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3. The defendants have now appealed to this Court and have pressed us to hold that as the suit has been tried in a manner unknown to law, the decree made by the Subordinate Judge should be vacated. We have invited the learned and experienced vakil for the plaintiff-respondent to explain to us under what provisions of the law the Subordinate Judge determined on the 12th April, 1923 that the defendants should be denied an opportuntiy to defend the suit. The case clearly does not fall within the scope of Order 11, Rule 21, which authorises the trial Court to strike off the defence, when the defendant is in default; for instance, where the defendant has failed to comply with an order to answer interrogatories or for discovery or inspection of documents. It is further clear that the order could not have been made under Order 9 rules 6 and 7. Order 9, Rule 6 provides that where the plaintiff appears and the defendant does not appear when the suit is called on for hearing, if it is proved that the summons was duly served, the Court may proceed ex parte. Rule 7 provides that where the Court has adjourned the hearing of the suit ex parte, and the defendant, at or before such hearing, appears and assigns good cause for his previous non-appearance, he may, upon such terms as the Court directs as to costs or otherwise, be heard in answer to the suit as if he had appeared on the day fixed for his appearance. It is manifest that the case before us does not fall within the scope of Order 9. Rule 6. The plaintiff did not appear on the 12th April and was not in a position to conduct the case. He was absent and he prayed for time in order that he might bring his witnesses. Consequently, the Court could not proceed ex parte under Order 9, Rule 6, though the Court might have dismissed the suit under Order 9, Rule 3. It follows as a corollary that Rule 7 has no application to the circumstances of this case. Nor could action be taken under Order 16, Rule 20. We are of opinion that the Subordinate Judge was entirely wrong when on the 12th April 1923 he determined that the defendants should have no opportunity to defend the suit. He had no statutory authority to take such a disciplinary measure as to strike out the defence and there is no question of exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court: Vasudevan v. Sankaran [1911] 22 M.L.J. 60. We may add that we have carefully examined the order sheet and we are at a loss to find any justification for the action taken by the Subordinate Judge as regards the defendants. The method adopted by him may lead to the speedy disposal of cases, but cannot possibly promote that administration of justice for which alone Courts exist. It is an elementary principle of law, as was observed by Brett, J., in Sato Koer v. Gopal Sahu [1907] 34 Cal. 929 that no order should be passed against a person without allowing him reasonable opportunity to be heard and to adduce evidence in his defence. A similar view was emphasised in Ajant Singh v. Sundar Mal [1912] 17 C.W.N. 862, where it was pointed out that the rule is of universal application, founded upon the plainest principles of justice, that no one should be condemned, punished or deprived of his property in a judicial proceeding unless he has had fair opportunity to be heard. This was supported by reference to Bagg's Case 11 Cob. 93; Re. Hammers Smith Bent Charge [1849] 4 Ex. 87; R. v. Saddlers [1863] 10 H.L.C. 404; Smith v. R. [1878] 3 A.C. 614; and Balabai v. Ganesh [1902] 27 Bom. 162.