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The effect of the application of doctrine of frustration is to render the contract void as from the date of the supervening impossibility and to excuse its further performance. Strictly speaking, therefore, the doctrine of frustration is applicable to purely contractual obligations and cannot put an end to an estate in land which has already been created and has accrued in favour of a party. In London and Northern Eslates Co. v. Schlesinger, (1918) 1 KB 20, Lush J. observed as follows :

"It is not correct Bo speak of this tenancy agreement as a contract and nothing more. A term of years was created by it and vested in the appellant, and I can see no reason for saying that because this order disqualified him from personally residing in the flat, it affected the chattel interest which was vested in him by virtue of the agreement." These observations were referred to with approval by Lord Reading C. J. while delivering the judgment in Whitehall Court Ltd. v. Ettlinger, (1920) 1 KB 680, In that case two fiats which bad been let to a tenant for a term of three years from 1915 were requisitioned and taken possession of in 1917 by the military authorities under the Defence of Realm Regulations and this remained in the occupation of the military till the expiry of the lease in 1918. In a suitt brought by the landlord for recovery of the rent stipulated in the lease agreement for the period after the flats had been requisitioned and taken possession of by the military, the defence taken was that in view of the intervening circumstance of the property having been requisitioned and taken possession of by the military authorities, the agreement came to an end either because of the interruption of the "title paramount" or on account of the intervening event which made the further performance of the contract impossible.

Different views were, however, expressed as to the question whether the doctrine of frustration could apply to a lease. According to the views of Lord Russell of Killowen and Lord Goddard, the doctrine of frustration did not apply under any circumstances to a lease while Viscount Simon L. C. and Lord Wright left the matter open and felt that in rare and exceptional circumstances, the doctrine of frustration could be applicable. Lord Russell at page 233 of the report observed as follows:

"On the broader question I confess that I am unable to grasp how the doctrine of frustration can ever apply so as to put an end to a lease and the respective liabilities of landlord and tenant thereunder. A lease is much more than a contract. 1C creates and vests in the lessee an estate or interest in the land. " When a contract is frustrated it is because what is called the 'venture' or 'undertaking in which the parties have contracted to engage can no longer be carried out. The Court in such circumstances declares the contract to be, or creates it as being, no longer binding on the parties. That is an end of the matter. But when a lease is in question, and has been granted by one to another, it is the lease which is the 'Venture' or "undertaking" upon which the parties have embarked. The contractual obligations thereunder of each party are merely obligations which are incidental to the relationship of landlord and tenant created by the demise, * It may well be that circumstances may arise during the currency of the term which render it difficult, or even impossible, for one party or the other to carry out some of its obligations. " The estate in the land would still be vested in the tenant. I know of no power in the Court to declare a lease to be at an end except upon findings that some event has occurred on the happening of which the lease terminates by reason of some express provision contained in the document."

Lord Goddard, similarly after referring to the doctrine of frustration and the three English cases mentioned above, observed as follows :

"It is now sought to apply this doctrine of frustration to a lease because circumstances Have arisen and restrictions have been imposed, which while not divesting the tenant of his interest do prevent him from putting the land to the use intended both by him and the landlord. Now whatever be the true ground on which the doctrine is based it is certain that it applies only where the foundation of the contract is destroyed so that performance or further performance is no longer possible. In the case of a lease the foundation of the agreement in my opinion is that the landlord parts with his interest in the demised property for a term of years which thereupon becomes vested in the tenant, in return for a rent. So long as the interest remains in the tenant there is no frustration though particular use may be-prevented."

9. It is, however, clear from the observations reproduced above that where a contract creates an estate in land, the rule of frustration is inapplicable to put an end to such an estate which has already been created in favour of one of the parties and that the doctrine of frustration is applicable only to purely contractual obligations. As was pointed out by Lord Russell and Lord Goddard in Cricklewood's case 1945 AC 221, if the doctrine of frustration were to apply even to contracts which create an estate in land, there is likelihood of unjust results though, to use the well-known words of Lord Sumner in Hirji Mulji v. Cheong Yue Steamship Co. Ltd., 1926 AC 497 at p. 510, the doctrine is "a device, by which the rules as to absolute contracts are reconciled with a special exception which justice demands". The exceptional and rare cases referred to by the other two learned Lords, are really covered to a great extent, so far as Indian law is concerned, by the limited provisions contained in clause (e) of Sec. 108 of the Transfer of Property Act which runs as follows :