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39. I may note that the decision in Dharam Prakash (supra), Bharat Heavy Electricals (supra) and Unipack (supra) do not take note of Section 14 of the Act and can not be treated as precedent so far as interpretation of Section 14 of the Act is concerned.

40. Section 12 of the Act casts a duty on the Arbitrator to disclose in writing at the outset, such facts which may give rise to justifiable doubts as to his independence or impartially. This obligation continues throughout the arbitral proceedings i.e. whenever such facts come into being during the arbitral proceedings. Therefore, what the law stipulates as a disqualification to become or remain an Arbitrator in a given dispute, is not the existence of actual bias, but the existence of such facts and circumstances as are ?likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his independence and impartiality?. An Arbitrator may be challenged only on limited grounds i.e. if circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to his independence or impartiality or that he does not possess the qualifications agreed to by the parties. Even this challenge is limited only to such cases where the party raising the challenge who has participated in the appointment of the Arbitrator becomes aware of the grounds on which the challenge is made after the Arbitrator has been appointed. Therefore, if a party was aware of such facts and circumstances at the time of participating in the process of appointment of the Arbitrator as would otherwise be considered good enough to give rise to justifiable doubts as to the independence or impartiality of the Arbitrator, that party is dis-entitled from challenging the Arbitrator on the same ground. Moreover, the challenge is required to be made within 15 days of the party learning of the relevant circumstances. If the challenge is not made in a timely manner, the same may fail as having being condoned and waived on the ground of his acquiescence in the holding of further proceedings.

58. On the contrary, decisions in Indira Rai and Anr v. Vatika Plantations (P) Ltd and Ors. and Shyam Telecom Ltd. v. Arm Ltd. 113(2004) DLT 778 of this Court and the decision in State of Arunachal Pradesh v. Subhash Projects and Marketing Ltd and Anr. 2007(1) ALR 564(Gau) (DB) are based on the premise that Section 14 so permits judicial intervention.

59. In State of Arunachal (supra) the Division Bench of Gauhati High Court have observed:

31. The legislative concern manifested in Section 12 requiring a prospective arbitrator to disclose any circumstance likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his independence and impartiality is of utmost significance. This coupled with the obligation of the appointed arbitrator to make such disclosure even during the arbitral proceedings proclaim the unambiguous legislative disapproval of the appointment or continuance of a person against whom circumstances exist giving rise to justifiable doubts as to his independence or impartiality. The lawmakers, while casting the said duty and permitting a challenge to the independence or impartiality of an arbitrator, recognized neutrality and fairness to be the hallmark of an arbitral tribunal absence whereof, would vitiate the proceedings striking at the validity, authenticity and the bona fide thereof.

62. Gauhati High Court in State of Arunachal Pradesh (supra) also considered the effect of the provisions of Section 13 on the scope of Section 14 and observed:

It is incomprehensible that in a given fact situation exhibiting justifiable doubts about the independence and impartiality of the arbitrator his mandate would continue and the challenge to his authority would have to wait till the completion of the process only because the party aggrieved had failed to act in terms of Section 13(2) within the period prescribed. It is not unlikely that in such an eventuality, irreversible consequences may follow, a situation neither statutorily conceived nor countenanced. Understandably, such a view cannot enjoy judicial imprimatur as well. We, therefore, hold that a party who had either abstained from or omitted to raise a challenge to the independence or impartiality of an arbitrator under Section 13(2) of the Act would not be debarred from invoking Section 14 contending that the arbitrator had become de jure unable to perform his functions. Independence and impartiality of an arbitrator being inseverable attributes to vest him with the legal authority to adjudicate the difference between the parties in an arbitration exercise, he would be de jure disqualified from discharging his functions once he renounces the above qualities. This according to us is the mandate of Sections 12, 13, 14 which form a complete scheme with the underlying objective of securing the sanctity and probity of an arbitration proceeding.? 63. However in para 35 of the judgment it was observed:

75. In my view both factors, viz. the non-disclosure in the very first instance of relevant circumstances by respondent No.2 and the subsequent disclosures made in Installments before and after the filing of the present petitions, as well as the personal knowledge and association of respondent No.2 with the principal contract give rise to justifiable doubts about his independence and impartiality insofar as the arbitration under the two contracts in question between the parties herein are concerned. Consequently, respondent No.2 has become de jure unable to perform his functions as an arbitrator, since his independence and impartiality is in justifiable doubt. His mandate as an Arbitrator accordingly stands terminated in both the Arbitrations in question. 76. Reverting now to the second contention of the petitioner, which pertains to OMP No.7/2006 only, that the arbitrator has failed to act within a reasonable time and there has been undue delay and therefore his mandate stands terminated, I find that the Arbitrator was appointed on 25.8.2003 and he entered into reference on 27.8.2003. Thereafter the petitioner sought the declaration under Section 12 from him. The Arbitrator replied to the said letter on 23.9.2003. However, no effort or progress was made so far as arbitration proceedings are concerned until 21.1.2005 when the Arbitrator called upon the petitioner to file its statement of claim. This to my mind was an unreasonable and lax approach on the part of the second respondent. I see no force in the contention of the respondent that since the said ground was not pleaded in the petition as originally filed and was introduced by way of an amendment at a later stage, it needs to be rejected. When an amendment is allowed by the Court, unless the claim introduced by the amendment is time barred, it relates back to the date of the filing of the original petition and delayed introduction of the claim by itself is not a ground for rejecting a claim which may otherwise be tenable in law and in facts of the case.