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12. The next question for determination is whether the plaintiff and the defendant agreed in July, 1949, that, in the place of a conveyance, which under Exhibit A-1 the defendant had promised to execute, the defendant would execute a deed of release. A deed of release was actually executed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff.

13. The reason why a deed of release was executed instead of a conveyance is that one Sivarama Iyer, who had been a Revenue Inspector and who was a document writer, advised the parties that a release deed would be less expensive than a conveyance but would be equally effective and the parties accepted his advice. According to P.Ws. 1 and 2, Sivarama Iyer, gave that advice and all the five vendors including the defendant accepted the advice and agreed in July, 1949, to execute release deeds. Two of the five vendors executed the release deeds Exhibits A-3 and A-4 in August, 1949. P.W. 2 another of the vendors executed the release deed Exhibit A-5 in November, 1949. The fact that each of the vendors executed a release deed in the place of a conveyance renders the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 probable, namely, that before August, 1949, there had been an agreement between all the vendors on the one hand and the plaintiff on the other that release deeds should be executed in. the place of conveyance. The defendant denies that he agreed to execute a release deed. We accept the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 and hold that the defendant and" the four other vendors named in Exhibit A-1 agreed with the plaintiff in July, 1949, on the advice and in the presence of Sivarama Iyer, to execute release deeds in the place of conveyances.

48. The plaintiff's claim to have a conveyance executed is rested in the alternative on the agreement contained in Exhibit A-2. Exhibit A-2 (release deed) states:

the releasor hereby assures and declares....that whenever called upon by the releasee the releasor will do sign and execute all deeds and writings for better securing the estate.

The Proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act enables Exhibit A-2 to be received in evidence to prove the agreement. The plaintiff's learned Counsel in the lower Court appears unfortunately to have failed to tell the learned Subordinate Judge that a release deed would not be effective to transfer title. A release deed can only feed title but cannot transfer title. If, for example, the plaintiff claims that he has acquired title to the defendant's 1/6th share in the estate by adverse possession and the defendant contests that position, a release deed by the defendant would be effective to place beyond doubt the fact of the plaintiff having acquired title by adverse possession. If two persons claim title to the same property adversely to each other, a release deed by the one to the other may be effective to complete or place beyond doubt the latter's title to the property. But it is not the case here that the plaintiff and the defendant claimed the undivided 1/6th share in the estate, which is in suit, adversely to each other. Exhibit A-1 proceeds on the basis that the undivided 1/6th share belonged to the defendant to the exclusion of the plaintiff. It is true that the plaintiff himself owned another undivided 1/6th share and that, by transfers effected by the four other persons he became entitled to an undivided 5/6th share.. But yet except as purchaser he had no claim to make to the defendant's 1/6th share. Title to that share could hence be acquired only by a proper deed of conveyance or by adverse possession. The plaintiff had not acquired title by adverse possession when he instituted the suit. In order that title to the estate might be secured to him, it was necessary that he should have a proper deed of conveyance. Even if Exhibit A-2 had been registered, the plaintiff would need a deed of conveyance in order to become owner otherwise than by adverse possession. The expression " all deeds and writings for better securing the estate " cannot be limited to deeds or writing which were in the contemplation of the parties at the time of the execution of Exhibit A-2. Any deed or writing, which the plaintiff may subsequently find to be necessary in order to secure title, would, under that clause in Exhibit A-2 have to be executed by the defendant, provided the plaintiffs claim that such further document be executed was reasonable and the plaintiff offered to bear the expenses of the execution and registration of such document. Among the many reservations which Srinivasa Aiyangar, J., made in his exhaustive judgment if I may say so, in Valambalachi v. Duraiswami Pillai A.I.R. 1928 Mad. 344, is the following: