Regulation 18(ii). I accept the argument with respect to typing mistake in Regulation 18(ii) of the IFCI Staff Regulations, 1974 that the expression "not" should not exist, and as urged on behalf of respondent no.1. Since therefore petitioner has not filed or shown any order to this Court of actual confirmation after completion of period of probationary services of the petitioner, it is not possible for this Court to hold that petitioner was confirmed in his employment after completion of probationary period.

(ii) In my opinion, both the fresh arguments which are addressed for the first time by placing reliance upon the aforesaid two documents do not carry any weight for the very simple reason that it is an admitted position that confirmation of services of a probationary employee is only by a specific order of the Board of Directors of the respondent no.1 which is the competent authority to decide the confirmation of a probationary employee. Not only the petitioner has failed to file any confirmation order or any resolution passed by the Board of Directors with respect to his confirmation, counsel for the respondent no.1 states that no resolution in fact has been passed by the respondent no.1‟s Board of Directors for confirming the services of the petitioner‟s probationary term. Once it is only the Board of Directors which is the competent authority for confirmation of services of the petitioner‟s probationary employment, merely because house building advances and ESOP were given to the petitioner, would not make petitioner a confirmed employee. If I accept the argument of the petitioner, it means the authority other than the authority which is competent to confirm the services of a probationary employee will by giving of house loan advances or ESOP be able to substitute itself for the Board of Directors for confirming the services of probationary employee, and therefore this argument urged on behalf of the petitioner cannot be accepted. There are many reasons why the house building advances or ESOP may be given, and one of such can be of a mistake or secondly it may be as a special case as is specifically mentioned in the house building advance document filed before this Court, however, I need not venture any further into this aspect for the reason that I refuse to agree that issuance of documents by authorities other than the Board of Directors, which is the only competent authority, can lead to confirmation of services of a probationary employee. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the arguments urged on behalf of the petitioner of deemed confirmation in terms of para 7 of the appointment letter and Regulations 18 and 20, as also the arguments of being a permanent employee in view of the two additional documents filed in this Court today, are accordingly rejected.

"4. On 20th November 1995 the appellant was served with a letter informing him that his performance during the probationary period was "far from satisfactory" and that it had been observed that he lacked drive, imagination and initiative 'in the performance of his duties'. He was informed that, despite being told time and again to improve performance in the said areas, but with no effect. He was advised to improve "in order to enable us to consider your case for confirmation favourably". He was issued several such letters drawing his attention to the fact that his services left much to be desired. His probationary service came to be extended from time to time, the last such extension being granted till 9th April 1998. Finally, by the letter dated 7.4.1998 the petitioner was informed that his service was "unsatisfactory in the areas of drive, initiative, promptness and leadership" and that despite advised verbally and through letter, what were deficiencies in his work he had shown no improvement. His attendance, office work and attention to the academic work and the affairs of the guest house were also unsatisfactory. The first respondent, therefore, said "your performance, ability and capability during the period of probation has been examined and your service during the period of probation is found to be unsatisfactory and hence you are considered unsuitable for the post you have to. The governing body is of the view that your performance was unsatisfactory and you are not suitable for confirmation". For these reasons the appellant's probationary period was not extended on the expiration of his probation period on 9th April 1999.

10. Accordingly, there is no requirement of following the principles of natural justice before termination of services of a probationary employee such as the petitioner and nor the impugned order is stigmatic in nature. In any case, in order to help the petitioner so that his future prospects are not affected, I direct that the respondent no.1 should now issue the order of termination of services simplicitor without giving any reason, and which is of course, not in any manner a reflection on the stand of the respondent no.1. I may also state that the present is not a case where the charge against the petitioner is a foundation for his removal and the same is only a motive for removal of the petitioner inasmuch as I do not find any stand of the petitioner stating that the petitioner has been held guilty in terms of an enquiry conducted and therefore termination pursuant to enquiry amounts to foundation for removal and not a motive for removal. An employer is entitled to find out and take a prima facie view by considering of records, the issue of lapses in performance of an employee and which issue of performance including the issue of lapses is to decide nature of satisfactory services or otherwise of an employee in order to decide whether the probationary employee should or should not be confirmed after completion of probationary period. Accordingly, there is no requirement to follow the principles of natural justice in the facts of the present case before terminating the services of the petitioner.