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Showing contexts for: penal code sec.504 in Amit Behal And Ors vs State Of Himachal Pradesh And Anr on 4 April, 2025Matching Fragments
24. The informant stated that petitioner No.4 used to abuse and harass her. She has not mentioned the abuses given by petitioner No.4. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vikram Johar v. State of U.P., (2019) 14 SCC 207: (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 795: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 609 that mere abuse is not sufficient to attract Section 504 of IPC. It was observed at page 217: -
21. Section 504 IPC came up for consideration before this Court in Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra [Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 44: (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 715]. In the said case, this Court had the occasion to examine the ingredients of Section 504 IPC, which need to be present before proceeding to try a case. The Court held that in the said case, the order issuing process was challenged by filing a criminal revision. This Court held that at the complaint stage, the Magistrate is merely concerned with the allegations made out in the complaint and has only to prima facie satisfy whether there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused. In para 11, the following principles have been laid down: (SCC pp. 48-49) "11. We are, in this case, concerned only with the question as to whether, on a reading of the complaint, a prima facie case has been made out or not to issue process by the Magistrate. The law as regards the issuance of process in criminal cases is well settled. At the complaint stage, the Magistrate is merely Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:9270 ) concerned with the allegations made out in the complaint and has only to prima facie satisfy whether there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused, and it is not the province of the Magistrate to enquire into a detailed discussion on the merits or demerits of the case. The scope of enquiry under Section 202 is extremely limited in the sense that the Magistrate, at this stage, is expected to examine prima facie the truth or falsehood of the allegations made in the complaint. The Magistrate is not expected to embark upon a detailed discussion of the merits or demerits of the case, but only consider the inherent probabilities apparent on the statement made in the complaint. In Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi [Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi, (1976) 3 SCC 736: 1976 SCC (Cri) 507], this Court held that once the Magistrate has exercised his discretion in forming an opinion that there is ground for proceeding, it is not for the Higher Courts to substitute its own discretion for that of the Magistrate. The Magistrate has to decide the question purely from the point of view of the complaint, without at all adverting to any defence that the accused may have."
21. Further, this Court in the case of Mohammad Wajid v. State of U.P. 2023 SCC Online SC 951, while discussing Section 504, IPC, propounded the test for considering the circumstances wherein, an abusive language takes the form and shape of an intentional insult and held thus: --
"28. Section 504 of the IPC contemplates intentionally insulting a person and thereby provoking such person insulted to breach the peace or intentionally insulting a person knowing it to be likely that the person insulted may be provoked so as to cause a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. Mere abuse may not come within the purview of the section. But, the words of abuse in a Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:9270 ) particular case might amount to an intentional insult provoking the person insulted to commit a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. If abusive language is used intentionally and is of such a nature as would in the ordinary course of events lead the person insulted to break the peace or to commit an offence under the law, the case is not taken away from the purview of the Section merely because the insulted person did not actually break the peace or commit any offence having exercised self- control or having been subjected to abject terror by the offender. In judging whether particular abusive language is attracted by Section 504, IPC, the court has to find out what, in the ordinary circumstances, would be the effect of the abusive language used and not what the complainant actually did as a result of his peculiar idiosyncrasy or cool temperament or sense of discipline. It is the ordinary general nature of the abusive language that is the test for considering whether the abusive language is an intentional insult likely to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace and not the particular conduct or temperament of the complainant.
22. Needless to say, that mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence does not amount to an intentional insult within the meaning of Section 504, IPC. Furthermore, it would be immaterial that the person who has been insulted and Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:9270 ) provoked did not actually break the peace or commit any offence.
23. Section 504, IPC consists of two parts. Firstly, the actus reus- being the intentional insult which gives rise to the provocation. Secondly, the mens rea, i.e., the intention or knowledge on the part of the accused that such intentional provocation is likely to cause the person insulted to break public peace or commit any other offence. The animus nocendi in Section 504, IPC is that the accused should 'intentionally insult' the other person with the intention or knowledge that the provocation caused by such insult is likely to result in the commission of breach of public peace or any other offence by the person who has been so insulted. The offence is said to be complete once the accused person makes 'intentional insult' with the aforesaid mens rea. Hence, intention or knowledge on the part of accused person that his actions of making 'intentional insult' have the potential to provoke the person insulted is sine qua non for the commission of the offence under Section 504, IPC.
24. The natural corollary of the above discussion is that if the accused does not intend to give provocation, the offence is not made out. An insult without an 'intention to insult' is not punishable under Section 504, IPC. Further, 'intentional insult' must be of such a degree that it has the potential to provoke a reasonable person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence.
25. It is trite that whether the person provoked further commits an illegal act or not is immaterial to draw the conclusion of culpability under Section 504, IPC. The 'intentional insult' and provocation must be so proximate and close that the accused has either the intention or the knowledge that the intentional insult made by him is likely to cause the provoked person to break public peace or commit some other offence. However, what would be the nature of 'intentional insult' causing provocation, to draw culpability under Section 504, IPC would depend upon the Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:9270 ) facts and circumstances of each case. The test to be applied to determine if the intentional insult made by the accused is sufficient to cause provocation is that of a reasonable person, i.e., if the insult is sufficient to provoke any reasonable person to break peace or commit any other offence, only then the accused will be liable for the offence under Section 504, IPC."