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We find no basis for the contention of the appellant that there was a reasonable apprehension in his mind that the Enquiry Officer was prejudiced against him. Nor do we agree with the statement that the Enquiry Officer combined in himself the role of the prosecutor and the judge. It appears that when the preliminary report of investigation was considered by the Vigilance Commissioner with a view to recommend to the disciplinary authority whether a disciplinary proceeding should be instituted or not, the report of investigation was referred by the Vigilance Commissioner to Shri A.N. Mukherji for his views and for the preparation of draft charges if institution of disciplinary proceedings was to be recommended. Shri Mukherji expressed his opinion that there was material for framing five charges and he also prepared five draft charges and forwarded them to the Vigilance Commissioner. The Vigilance Commissioner in turn forwarded the papers to the Government who finally decided to institute a disciplinary proceeding against the appellant. Thereafter Shri A. N. Mukherji was appointed as Enquiry Officer. From the circumstance that Shri Mukherji considered the report of investigation with a view to find out if there was material for framing charges and prepared draft charges, it cannot possibly be said that Shri A. N. Mukherji, when he was later appointed as Enquiry Officer constituted himself both as prosecutor and judge. Anybody who is familiar with the working of criminal courts will at once realise that there is nothing strange in the same Magistrate who finds a prima facie case and frames the charges, trying the case also. It cannot for a moment be argued that the Magistrate having found a prima facie case at an earlier stage and framed charges is incompetent to try the case, after framing charges. This was one of the circumstances on which the appellant relied to substantiate his allegation of apprehension of bias. The other circumstances were that he did not permit the appellant to engage a lawyer and that he allowed the Presenting Officer to introduce extraneous matters. The rules give a discretion to the Enquiry Officer to permit or not to permit a delinquent Officer to be represented by a lawyer. In the present case the appellant cross-examined the prosecution witnesses and also examined defence witnesses. Thereafter when the matter was posted for arguments and was adjourned atleast once at the instance of the appellant, the appellant came forward with an application seeking permission to engage a lawyer. The Enquiry Officer rejected the application noticing that it was made at a very belated stage. We think he was right in doing so. Nor is it possible for us to infer bias from the circumstance that the Enquiry Officer did not allow the appellant to engage a lawyer. We may mention that the appellant who himself presented his case before us argued admirably and with such clarity and precision as would have done credit to the best of advocates. We cannot conceive of any prejudice resulting to him by the denial of a lawyer. The other circumstance regarding extraneous matters being allowed to be brought in is also equally weightless and we need say nothing more about it.